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A b s t r a c t
An area of e-commerce that is very much an active area of research is that 
of using an individual’s preferences to enhance search. The development of this 
research area, and the model used to produce all existing methods, has an implicit 
assumption that the vendor to whom the consumer is releasing their preference 
information is trustworthy. This assumption results in two major issues: the 
certainty of privacy loss, and the potential for exploitation.
Motivated by a wide ranging investigation into the concept and history of pri­
vacy and the methods used to protect it, along with the conclusion drawn from 
this investigation that the previously used methods of privacy protection via legal 
means can no longer keep pace with technological evolution, this thesis presents 
an alternative approach to searching with a consumer’s preferences that enables 
the main goal of preference searching whilst also minimising privacy loss and the 
potential for exploitation.
A proof of concept implementation of this approach, called “Gradual Partial 
Release” , is presented. Essentially, its aim is to minimise privacy loss and ex­
ploitation by splitting a consumer’s preferences up into multiple subsets of these 
preferences partial release -  to be released one at a time to the vendor -  gradual 
release -  until sufficient results are returned.
Three different Gradual Partial Release algorithms, that split up preferences 
into subsets in different ways, are presented, along with measures enabling quan­
titative measurement of privacy loss and exploitation to allow evaluation of their 
effectiveness.
An evaluation was performed of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Gradual 
Partial Release algorithms, comparing the effectiveness (in terms of minimising of 
privacy loss and exploitation) of each algorithm and to the current approach to 
preference searching. Experiments show that the proposed Gradual Partial Release 
approach enables the basic idea of preferences searching whilst simultaneously 
offering the possibility of reduced privacy loss and reduced exploitation.
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C h a p t e r  1
In t r o d u c t i o n
The dawning of the information age has brought about a world where infor­
mation itself is valuable: possession of intellectual, personal, social, and economic 
information about oneself can create opportunities for an individual and provide 
them with social and economic advantages. On the other hand, it has enabled a 
world where an individual can unwittingly lose control of this valuable information 
while trying to take advantage of new technologies born of the age. This loss of 
control and possession of personal information represents both an abstract loss of 
privacy and a concrete loss of valuable information.
One specific aspect of the information age is e-commerce; this is an aspect con­
taining many prime examples of new technologies that manifest privacy-related 
issues to participating individuals. These issues have had a major effect on e- 
commerce: it is a virtually indisputable fact that concerns about privacy in the 
current climate of e-commerce are limiting its acceptance and usage by the public 
by a notable amount [48, 66, 85, 92, 97, 136, 180, 181]. Worryingly, the future 
seems destined to produce even greater possibilities for such invasions of individ­
ual privacy, and in a much less obvious and more insidious way than ever before. 
Given that current privacy concerns are already hampering the current growth 
of e-commerce, future privacy violations can only further intensify public disquiet 
and further impede the growth of e-commerce. Thus, to help maximise the future 
growth of e-commerce, considerable diligence is needed from the research com­
munity in identifying such privacy issues with new technologies -  both existing 
and forthcoming -  and to work to minimise and alleviate these concerns. Indeed, 
influential companies such as IBM and Microsoft have recently supported this 
view [91, 118].
One area of e-commerce technology is the area of information filtering and
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retrieval. This area is one that has remained somewhat stagnant since its inception: 
most e-commerce websites still only provide a simple binary keyword search option 
to help individuals to locate items that they desire to purchase. The consumer 
would typically interact with such a website by declaring their search terms in a 
carefully structured, and very limited, way. This information would be sent to a 
vendor and turned into a query to search their stock database; the list of results 
matching the query is then returned to the consumer.
Two particular shortcomings associated with such binary keyword based infor­
mation filtering and retrieval techniques are the related and equally undesirable 
problems of information overload and empty result sets. Information overload is 
the problem of large amounts of results being returned due to too broad a search 
being submitted, many of which are likely to be substandard, while empty result 
sets are the opposite problem of no results being returned due to too specific a 
search being submitted. Both are equally undesirable from a usability perspective 
as they are likely to frustrate consumers, potentially resulting in a consumer giving 
up after a few failed search attempts.
To overcome these shortcomings, improved search techniques are being devel­
oped with an emphasis that is shifting away from the simple paradigm described 
above and edging towards advanced interfacing between business and customer (for 
example, using personalisation [23]). Such advanced techniques work by making 
use of a consumer’s personal preferences for searching: the consumer’s preferences 
are used by the vendor to assist with the evaluation of database queries by helping 
target search results towards these preferences. For example, instead of a consumer 
issuing a search for a used car with strict binary search terms equating to “Make 
is BMW; Colour is Black” -  which may return no results due to its exact-match 
specificity -  a consumer could instead issue a query that equates to “I’d like a 
BMW or a Mercedes; I like Black, but Silver would be okay”.
All work developed thus far in this area is based upon what we have called the 
“complete release” paradigm. This assumes that the consumer’s preferences are 
to be sent in full to the vendor, who will subsequently analyse the preferences, 
perform the necessary calculations, and return the best matching results from 
their stock database. An assumption implicit to this paradigm is that the vendor 
is entirely trustworthy in the handling of these preferences. In practice, however, 
the main goal of most business is to turn as large a profit as possible, so if an 
opportunity to increase profit presents itself then this assumption can no longer 
definitely hold to be valid. Thus, the paradigm can be shown to present two main
2
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problems, both related to the issue of trust:
o Firstly, there are some obvious inherent privacy implications. In order to 
take advantage of these newly designed search technologies, a consumer has 
to release the entirety of their preference information (personal information 
about their likes and dislikes) to an entity that they generally would -  and 
should -  have no good reason to trust. The issue here is fairly simple - con­
sumers have a right to keep the information about their preferences private 
if they so wish, but in order to use the enhanced search technologies they 
have to give up this right.
o Secondly, there is a potential problem of exploitability. Given a hypothetical 
world where we assume a consumer has correctly expressed all of their pref­
erences and passed them across to a vendor, and that the vendor is purely 
interested in maximising the possibility of making a sale to that individual, 
then the new technology will indeed achieve what it is designed to achieve 
-  blindly maximising the quality of the search results for its customers. If 
we assume that the vendor is not trustworthy, however, we can easily foresee 
the possibility that they could instead use the information gifted to them 
by the consumer to maximise many things other than simply the quality of 
results returned to the participating individual. The most obvious of these 
possibilities is simply maximising profit.
Due to these issues of privacy loss and the potential for exploitation inherent 
in the currently proposed approach to preference-enhanced search techniques, a 
new consumer-centric approach is needed to address these issues and add to the 
arsenal of tools available to the privacy-conscious consumer.
1.1 P r o b l e m  S t a t e m e n t
The problem inherent with the current preference-enhanced search techniques is 
that they release all of a consumer’s preference information to a vendor. Therefore, 
to avoid a loss of privacy and a potential for exploitation, it is clear that a new 
consumer-centric approach should consider how the release of preference informa­
tion to the vendor may be “disguised” and “controlled” in such a way that the 
preference is largely kept private yet the benefits of preference-enhanced search are 
still seen by the consumer.
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In this thesis, we investigate the issue of how to control the release of preference 
information to a vendor. Our hypothesis is this: by suitably partitioning preference 
information and gradually releasing them to a vendor, we can develop a preference 
search method that is more effective than existing techniques in terms of privacy 
loss, potential exploitation, and search utility. That is, we will be able to enable the 
retrieval of a set of items that must closely match the consumer’s preferences while 
measurably minimising the amount of preferences released and the exploitation 
that could have occurred using existing techniques.
1.2  M a jo r  C o n t r ib u t io n s
The overriding contribution of this thesis is a new approach to enabling preference- 
enhanced searching that does not require participating consumers to release all of 
their private preference information at once; simultaneously reducing their privacy 
loss and the possibility for exploitation. The new approach resulted in a basic 
framework that allows the gradual partial release of a consumer’s preferences -  
aiming to gradually send a certain fraction of the consumer’s full preferences to 
the vendor. This framework, implemented as a proof of concept, is shown to 
successfully enable the goal of preference-enhanced searching while also minimising 
individual privacy loss and the possibility of exploitation of these preferences.
More specifically, this thesis makes the following contributions:
o A comprehensive analysis of the concept of privacy and historical develop­
ment of its protection; and how this has affected the world of e-commerce;
o Methods designed to measure privacy loss and exploitation in the context of 
user preferences and search;
o A new method of preference-enhanced searching called “Gradual Partial Re­
lease” (GPR) that aims to gradually send a subset of the consumer’s pref­
erences to the vendor, enabling preference searching while simultaneously 
minimising privacy loss and exploitation of these preferences;
Looking from a broader perspective, these contributions have two intended con­
sequences. The first, and most obvious, is that the beginnings of a new tool for 
the privacy-conscious individual has been created that could be useful in their ev­
eryday dealings with the world of e-commerce. Secondly, it is demonstrated that,
4
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with some additional effort, it can be possible to design new e-commerce technolo­
gies and techniques with a more consumer-centric viewpoint. It is hoped that this 
effort may lead to e-commerce technologies that may be developed in the future 
to follow a more privacy-friendly path.
1 .3  T h esis S t r u c t u r e
The remainder of this thesis consists of the following:
Chapter 2 explores the history and development of privacy throughout the ages, 
concentrating on how developing technologies have affected this history. This 
information provides a solid understanding of the current world of privacy, 
giving a solid context within which to place the work of this thesis.
Chapter 3 examines existing technologies and techniques that have been created 
and designed for privacy protection in the world of e-commerce, discussing 
their core concepts and commenting on their effectiveness. It also examines 
existing work in the area of the use of preferences in order to enhance search 
techniques. Together, this gives us an understanding of where the work of 
this thesis fits in amongst other relevant work.
Chapter 4 discusses in detail the problem this thesis deals with. It examines the 
development of search techniques into preference-enhanced searching, looks 
at the current “complete release” approach used to enable this, and demon­
strates the problems that this approach exhibits. A detailed model and scope 
of the problem is developed, allowing the problem to be precisely understood, 
thus enabling potential solutions. A new model is then introduced that aims 
to help mitigate against these issues.
Chapter 5 details the new model, called “Gradual Partial Release” (GPR). A set 
of measures designed to allow evaluation of the effectiveness of GPR is next 
introduced. The full detail of the GPR approach is then presented, including 
some algorithms that implement GPR in different ways.
Chapter 6 presents an evaluation of the GPR approach and algorithms as imple­
mented in the form of a proof of concept system. The experimental setup 
is discussed, along with the methodology used to evaluate the system. The 
evaluation itself considers the effectiveness of the proposed GPR algorithms 
and compares them to the existing approach.
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Chapter 7 summarises the findings from previous chapters, drawing some con­
clusions, and providing some suggestions as to what the next steps of work 
should be.
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C h a p t e r  2
P r i v a c y : C o n c e p t  a n d  
D e v e l o p m e n t
Privacy is a core theme of this thesis; and an idea fundamental to the work of 
this thesis is the idea that individual privacy is something that is worth protecting 
wherever possible. It would, however, be remiss to simply assume that this is 
indeed true; therefore, an examination of the very idea of privacy is necessary. 
Several obvious relevant questions that need answering quickly present themselves: 
What exactly is privacy? Why is it important? Where did the idea start and 
how has it changed throughout its lifetime? How has technology influenced these 
changes? This chapter aims to answer these questions, and more; giving a solid 
foundation on which the remainder of this thesis is built.
2 .1  T h e  N a t u r e  o f  P r iv a c y
Privacy, as a concept, is highly interesting. Perhaps its most striking feature is 
the fact that nobody seems able to agree upon what it actually is. The “right to 
privacy” has inspired considerable debate in many fields of thinking: including the 
areas of law, philosophy, sociology, politics, and more recently, computer science. 
This debate is fascinating, complex, and at times rather surprising. Furthermore, 
how this right to privacy fares in the context of the world of e-commerce is an 
even more contentious issue. Thus, our first stop in our journey of understanding 
privacy will be in this neighbourhood of the nature of privacy.
At first glance, the idea of privacy seems fairly intuitive. When pressed upon to 
elucidate this idea of privacy in a clear-cut all-encompassing definition and defence 
of privacy, however, people consistently flounder. Thus, debate about this most
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impalpable of human values has raged throughout recorded history. These debates 
became prominent in the philosophy/sociology literature in the latter half of the 
20th century: Benn and Gaus’ anthology [18], Schoeman’s anthology [153], and 
Weintraub and Kumar’s anthology [176] have collected many of the important 
arguments presented throughout these decades.
The most rudimentary area of this debate is one which is concerned with the 
defence of privacy: why is privacy important, and what does retaining privacy 
bring to an individual? Many theorists have produced defences of privacy that 
state that privacy is a highly important human value necessary for many aspects 
of an individual’s moral and social being, such as: privacy being a requirement 
of the ability to develop diverse and meaningful relationships [68, 139]; privacy 
being a basic aspect of individual personality and integrity [68]; privacy being a 
requirement for human dignity and retaining one’s uniqueness and autonomy [19]; 
and privacy being a necessary prerequisite for intimacy [71].
Another area of debate -  probably the most fundamental and essential of areas 
-  is the definition of privacy. The fact is that nobody has yet produced a single 
agreed-upon definition for the right to privacy -  and this is not at all surprising 
since an individual’s conception of privacy is based partly upon their society’s 
general conception of privacy [59, 178, 179] and partly upon their own life’s expe­
riences and general social attitudes. Despite this difficulty, many people have, of 
course, attempted to produce all-encompassing definitions of “privacy” . Schoeman 
noted that they all fall into three main categories [153]:
(a) The right an individual has in being able to control access to personal infor­
mation about themselves;
(b) The measure of control an individual has over information about themselves, 
or who has sensory access to them;
(c) The state of limited access to an individual and their personal information.
Each of the three proposed categories of definitions has properties that are 
pleasing in the attempt to produce a single unified definition of privacy, however, 
they each contain some major problems. The first category is simply a statement 
about privacy that assumes that privacy is a morally significant human value and 
therefore something sacred tha t should be protected, but does not say why this 
should be the case, and indeed does not define what privacy actually is. The second 
category’s critics argue that counter-examples can easily be created that disprove
2.1 T h e  N a t u r e  o f  P r i v a c y
the definition (although its proponents refute this claiming that such examples 
are not realistic and to produce them “would be to engage in irony” [68]). The 
third category inherently poses the question as to whether privacy is desirable, 
and to what extent. It also raises further questions about the difference between 
privacy itself and the right to privacy -  examples where one can be said to have 
lost privacy but not had one’s right to privacy violated (and the converse) are 
easily constructed.
More recently, theorists have argued that the reason that no-one has yet pro­
duced a single unified concept of privacy is that privacy is far too complex to 
actually capture in a single (relatively) simple definition -  therefore it should in­
stead be treated as a collection of related concepts. Benn and Gaus, for example, 
suggest that privacy is a wide-ranging social concept that shapes how an individual 
sees and interacts with society [18]. Many studies have been carried out investi­
gating the cultural relativity of privacy: most social theorists claim that privacy 
is (in some way) recognised and institutionalised in all societies (e.g. [123, 179]), 
with only a few notable exceptions (e.g. [10]).
The attempt to define privacy has further been complicated with the transition 
from the industrial society to the technological society through to the information 
society. In the information society, an individual’s concept of self is expanded into 
provinces additional to the traditional: it gets expressed through, and is affected 
by, technology and the projection of one’s identity to additionally include one’s 
online identity. This addition of a component that exists in a totally different 
kind of space shifts and blurs the public/private boundary, making an attempt to 
define privacy even more difficult than ever before. Thus, increasing numbers of 
theorists have started to subscribe to the view that privacy is in fact a collection 
of concepts rather than one specific concept.
Not all theorists, on the other hand, have views that are complementary to the 
idea of privacy. Some of the most common arguments against privacy are those 
such as the view put forward by Prosser and Thomson who hold that privacy is 
non-distinctive - there is no “right to privacy” [138, 160]. They argue that while 
privacy is important, thinking of privacy as something special is unproductive, 
as any interest that could be categorised as a privacy interest could be equally 
well explained and better protected by considering other interests or rights, such 
as property rights and the right to bodily security. This view is not actually 
‘anti-privacy’ per se, but can be considered critical of it as it questions the whole 
foundations of privacy as previously discussed. When investigating privacy from
9
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a purely legal standpoint, Volokh came to a similar conclusion -  that privacy is 
possibly best protected in law by relying on contractual protections [172].
Delving deeper into the criticism of privacy, a highly sceptical view of privacy 
was produced by Wasserstrom who argued that withholding information about 
oneself might be morally equivalent to deception, and therefore socially undesir­
able [174]. He suggests that views on privacy encourage individuals to feel more 
vulnerable than they should simply by accepting the notion that there are thoughts 
and actions which should make one feel ashamed or embarrassed, and that privacy 
encourages hypocrisy and deceit.
Another critical view -  one possibly more interesting in the context of e-commerce 
-  sceptical of the reasons for privacy were first introduced by Posner and Stigler [134, 
135, 156]. Posner argued that privacy interests axe non-distinctive, and are better 
thought of in economic terms [135]. He posits that information can have value -  
people will incur costs to discover it -  and that there therefore are two economic 
goods: “privacy” and “prying”. He however regards them as instrumental rather 
than “final” goods, allowing them to be analysed economically. According to this 
idea, people do not desire privacy for privacy’s sake, but for the economic or social 
advantage that it gives them. His view is that privacy should only be protected 
when allowing access to information would reduce its value. He classifies personal 
information such as “my ill health, evil temper, even my income” [135] as facts 
that should not generally be protected since the main motive for concealment is of­
ten to mislead others, or for private economic gain. Since corporate gains enhance 
the economy more than individual gains, he concludes that defence of individual 
privacy is hard to justify as it can negatively impact these more “important” cor­
porate gains. Whether one agrees with this stance of course depends entirely on 
whether one is a corporation or an individual. Etzioni also espoused a similar view 
that individual rights with regards to privacy can be trumped if doing so benefits 
society at large [55]. Critics of this viewpoint question whether the idea that such 
conditions whereby economic benefits can be reaped exist at all [124]. Thinking 
specifically about e-commerce, these views of privacy do not take into account the 
facts presented in the Chapter 1 -  that favouring corporate over individual pri­
vacy leads to a reduction in the amount of e-commerce an individual will engage 
in. Nevertheless, these are highly interesting viewpoints from the perspective of 
this thesis, as they suggest the idea that privacy loss can be measured from an 
economical point of view, rather than a purely social point of view.
One thing that all of these arguments about the nature of privacy -  both those
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for and those against privacy -  have in common is that they all agree on the core 
existence of the concept of privacy: to debate whether something is materially good 
or bad must necessarily mandate the existence of the subject of the debate. Thus, 
virtually all theorists have acknowledged that the idea of privacy is indeed a real 
concept. Additionally, although a single, all-encompassing view of privacy has not 
yet been presented (and seems unlikely to ever be presented), individual privacy, 
however defined, is seen by the vast majority of theorists as a highly important 
human value and therefore an area that deserves to be fiercely protected in all 
areas of life. Thus, the assumption made in this thesis that an individual’s privacy 
is something worth saving is indeed a valid assumption to make, and provides the 
necessity for the work presented in this thesis.
2 .2  T h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  P r iv a c y
Given an increased understanding about the nature of privacy, the second stop on 
the journey of understanding privacy is to look at the development of the idea of 
privacy throughout the ages. This will give a historical perspective that can be 
built upon to theorise about the future of this development.
The idea of privacy, as with any other human sociological creation, is not abso­
lute and static -  developments in society itself have grown and shaped this human 
value for most of recorded human history. The development of privacy has gone 
through several main stages in the lead up from its initial articulation in ancient 
times to its current incarnation in today’s world. Each of these stages can be 
differentiated by their unique view of privacy and how it has been protected.
2 .2 .1  T h e  I n f a n c y  o f  P r iv a c y
The concept of privacy has roots dating back many millennia. In approximately 
350 BC in his treatise Politics [11], Aristotle distinguished between the public 
sphere of the city and its political activities (polis) and the private sphere of the 
household and its domestic life (oikos). Aristotle claimed that the private sphere 
has an inherent hierarchical structure whose physical assets provide the material 
ability for the citizen to act in the public political sphere. Thus, the presence of 
the “private” is a necessity for the smooth running of the “public” .
This idea of public and private spheres were embodied in Greco-Roman society, 
where the public sphere was not just a metaphorical place but an actual physical
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space — the Roman forum  and the Greek agora — where public and legal affairs 
were discussed and where any free man could directly participate in the running 
of public life [89].
Greek society originally conceived of no separation between the two spheres. 
The concept of an individual being separate from the polis was brought to the 
Greek peninsula in the fifth century B.C. by radical Sophists, teaching that the 
human being was the measure of all things -  not the city or gods as was the 
prevailing philosophy [147]. This view was alien and highly radical but slowly 
permeated through Greek society, being discussed by the great Greek philosophers 
and ultimately inspiring Aristotle’s Politics as an attempt to solve this opposition 
between the opposing views.
The Romans further developed the idea of the private sphere as opposed to 
the public sphere. In Roman society, the notion of public equated to the good of 
the state and its sovereignty, while the notion of private equated to the interests 
of the individuals in the empire [81, 175]. These notions were actually eventually 
accepted as fundamental enough that they were incorporated into late Roman Law 
- in the first chapter of the two sections of the Corpus Juris Civilis, the compilation 
of Roman Law issued by Emperor Justinian in 533-34 AD [175]. Indeed, the words 
‘public’ and ‘private’ have a Roman origin1.
As the Roman Empire fell into decline and the middle ages advanced upon 
Europe, the idea of the separation of the state and the individual, the public and 
the private, fell out of public consciousness. Society at the time simply did not have 
any significant distinction between public and private, mainly due to the feudal 
system of rule which was based upon kinship and bonds of loyalty -  basically a 
network of personal dependent links in which there was no distinction between 
state and individual [175].
The revival of the separation of public and private began in more modern his­
tory with firstly the occurrence of the enlightenment and later with the growth of 
capitalism, as the separation of the sovereignty and the citizen once more occurred 
and public political society came back into prevalence. The development of bour­
geois society also had heavy influences on this development of the modern public 
sphere [81].
At this point in the history of privacy, the basic tenet of privacy was slowly being 
recognised once more as a concrete human value, and thus support for treating it
1 Public originally comes from the Latin “populus” (public),  while private originally comes 
from the Latin “privus” (single, alone)
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as such began to grow. With these occurrences the concept of privacy entered a 
new age as it began to be afforded legal protections in an effort by the legislators 
to protect this most basic of human rights.
2 .2 .2  T h e  L e g a l  A g e  o f  P r iv a c y
One of the first areas in the legal arena in which privacy has been deliberated was 
in English common law, where the idea of the right to privacy has been discussed 
for at least the last few centuries in numerous legal cases and judgements over the 
years. One example of this was articulated by Mr. Justice Yates in 1769 in a case 
actually centred around common law copyright (Millar v. Taylor [185]):
“It is certain every man has a right to keep his own sentiments, if he 
pleases: he has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them 
public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends”
These early English legal cases paved the way for many further privacy develop­
ments. Since many American legal practices have their roots in English common 
law, it has been argued by many that one of the most basic and well-known of 
these developments is the U.S. constitution -  many arguments have been put forth 
supporting the idea that the distinction of the private sphere is enshrined within 
it; for example, the Fourth Amendment protects the physical private sphere of 
an individual against unreasonable violation, and many have read this to include 
electronic property and communications. Other of the amendments also arguably 
have privacy interests (the search and seizure limits of the third and fourth; and 
the self-incrimination limits of the fifth).
This basic idea of privacy being incorporated into the very foundation of the 
United States further paved the way for one of the most famous, influential and 
oft-cited articles about privacy, published in 1890 by Warren and Brandeis [173]. 
Their article mainly focused upon the privacy violation that can occur due to 
the public dissemination of information about an individual that the individual 
would rather stay private (the article was inspired by the press intruding in Mr. 
Warren’s private life -  the reporting of the wedding of his daughter). During the 
course of the article the authors discuss many aspects of privacy, including control 
over one’s private thoughts, and they connect it to many other values, such as an 
individual’s “right to be left alone” and the respect due an individual’s “inviolate 
personality” . Somewhat sensibly, they do not, however, attempt to define what
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privacy actually is. Their main argument is that in order for law to properly 
protect privacy, privacy needs explicit legal recognition, as simply applying other 
legal arguments to protect privacy — such as using copyright law or contract law 
— is inadequate. A significant claim that they make is that privacy is a specific 
human interest, connected to the moral character, and that this interest is more 
important in the present than it has been in the past -  the importance of privacy 
is increasing.
In the wake of Warren and Brandeis’ article, privacy related cases slowly began 
to surface over the next several decades that supported the article’s views. This 
continued until 1965 when what is known as the “constitutional right to privacy” 
was explicitly recognised by the US Supreme Court (Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 - 1965) [86]. Until this point, protection of privacy in U.S. law was simply 
viewed as being necessary to the protection of other more well-established rights, 
and were therefore dealt with as such. Justice Douglas wrote in the US Supreme 
Court Decision that the case in question concerned “a relationship lying within 
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees” -  
the amendments previously mentioned, each of which creates different zones or 
“penumbras” of privacy [86]. Some people axe now arguing that this ruling should 
be taken further and another amendment to the constitution should be added that 
explicitly recognises the right to privacy in a specific and fundamental manner.
Outside of the USA during these times, many other countries were developing 
laws that protected people’s privacy. For example, in 1789 in France La Declaration 
des droits de I ’Homme et du citoyen (The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen) [125] was adopted by the ruling government, which included privacy 
guarantees to its post-revolutionary citizens. Meanwhile, on a wider scale, two 
highly important developments occurred.
Firstly, in 1948 (December 10th), the General Assembly of the United Nations 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [164], wherein privacy was 
enumerated in Article 12:
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.”
However, since the Universal Declaration of Human rights was so wide-ranging 
in scope, it never garnered the international consensus necessary to become a
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binding treaty. To solve this problem, the declaration was spilt into two bind­
ing covenants - with the privacy guarantees becoming part of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 17) [165] created in 1966, which 
has been ratified by 149 parties worldwide.
Secondly, in 1950, the European Convention on Human Rights [43] (officially 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) 
was adopted by most Council of Europe member states, wherein privacy was enu­
merated in Article 8 (right to respect for private life):
(a) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence.
(b) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exer­
cise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and 
is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national se­
curity, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
The history of privacy in its legal age shows that as societies have risen and fallen 
in their haphazard progression and western society’s current incarnation slowly 
emerged, the importance placed upon the ideal of privacy as a fundamental human 
right has increased enormously, and the subsequent necessity for its protection has 
thus also grown and gained in importance. However, the nature of protection of 
privacy has changed as this legal age of privacy gradually gave way to the current 
modern ages of privacy. This transition was initiated by the ever-forward march 
of technology, which has affected both the concept of privacy and the mechanisms 
of its protection in some major ways.
2 .2 .3  P r iv a c y  in  t h e  T e c h n o l o g ic a l  A g e
The privacy implications of ever-evolving technology are not exactly new: War­
ren and Brandeis’ “right to be left alone” came from a time when privacy was 
threatened by a new technology that allowed photographs to be included in mass- 
circulation newspapers. During the 118 years since their article, the problems 
posed by technology have increased wildly, from such “simple” examples as tele­
phones being introduced (leading to objections being raised that they “permitted 
intrusion [...] by solicitors, purveyors of inferior music, eavesdropping operators,
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and even wire-transmitted germs” [63]) through to far more complex recent tech­
nologies; while privacy protection has struggled to keep apace. Tuerkheimer clas­
sified these problems into two broad categories: surveillance and personal data 
protection [163].
Surveillance is the monitoring of behaviour2, and many new surveillance tech­
nologies have posed new and complex privacy issues. Some examples of privacy 
issues brought forth by these technologies include wireless telematics networks em­
bedded in lamp posts tracking the location of one’s automobile at all times [101], 
automatic toll payment systems based on RFID and automobile number plate 
recognition [64], facial recognition systems employed widely tracking the location 
of individuals, national identity cards [137], monitoring of employees in a work­
place [93], SMS [82, 117], Instant Messaging [80, 120], location awareness services 
on mobile telephones [90], blanket coverage of CCTV [22, 127], monitoring sys­
tems deployed in the homes of the elderly [17], implanted sensors monitoring the 
health of the sick, monitoring of computer traffic, email and telephone calls, and 
governmental surveillance systems such as Carnivore and Echelon [61]. All of these 
technologies are able to violate an individual’s privacy in some major ways, as in 
extreme cases a person can be monitored 24 hours a day without any awareness 
as to this fact.
So far, there has been little legislation guarding against privacy violations caused 
by such surveillance technologies, except in a few specific cases: such as when the 
basic protections that the Fourth Amendment brings Americans against unreason­
able violation was extended in the latter half of the last century to cover devel­
opments in electronic surveillance (Katz vs. United States, 389 U.S. 479 - 1967)), 
requiring U.S. government agencies to obtain a court order giving permission to 
use a wiretap. In fact, however, even this little legislation has been overridden by 
the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act” , more commonly known as the Patriot 
Act [170]. This Act expanded the authority of the United States government (more 
specifically the F.B.I.) to, amongst other things, search telephone and e-mail com­
munications and medical, financial, and other records. They can, through the 
use of “National Security Letters” , do this without a court order. Since its intro­
duction in 2001, several legal challenges have been brought against the act, and 
US courts have ruled at least one provision unconstitutional. Outside of the U.S. 
many countries have enacted similar, but weaker, legislation. Thus, legislation is
2 “Surveillance” comes from the French, meaning literally “Watching Over”
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not solving the problem of privacy violation caused by surveillance technologies, 
and has not even begun to attem pt to legislate against private company carrying 
out such activities.
Personal data protection is the well-known privacy issue created by the prolif­
eration of databases containing information about individuals’ lives, habits, pref­
erences, and personal histories. From virtually every place one goes to shop, from 
the supermarket to the video store to the bookstore to the pharmacy, a steady 
stream of information about customers pours into vast warehouses of data. These 
treasure-troves of knowledge can help companies in their drive to ultimate effi­
ciency and therefore the good of the customers; at least, that is the argument used 
to support this. Undoubtedly this is true. However, it can also give a business a 
huge unfair advantage in their dealings with the customers as it leaves them hold­
ing all the cards in the game of commerce -  while most of the individuals playing 
do not know for sure how to play the game, or even that they are playing at all. 
The time may come when everything it is possible to know about an individual is 
stored somewhere, and there are no technological guarantees that this information 
cannot be accessed by anyone, at any time.
In an attempt to counter this problem, governments in many countries have 
enacted legislation that specifically attempts to protect the privacy of this data: 
for example, in the UK and Sweden there is a legal restriction on any entity 
possessing any kind of personal information without the explicit consent of the 
data subject, and every entity that does store such data has to register this fact 
with the government. These types of legislation originated from a set of guidelines 
called the Fair Information Practices (FIPS), developed in the early 1970s as part 
of an investigation by the then US Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
concerned with citizens rights with regards medical records [169].
The FIPS were a set of desirable practises with regards to the processing and 
storage of data within computer systems, advocating such things as limiting the 
collection of data to that which is necessary for the application involved and al­
lowing individuals to view the information help about them. This in turn led to 
the Organisation of Economic Development issuing a set of guidelines (the OECD 
privacy guidelines) based on the FIPS ideas which set out the minimum standards 
for data collection, storage, processing and dissemination that both the public and 
the private sector should adhere to [132]. These guidelines are commonly consulted 
by nations and private organisations when drafting privacy laws and policies.
One notable collection of privacy laws created based upon the FIPS was created
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in Europe: in 1981 personal data became specifically highly protected when the 
Council of Europe created the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data [44]. This convention obliged 
the member states of the Council of Europe to enact legislation concerning the 
automatic processing of personal data, resulting in different types of regulatory 
models and approaches being adopted [119]. These ranged from the “self-help” 
approach (where there is no government interference and it is up to the countries’ 
citizens to challenge inappropriate practises and bring them to the attention of the 
courts) to the “registration” /  “licensing” approach (where a government takes full 
control of ensuring that personal data about its citizens is not misused).
Over the following decade or so, a range of diverging legislation was enacted 
in EU countries. The European Commission realised that the different, and oft 
contradictory, approaches and laws enacted by its member states would impede the 
free flow of data within the EU. Therefore the European Commission decided to 
build upon their previous work and harmonise data protection regulation across 
member states, proposing the Directive on the Protection of Personal Data in 
1995 (officially Directive 95/46/EC  on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data) [60]. All 
members of the EU had to transpose this legislation into their internal law by 1998, 
and all did. This directive required that many things become legally mandatory, 
including the creation of government data protection agencies and the registration 
of any databases of personal information with these agencies. However, a 2003 
EU report concluded that European citizens do not understand what rights they 
actually have under the data protection legislation [42], partly leading the EU to 
publish a plan calling for common rules on the form in which companies publish 
privacy policies in order that they are simpler to understand [57].
One of the stipulations of the 1995 Directive was that personal data would 
only be allowed to be transferred to non-EU countries if the country provided an 
adequate level of protection of the data protection. However, while the EU and 
the United States both ostensibly share the goal of enhancing privacy protection 
for their citizens, the EU and the US take fundamentally different approaches to 
achieving this. As has been discussed, the EU approach relies on comprehensive 
legislation to mandate its corporate citizens to be respectful of an individual’s pri­
vacy; the US, however, uses an approach that mixes small amounts of legislation 
with large amounts of self-regulation, relying on its corporate citizens to behave 
responsibly. This, however, means that it is impossible to show that the US can
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provide an adequate enough level of protection, and means that the directive could 
have significantly hampered many US companies from engaging in transatlantic 
transactions with European customers. In an attempt to solve this problem, the 
European Commission and the US Department of Commerce jointly developed 
what is known as the “Safe Harbor” framework3, which was adopted in 2000. Un­
der the safe harbor agreement, US companies can choose to register and enter the 
safe harbor (self certifying annually): agreeing to comply with the agreement’s 
rules and regulations (which includes elements such as notice, choice, access, and 
enforcement). EU organisations can then ensure they are sending personal infor­
mation to US companies in accordance with EU rules by checking that the US 
company they are dealing with is on the list of participating companies.
Other notable examples of things influenced by the FIPS include HIPAA (the 
US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1999) and privacy work 
around various policies and technologies such as P3P [46] (see Section 3.1.2.1), data 
management [99], RFID [69], ubiquitous computing [110], video surveillance [56] 
and biometrics [58].
In this age of privacy, technology has advanced so far and so fast that the 
approach of protecting privacy through legal means is not as effective as it once 
was: technological development is far outpacing the ability of the legal system 
to react and adapt to new developments -  and in many cases has overstepped 
the line where the legal system is able to protect privacy at all. In an effort 
to keep up, instead of continuing the past legal developments calling for an all- 
encompassing legal and moral protection of privacy, the legislators have instead 
had to mitigate against specific privacy violations as they appear -  resulting in 
today’s legal landscape containing a mishmash of various legal protections and 
requirements that help guard against only the occasional isolated pocket of privacy 
violation.
2 .2 .4  P r iv a c y  in  t h e  I n f o r m a t io n  A g e
In the information age that we live in the nature of privacy changes in some 
interesting ways. Moor has discussed how in the information age information is 
“greased” -  quick moving and with uses impossible to imagine when it was initially 
entered onto a computer [121]. The privacy implications of this one development 
alone are staggering. It is now possible to give personal information to one entity
3http://export.gov/safeharbor
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(whether purposefully or without realising it) for one specific purpose or reason, 
only for it to be transferred to another entity and used for an entirely different (and 
possibly objectionable) purpose, ad infinitum. Moor therefore argues that we need 
to create “zones of privacy” which allow individuals to control levels of access to 
private information differently in different situations. He argues that it is impor­
tant to think of privacy as an amalgamation of the competing ideas that privacy 
is either about controlling one’s information or about the state of limited access 
to one’s information, saying that although the control theory is highly desirable it 
is impossible to totally control one’s information in a computerised society.
Obviously, Moor’s conclusion is based upon the assumption that individuals re­
ally do care about the privacy of their personal information in this greased world 
of the information age. However, not everyone believes this to be the case. One 
point often raised supporting their opinion is that while most individuals state 
they are concerned about privacy, many of them then go online and give away 
personal information with apparently no thought or hesitation. This, they argue, 
seems to suggest that retaining privacy of their personal information online is not 
as important to people as they like to think, and therefore it can safely be ignored. 
To counter this argument, Syverson briefly discussed this view and produced some 
preliminary evidence debunking it in [158], while Acquisti discussed how it is “un­
realistic to expect individual rationality in this context” , since consumers who wish 
to protect their privacy “might not do so because of psychological distortions well 
documented in the behavioral literature” , or that they may incorrectly “perceive 
the risks from not protecting their privacy as significant” [3].
Looking more deeply at the statistics of public views on privacy, a number of 
studies have been carried out looking at the people’s privacy preferences when deal­
ing with commercial entities. Some of the first of these were carried out by Alan 
Westin, followed by Privacy &; American Business (a research company founded 
by Alan Westin) [136, 180], while more recent work backing up the conclusions of 
these first studies being provided by the Eurobarometer survey in the EU [59], by 
Ackerman et al [2], and by Jenson et al [96]. The conclusions of all of the studies 
are that while consumers in general maintain that they have a high level of concern 
about privacy, when faced with real life situations these consumers can be split into 
three main categories termed the privacy fundamentalists, the pragmatic majority, 
and the marginally concerned. Privacy fundamentalists are extremely concerned 
about privacy, unwilling to provide private information under almost any circum­
stances. Pragmatists have privacy concerns, but are willing to give certain private
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information for pertinent reasons when assured by privacy protection measures. 
The marginally concerned are willing to give private information under almost 
any circumstances. While the distributions of consumers in these three categories 
has varied over time [182], generally, the percentages seen are around the 15-25% 
mark of privacy fundamentalists, 40-60% pragmatists, and 15-25% marginally con­
cerned. Thus, while some individuals may reveal private information at any time, 
the majority of people (some 55-85%) are at least partially concerned about their 
privacy online. To further this investigation, Tsai et al performed a study whose 
findings showed that when a consumer had privacy information made easily avail­
able, they tended “to purchase from merchants that offer more privacy protection 
and even pay a premium to purchase from such merchants” [162].
These studies prove that, despite the point of view of some people such as ex- 
Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy -  who once famously said “Privacy is dead, 
deal with it” -  the public themselves are in fact concerned about privacy. However, 
the greased nature of information makes the privacy of information something very 
difficult to protect.
2 .2 .5  T h e  F u t u r e  o f  P r i v a c y
These conclusions suggest that a new model of privacy protection is necessary 
in the information age if the laudable goal of protecting a consumer’s privacy 
is to be achieved. Instead of relying upon legal protections alone to guarantee 
that no entity can violate a consumer’s privacy, the future of privacy protection 
seems likely to need to be a mixture of legal protections and technologies that 
put consumers back in control of their information: thus allowing the consumer to 
flexibly protect their own privacy to the extent that they wish, releasing certain 
amounts of personal information for whatever reasons they wish, tailored to the 
specific circumstance they are faced with.
2.3 S u m m a ry
Privacy is a complex and contentious concept that has been debated vociferously 
ever since its first inception. It is generally recognised as a core human value that 
is important for many various reasons. Over time, the methods used to protect this 
core value have changed as the nature of potential privacy violations have changed; 
and the speed of this change has increased dramatically in the last few centuries
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as humanity progressed through the industrial age to the technological age. In 
this age, most privacy violations against an individual were due to calculated acts 
by specific entities, without the individual’s consent, and the best defence was 
specific legislation protecting individuals against such acts. However, as we move 
into the information age, information has become “greased” , resulting in privacy 
violations that can likely be due to entities misusing data that was collected from 
individuals for apparently legitimate reasons. Thus, protection of privacy becomes 
a new challenge as individuals have freely given this information away for a specific 
purpose -  and once this information is out in the wild, it is impossible to keep 
track of, or recapture. One way to answer this challenge suggested by this thesis is 
to create technologies that put consumers back in control of their personal private 
information. The next chapter explores this conclusion in more detail by examining 
methods of protecting privacy in the context of e-commerce in the information age.
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C h a p t e r  3
P r o t e c t i n g  P r iv a c y  in
E-COMMERCE
The previous chapter examined the idea of privacy and its development in a 
general sense. Since the focus of this thesis is on addressing the problem of using a 
consumer’s preferences to enhance e-commerce search techniques while preserving 
privacy and reducing exploitation, this chapter will explore the idea of privacy 
and privacy protection in the more specific area of e-commerce. This will help to 
understand where the contributions of this thesis fit within the range of current 
research in two relevant areas -  that of Privacy Enhancing Technologies, and that 
of Preference Searching.
3.1 P r i v a c y  E n h a n c in g  T e c h n o l o g i e s
Desire for consumer privacy had led some in the research community to design tech­
nologies that aim to uphold the ideal of protecting this privacy in the e-commerce 
environment. These technologies can generally be placed into one of two cate­
gories: anonymous technologies and non-anonymous technologies; or to use the 
correct but oft-ignored antonym of anonymous -  “onymous” technologies. The 
methods by which the technologies of these two categories attem pts to preserve 
individual privacy differ both in fundamental philosophy and in application.
3.1.1 A n o n y m o u s / P s e u d o n y m o u s  T e c h n i q u e s
Anonymising/pseudonymising technologies attem pt to achieve unlinkability be­
tween a consumer and any of their personal information. That is, they aim to
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secure the privacy of a consumer’s personal information by simply trying to en­
sure that any personal information released to an organisation cannot be linked 
to a consumer’s real identity. Thus, a consumer could make use of preference- 
enhanced search techniques by releasing their preferences with impunity, safe in 
the knowledge that the vendor could not link this preference information back to 
them as a person. These kinds of technologies will not, however, help with the 
issue of a vendor exploiting the knowledge contained in these preferences to the 
detriment of the consumer.
There are a range of levels of anonymity available: from the truly anonymous 
-  no one can find out who you really are; through the pseudo-anonymous -  your 
identity is generally not known but can be obtained if deemed necessary and with 
enough hard work; through to the pseudonymous -  where a consumer can create 
a range of virtual identities for use in various circumstances. Throughout this 
spread individual privacy is maintained -  as although an attacker trying to harvest 
personal information is able to gather large quantities of it, the material gathered 
cannot (normally) be linked back to a specific individual.
User anonymity, at whatever level, can be achieved through one of three main 
methods: anonymising the transport medium; allowing anonymous but account­
able transactions (credential systems); and ‘scrubbing’ of data stored by an organ­
isation.
3.1.1.1 Anonymising the Transport Medium
One method of enforcing anonymity between consumers and their prospective e- 
commerce vendors is to ensure that any communications between the two occur in 
such a way that the original identity of the consumer cannot be gleaned through 
examination of any of the communications, or by eavesdropping on communication 
patterns. So for example, when a consumer browses a vendor’s website and buys 
items from them, this type of technology will aim to prevent the e-business from 
ever knowing exactly with whom they are dealing. Technologies have been created 
that attempt to achieve this goal, with varying degrees of success.
One of the simplest ways for a consumer to achieve anonymity in this fashion 
is to set up an account with a free email service such as Hotmail4 (now Windows 
Live Hotmail), Yahoo Mail5 or Google Mail6. This allows a consumer to have
4http://www.hotmail.com/
5http: / /mail.yahoo.com/
6http://www.gmail.com/
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a point of contact for communications -  enabling them to be members of online 
communities, have accounts with vendors, etc -  whilst retaining anonymity as 
there is no easy way for anyone to link such an email account to the individual 
who controls it. Hushmail7 takes this idea further offering end-to-end encryption 
for its users ensuring eavesdroppers cannot breach the privacy of this setup. This 
simple approach to anonymity through free email systems however requires that 
the consumer trust the email service provider completely -  that they will not log 
communication details such as IP addresses during email sessions. Additionally, 
this approach is fast becoming impossible in recent times as the majority of these 
services increasingly require personal details to sign up. That being said, there is 
generally nothing to stop consumers signing up with false details.
A step up in technological complexity leads us to a well known tool to achieve 
anonymous web browsing -  Anonymizer8. When a consumer uses this service to 
view items on the internet or submit information to remote sites, it is done with 
all communications being routed through Anonymizer’s servers -  thus the remote 
site has no way of detecting the IP address or identity of the consumer. However, 
this kind of technique also requires a trusted third-party -  in this case Anonymizer 
itself. This is simply because Anonymizer’s servers (or the user’s ISP) can certainly 
identify the consumer if they so desired.
To achieve complete anonymity on the internet, tools are needed that do not 
rely on a trusted third-party. In this vein, Reiter and Rubin created a system 
called Crowds [142, 143] that operates by grouping consumers into large groups 
(crowds). Consumers connect to this crowd, and instead of directly issuing requests 
to internet servers, they give it to the crowd. The request gets passed around the 
members of the crowd randomly until it eventually gets submitted to the intended 
recipient. To use Crowds is essentially to play ‘pass the parcel’ with users’ requests. 
The recipient of the request thus cannot identify who in the crowd issued the 
initial request -  as it is equally likely to have been any of the members of the 
crowd. However, malicious behaviour by any rogue crowd members can affect the 
usefulness and reliability of the system -  although they cannot compromise the 
anonymity of any of the other members through such behaviour.
Another step up in complexity of technology leads to technologies that use 
encryption to assist with solving the problem. A well known technology of this 
type that spurned numerous off-shoots was created by Chaum in 1981 [32]. A
7http://www.hushmail.com/
8http://www.anonymizer.com/
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Chaum Mix is a system based upon public key cryptography that allows people 
to communicate via email while remaining anonymous to each other (and any 
global eavesdropper), all without needing any guarantees as to the security of the 
underlying communications system. It does this by ensuring that messages passing 
through the system are of equal size, cryptographically changing them and then 
sending the messages to their recipients in a different order. This makes it very 
difficult for even a global eavesdropper to link an incoming message and its sender 
to an outgoing message and its recipient. Chaum Mixes can be improved by linking 
mixes together to create a ‘cascade’ of Mixes in order to further provide security 
guarantees and not to have to require a person to trust one single mix server.
One of the off-shoots of Chaum Mixes was created by Goldschlag, Reed and 
Syverson [75, 76]. They designed an anonymous communication architecture called 
Onion Routing which can be used by any protocol capable of being adapted to use 
a proxy service. It is built upon the idea of using a network of dynamic real-time 
Chaum Mixes. Onion routing allows bi-directional, near real-time connections 
that are highly resistant to eavesdropping and traffic analysis. The user submits 
an encrypted request in the form of an onion -  a layered data structure specifying 
the properties of the connection at each point along the route (including cryp­
tographic information and keys). Each point can only decrypt its layer, finding 
out only where the next point in the route is, except for the final point which 
decrypts its onion to find the request to send and whom to send it to, which it 
then does. Thus, a recipient only knows the identity of the person at the end of 
the chain. This first generation of Onion Routing, however, never developed much 
beyond a proof-of-concept system that ran on a single machine. The Freedom 
Network [14, 21] designed and operated by Zero-Knowledge Systems Inc. was a 
commercial implementation of a variant of Onion Routing, routing IP connections 
through intermediate nodes to provide users with anonymity. This was, however, 
a commercial failure [74].
In 2003, Acquisti, Dingledine, and Syverson examined the current state of de­
centralised anonymity infrastructures, identifying the then current issues that were 
limiting the deployment of such systems and drawing conclusions about what the 
next generation of these systems should do in outline form [4]. This partly led 
to a new second generation Onion Routing system (supported by the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation9) called Tor10 (The Onion Router) being presented [52]. This 
new generation of communication service added many useful features designed to
9http://www.eff.net
10http://www.torproject.org/
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make Onion Routing secure, efficient, and usable enough for real world use. It 
still, however, lacked an user interface good enough to enable large scale adoption, 
leading to a “grand challenge” being issued to develop such a user interface11.
All of these anonymising technologies however have one general major caveat - 
they only work properly (provide anonymity) if certain conditions are met. Some of 
these conditions have been noted by Clayton, Danezis and Kuhn [41]: for example, 
attacks can be made that will reveal a supposedly anonymous individual’s IP 
address by doing such things as making use of client-side scripting, sending images 
which can be tracked when loaded by the user (web bugs), cookie stealing, and 
many other methods. Clayton et a /’s conclusion is that it is important to not 
only think about the anonymity properties of communication channels, but to also 
consider ways of protecting anonymity throughout the entire system. To use the 
old adage, ‘A chain is only as secure as its weakest link’.
3.1.1.2 Credential Systems
Besides anonymising the transport medium, another method of enabling anonymity 
between a customer and a vendor is through the use of a credential system (some­
times referred to as a pseudonym system). In a credential system, consumers are 
known to the vendor they are doing business with only by a pseudonym (or nym). 
A single consumer can use different pseudonyms with different vendors, and these 
cannot be linked together by any member of the system. However, a vendor can 
issue a credential to a pseudonym, who can then prove possession of this to an­
other vendor revealing only that the consumer owns a credential. A certification 
authority sometimes plays an important role in guaranteeing that the system is 
used properly and that users can be trusted. What this means in e-commerce 
transactions is that these technologies enable consumers to buy items from an e- 
business by proving certain facts: that they are eligible to buy the item, that they 
have given a payment, that they are old enough to buy an age-restricted item, 
etc., all without the vendor knowing exactly with whom they are dealing.
The idea and basic framework of credential systems were first introduced by 
Chaum in 1985 [30], who soon after published a full model with security proofs 
using RSA as a one-way function [31]. This model, however, requires a trusted 
third party (the certification authority) which manages the transfers of consumers’ 
credentials between organisations. To relax this constraint, Damguard developed
11 http://tor.eff.org/gui
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a model that only needs a third party to be involved - it does not necessarily have 
to be trusted [49]. It does this by using the idea of multi-party computations [77], 
resulting in a scheme that is provably immune to forgery by malicious entities in 
the system. This model however is not meant for implementation as some of the 
methods used are too inefficient for heavy use. A practical version of this work 
was produced by Chen [33]; however, it requires that the certification authority 
behave honestly, thus negating the advantage of Damguard’s approach.
One weakness of all of these models of credential systems is that there is nothing 
to stop a consumer from sharing his pseudonym and/or credentials with other 
consumers. For example if a consumer was issued with a certificate proving that 
they are over 18, they could then share this with an under-age consumer who 
could use it to purchase age-limited products. While this is in fact acceptable 
from the perspective of protecting privacy, it may result in business transactions 
that are not valid or intended (and possibly illegal). In an attem pt to solve this 
problem, Lysyanskaya, Rivest and Sahai produced a model [114] that includes the 
presumption that the consumer’s private key (linked to the corresponding public 
key in the credential system) is something that they are motivated to keep secret 
-  for example, it could be their digital signature key. If a consumer then shared 
a credential with another consumer, the other consumer would have access to this 
secret. If the secret was the digital signature key, the other consumer could then 
forge signatures on any documents in the original consumer name. This idea was 
termed non-transferability. As with Damguard’s model however, this model is not 
directly usable in practice due to the reliance on methods that are too inefficient 
to use in practice.
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya further developed this idea of non-transferability [25] 
producing another model for a credential system that additionally has the optional 
property of allowing a consumer’s identity to be revealed if the consumer misuses 
their credential or uses it in an illegal transaction. This model, however, requires 
that the certification authority is trusted to do their job properly -  this risk can be 
minimised, however, through distribution of the tasks of the certification author­
ity, weakening the trust assumptions. Camenisch and Van Herreweghen described 
a prototype of a system based upon this model [24].
The idea of credential systems, along with the lack of success of PKI (Public 
Key Infrastructure) systems, has led to the development of PMI (Privilege Man­
agement Infrastructures), AAI (Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructures) 
and FAM (Federated Access Management) systems. As such, several proposals for
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working systems and implementations of these proposals have been put forward: 
such as Kerberos [105, 126], Microsoft Passport (now Windows Live ID)12, the Lib­
erty Framework13 [112], and SAML [26]. Work in these areas has been performed 
by many different communities, notably including the Grid /  e-Science community 
(e.g. PERMIS [28, 50]). However, given the difference in requirements of these 
communities to those of e-commerce, many do not fit in the world of e-commerce 
-  a view shared by Schlaeger and Pernul who surveyed many of these proposals, 
concluding that none of them “is perfectly suitable for b2c e-commerce” [149].
3.1.1.3 Privacy in databases
Another area examined by the research community is the area of enabling anonymity 
of existing sets of consumer information held by a vendor (both personal and trans­
actional). There are two main reasons this may be desirable: the vendor may have 
a desire to keep such valuable information where individual identification of a cus­
tomer is not necessary, and removing this possibility saves them from having to 
deal with privacy, security and data protection issues (e.g. to understand overall 
purchasing trends over tim e); and the vendor may wish to pass parts of this infor­
mation on to third parties without any information being personally identifiable.
Techniques to accomplish this were originally pioneered to help solve privacy 
issues in statistical databases. In these databases it is the statistical information 
about the data — rather than the data itself — that is important, thus meth­
ods have been considered that can keep the statistics of the data-set valid whilst 
keeping the individual data itself private. Two excellent surveys of this area were 
produced by Adam and Worthmann [5] and Shoshani [155]. Broadly, the methods 
that attem pt to accomplish this ideal of privacy of database information can be 
split into three main categories: query restriction, data perturbation and output 
transformation [5].
The goal of technologies that fall into the query restriction category is to retain 
privacy of individual data items by restricting the information that can be released. 
In this approach only queries that obey specific criteria are allowed, in an effort to 
prevent information about specific data items becoming known. The problem of 
this approach is that only a small subset of possible queries are allowed, reducing 
the usefulness of the database. Similar to this idea is query auditing [34], where an 
audit trail of all queries that have been performed is kept and every new query is
12http://www.passport.net
13http://www.projectliberty.org
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checked for possible compromise. If a possible compromise is detected, the query 
is disallowed. The main problem with this approach, however, is that an entity 
can use the results of queries along with the knowledge of what queries have been 
allowed and denied to infer data and thus compromise the privacy of the data 
contained in the database.
The goal of data perturbation is to modify the original database in such a way 
that the overall statistics remain valid while individual items are changed, thus 
preserving privacy of individual records. A very basic method of achieving a limited 
degree of confidentiality is simple rounding of numerical data. This naive approach 
can be improved slightly by randomly rounding or by adding random noise with 
a mean of zero [171]. This idea has been further developed, for example in [6, 7]. 
Other methods have been proposed that fall into this category, including data 
swapping, which involves swapping each item in the database with another one 
from the same distribution, thus creating a new database with supposedly the 
same statistics [141]. However, by its very nature the process of modifying the 
original data will always alter the overall statistics at least slightly, as well as 
making the original data meaningless, making the information gained less useful 
overall.
The final category of output perturbation allows a database to permanently 
store the original data and perform queries on it, however the results of any query 
performed are altered such that the original data cannot be inferred before being 
returned to the user. Methods that achieve this include adding a random pertur­
bation to query results (with increasing variance as queries are repeated) [16].
One prevalent example of such a technique in this area is Sweeney’s idea of 
k-anonymisation [157]. The basic idea of this approach is to make each record of 
a table identical to at least k -  1 other records over a chosen set of attributes, thus 
enabling anonymity by ensuring that when a record is released, its linkage to a 
single individual cannot be identified. This idea has since been refined in many 
ways (e.g. [ I l l ,  113, 115]) and a good survey of this work has been presented by 
Ciriani et al [40].
All of these techniques have one major technical drawback however -  they do 
not adequately satisfy the conflict of being able to provide high quality statistics 
while simultaneously preventing disclosure of individual information [5]. Also, 
attempting to achieve the privacy of individual data itself is a very hard problem 
to overcome. Denning and Denning discussed the details of this problem -  whereby 
statistical information “contain[s] vestiges of the original information; a snooper
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might be able to reconstruct this information by processing enough summaries” [51] 
-  drawing on work both by themselves and Schlorer (e.g. [150, 151, 152]).
From an e-commerce and consumer’s point of view there is a big drawback with 
these methods: any consumers wishing to enter into a business relationship with 
a vendor have to trust that vendor’s promise that once their personal information 
is received and stored it will be anonymised. Given the public view on privacy 
in e-commerce as discussed in Chapter 1 this trust may not be something easy to 
come by for many vendors, and any breach of trust by any vendor has the potential 
to destroy any trust built up between the public and all vendors.
3.1.1.4 Summary of Anonymous/Pseudonymous Techniques
A summary of anonymous/pseudonymous techniques surveyed is presented in Ta­
ble 3.1, where we compare each of the techniques by their basic architecture, 
indicate whether they are usable in practical circumstances, and indicate in which 
application areas they can be used successfully. As can be seen, the majority of 
the anonymous/pseudonymous privacy enhancing techniques are practically us­
able in areas involving web applications (which includes e-commerce), but require 
a trusted third party in their architecture. This is potentially a serious limiting fac­
tor for the usefulness of this type of technology: it requires that entities exist that 
consumers trust entirely (and all the problems this entails); also as e-commerce 
develops further and e-businesses become ever more distributed, it may not be re­
alistic to require the existence of a trusted third party in order to protect privacy 
for consumers.
Of course, there are other privacy-enhancing techniques available. One such 
area of techniques is the area of steganography [98, 100] -  the science of hiding 
communication between two parties in such a manner that an eavesdropper would 
not know that a message exists. However, while these techniques are highly devel­
oped, none are realistically applicable to the field of e-commerce as it stands today 
(e.g. in the case of steganography, hiding the fact that an individual e-commerce 
transaction was occurring from an eavesdropper would only guard against privacy 
invasions from that eavesdropper -  which is not where the types of privacy invasion 
that this thesis is interested in is occurring).
So, where anonymous/pseudonymous techniques are both desirable and tech­
nically plausible, they are an excellent method of preserving the privacy of a 
consumer’s personal information, including information about their preferences.
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However, such techniques cannot help at all with the problem of exploitation of a 
consumer’s preferences.
3.1.2 O n y m o u s  T e c h n i q u e s
Preserving privacy by staying anonymous is not always possible. Sometimes a 
consumer is required to be identified by a vendor in order to receive their services. 
Examples of cases where this may be true are the use of digital libraries where 
payment is required to access the data (and therefore credit card details, and thus 
identity can be revealed) or standard Business-to-Consumer (B2C) e-commerce -  
if a consumer orders a book from Amazon, payment details as well as delivery 
details are required. While anonymous e-cash systems have been developed that 
have the potential to solve the first problem, any material goods one orders still 
need to be delivered: therefore an address needs to be supplied, therefore identity 
can be discovered. Solutions to this problem have also been proposed -  a simple 
example being that a consumer set up a PO Box. However, none of the solutions 
to this problem developed so far would realistically work in the real world of mass 
e-commerce, where the average individual would simply not bother engaging in 
e-commerce if it meant having to go well out of one’s way to retain privacy by 
enacting one of the solutions.
Onymous technologies have started to be developed to counter this problem. 
The main philosophy behind onymous technologies is not to attem pt to withhold a 
consumer’s identity from a vendor, instead attempting to help consumers preserve 
the privacy of some of their information -  or at the very least to help them to make 
informed decisions about which entities can be trusted. This area of technology is 
becoming increasingly important in recent times as more resources on the internet 
slowly move away from the free-service model and as security concerns are pressing 
for fully accountable and identifiable transactions.
Additionally, the enabling of a consumer to either minimise the amount of 
personal information released to a vendor, or to only release such information to 
those vendors it has made an informed judgement about, allows for that consumer 
to not only minimise loss of privacy but also has the potential for helping with 
the second problem addressed in this thesis; that of minimising exploitation of 
personal information.
Onymous technologies fall largely into two distinct groups: those that help 
consumers to make informed decisions when transacting in e-commerce, and those
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Table 3.1: A n o n y m o u s / Pseudonymous Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Architectural Requirements Practically Usable Application Areas
Technology Type References Trusted 3rd Party 3rd Party Decentralised Email Web Other
Anonymous Techniques:
Anonymous Email X X X
“Anonymizer” X X X
“Crowds” [142, 143] X X X
Simple Chaum Mix [32] X X X
Network of Chaum Mixes [32] X X X
“Onion Routing” [75, 76] X X X X
Credential Systems (CS):
“Mixnet” [30, 31] X X X
Damguard’s CS [49] X X
Chen’s CS [33] X X X
Lysyanskaya et aVs CS [114] X X
Camenisch et a /’s CS [25] X X X
“Idemix” [24] X X X
Database Privacy:
Query Restriction [34] X X N/A N/A N/A
Data Perturbation [6, 7, 141, 171] X X N/A N/A N/A
Output Perturbation [17] X X N/A N/A N/A
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that actively attem pt to actually enforce the preservation of privacy.
3.1.2.1 Decision Helping Techniques
One of the simplest methods of helping maintain consumer privacy onymously 
are those which aim to guide a consumer in the decision about which vendors 
can be trusted to be (relatively) respectful of their privacy and which to avoid. 
Various certification programmes exist that implement this idea; Anton and Earp 
summarised these programmes [9]. One of the more famous examples is TRUSTe, 
the ‘online privacy seal’. TRUSTe is simply a programme designed to help an 
individual make a choice over which websites they can trust and enter into business 
with. The TRUSTe organisation issues a ‘trustm ark’ to e-businesses that adhere 
to TRUSTe’s privacy principles -  practices approved by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission -  and which allow oversight to 
ensure that they follow through on their promises. Moores and Dhillon [122] 
conducted a study into the effectiveness of these methods and concluded that while 
they can be effective for the organisations that participate in these programmes 
and abide by their stated privacy principles, the overall perception of trust in e- 
commerce is still heavily damaged by the majority of organisations that do not 
participate. Thus, this solution to the trust problem of e-commerce is not effective 
enough to make a significant difference.
A more technological solution of the decision helping techniques proposed is the 
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [45, 140], a World-Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C) specification from Cranor et al. An overview of the history of P3P was 
presented by Hochheiser [87]. Its main philosophy is that if individuals have to 
give up some privacy in order to transact with an e-business, they should be able 
to at least make an informed choice as to which e-businesses they wish to interact 
with. To achieve this, P3P enabled e-businesses make available their P3P policy 
- a set of privacy practices that their website and company adhere to. P3P en­
abled individuals create their own policy, deciding what privacy practices they find 
acceptable. These two items come together when a user visits an e-business’ web­
site, where a P3P agent under the individual’s control compares the two policies, 
informing the individual about their similarities and whether they match. This 
process allows individuals to tailor their relationships with different e-businesses, 
releasing different amounts of personal information accordingly. However, P3P 
has not seen wide adoption -  in 2006 only 21% of e-commerce sites from a sample
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taken from Froogle14 had a P3P policy [53]. Also, P3P has one main drawback -  
an e-business’ P3P policy only states what their policies are, it does not ensure 
these policies are actually enforced. This lack of enforcement, alongside a lack of 
motivation amongst e-businesses [87] and a lack of a good user interface to involve 
the user in the decision making process [1] are the suggested main reasons for this 
lack of adoption.
3.1.2.2 Enforcement Techniques
In an attempt to counter the main drawback with P3P, Ashley, Powers and 
Schunter created an extended variant of it which works towards enterprise-wide 
enforcement of P3P policies [12, 13]. Organisations create an “Enterprise Privacy 
Policy” which is then enforced by a protected system holding the consumer’s data. 
The system grants or denies attempts to access information and creates an audit 
trail that can be requested by the consumer. While this is a good step forward 
for P3P enforcement -  ensuring that employees of the company can only access a 
consumer’s data for agreed upon reasons -  the consumer must still assume that the 
company has indeed protected its system, and therefore the company as a whole 
is trustworthy.
A more consumer-centric privacy-enforcement solution was presented by Elovici, 
Shapira and Maschiach [54]. They presented a model for hiding information about 
group interests of a group of individuals who share a common point of access to 
the internet. The model works by generating faked transactions in various fields 
of interest in an attem pt to prevent the real group profile being inferred. The 
raison d ’etre for the model is to allow individuals within the group to identify 
themselves to, and thence make use of, various services -  such as digital libraries, 
specialised databases, etc. -  without allowing eavesdroppers to infer a common 
group interest. This could be used for example to prevent someone inferring the 
direction of research within research groups in rival companies. The measure of 
the model’s success is based upon measuring the “degree of confusion” the system 
can inflict upon eavesdroppers.
Another technological solution to preserving privacy by enforcement was pre­
sented by Rezgui, Ouzzani, Bouguettaya and Medjahed [144]. Their system con­
centrates on preserving privacy of a citizen’s personal information in web-services 
in general, and in e-government applications in particular. Its main thrust is in
14http://froogle.google.com/
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enforcing privacy by requiring entities which wish to access data to provide cre­
dentials proving that they are allowed to access it, filtering out data that they 
are not allowed to access, and finally by delivering the data through mobile pri­
vacy preserving agents which enforces the privacy of the data on the remote site. 
However, the security of mobile agents is a major problem that has not yet been 
addressed adequately (see [144] for an overview of this problem), consequently 
any solutions that include the use of mobile agents cannot currently contain any 
security guarantees.
3.1.2.3 Summary of Onymous Techniques
Onymous techniques can be very useful in e-commerce as they support the ideal 
of consumer privacy — attempting to maximise the amount preserved — whilst 
still allowing fully onymous verifiable transactions to occur between consumer and 
e-business. Compared to anonymising technologies there have been relatively few 
technologies of this type proposed -  possibly because realistically usable methods 
of maintaining consumer privacy onymously spring to mind less readily than their 
anonymous counterparts. A summary of the techniques surveyed is presented 
in Table 3.2, where we compare each of the techniques by their basic philosophy 
(whether they are decision helping or enforcement), whether they require a trusted 
third party, and whether they can be applicable to the general area of e-commerce. 
As we can see, with the relatively few onymous privacy enhancing technologies so 
far proposed, only one actually fulfils the ultimate goal of enforcement of consumer 
privacy in e-commerce without requiring a trusted third party to operate (outside 
of the work by this author): the technology proposed by Elovici, Shapira and 
Maschiach [54]. More work in this area is clearly desirable.
3.1.3  S u m m a r y  o f  P r i v a c y  E n h a n c i n g  T e c h n o l o g i e s
Current privacy enhancing technologies are making significant achievements in 
the arena of preserving the privacy of a consumer and their personal information 
through achieving user anonymity. In the cases where anonymity is possible (and 
indeed desirable), and the caveats mentioned are managed satisfactorily, this is 
a very viable and effective approach and definitely merits the attention it cur­
rently receives. However, more work is required into the area of designing systems 
that can manage these caveats automatically, and also into relaxing the require­
ment of trusted third parties in their architectures. This will then provide total
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Table 3.2: Onymous Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Privacy Philosophy
Technology References Helper Enforcement Requires Trusted 3rd Party Applicable to E-Commerce?
“TRUSTe” [122] X X X
“PSP” [47, 140] X X X
“E-P3P” [12, 13] X X X
ESM’s [54] X X
ROBM’s [144] X X
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anonymity/pseudonymity, rather than just concentrating on the basic methods 
and protocols that provide anonymity at the base level.
It is not always possible, however, for a consumer to remain anonymous. This is 
especially true in the area of e-commerce -  where names, payment details, delivery 
details, etc. are required when one buys material goods over the internet and enters 
into a contract with that vendor. This, coupled with the fact that such technologies 
cannot help guard against exploitation of a consumer’s personal information, leads 
to the conclusion that onymous technologies are needed to allow an individual to 
preserve their privacy whilst simultaneously fulfilling the practical necessity for 
fully accountable and identifiable transactions.
So far, in this area of preserving privacy in onymous circumstances only a few 
technologies have been produced: the main contender (at least as far as take-up 
is concerned) being the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P). However, this 
technology does not actually enforce individual privacy, it is a technology to help 
guide decision making about whom to trust. More technologies, and specifically 
technologies that attem pt to enforce the preservation of privacy, are required.
If it is accepted that there is a need to produce new and more advanced onymous 
technologies then a need develops to understand fundamentally how consumer pri­
vacy in the e-commerce context may be measured. That is, for example, whether 
some types of information are worth more than others, whether there is any correla­
tion between what businesses and individuals value the most, and if certain kinds 
of private information hold more economic power (and thus bargaining power). 
Establishing these measures will then give a sound basis for developing onymous 
technologies, and allow full evaluation and comparison of any technologies that 
may be created in future.
Finally, there is a need to study privacy enhancing technologies in the light of 
security requirements. Allowing any individual to transact anonymously on the 
internet is sometimes considered a potential security problem in today’s world. 
However, in the specific context of e-commerce, it is easy to argue that any in­
dividual who truly desires to be anonymous can simply choose to not transact 
electronically and instead go into a physical shop in person and pay with cash. 
Thus, stopping anonymous e-transactions may not get rid of this potential secu­
rity problem; it only removes it from e-commerce shifting it to a different area. 
More studies are needed in order to understand how the two sets of requirements 
can be meaningfully balanced in e-commerce; onymous technologies seem possible 
to play an important role in viable solutions.
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3 .2  E n h a n c e d  S e a r c h  T e c h n iq u e s
The idea of using an individual’s preferences to help with searching information is 
becoming increasingly common in information systems in general; the use of this 
idea in the world of e-commerce is a good example of this trend. In this particular 
circumstance preferences are mainly used to filter and personalise information 
before it is presented to an individual.
Conceptually, the work required to enable preference-enhanced searching can 
be split into two areas: the initial act of obtaining preference information, and the 
subsequent act of using this information to help computational problems. While 
the first area naturally leads to the second, both can be viewed as essentially 
disparate problems.
3.2.1  O b t a i n i n g  P r e f e r e n c e s
The initial obtaining of consumer preference information by a vendor can happen 
in one of two ways: via explicit expression or implicit collection. Each of these are 
explored in more detail next; however, irrespective of which method is used, the 
very fact that personal information has been obtained assuredly leads to questions 
around privacy issues caused by the storage and usage of such information. To 
mitigate against this, such personal information needs to be treated carefully by 
all parties.
3.2.1.1 Explicit Expression
The most obvious way for a vendor to obtain a consumer’s preferences is for the 
vendor to explicitly collect relevant preference information directly from a con­
sumer in what can be considered a just-in-time manner -  by essentially simply 
asking the consumer to express their preferences manually to the vendor.
Examples of this method are diverse. One approach is to simply ask a consumer 
to enter preference information relevant to a specific domain on a web page that 
essentially represents a preference-enhanced search form. An example of this is 
the interface employed by Kiefiling and Kostler, used to demonstrate their prefer­
ence search technology called Preference SQL [104] where the consumer was simply 
asked to describe various aspects of their perfect used car in a manner fairly similar 
to existing standard search webpages. Another example of this type of approach
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that is commonly seen is the style of interface deployed on dating websites, where 
an individual first describes themselves, then expresses various preferences of the 
type of person they are looking for [62]. This style of explicit expression of pref­
erences has the advantage that consumers should be able to get to grips with the 
interface quickly due to the similarity to existing search interfaces, and that it is 
fairly intuitive for consumers to understand how their preferences will be used. A 
major issue with this approach, however, is the fact that an upfront investment in 
both time and effort is required of the consumer to perform the process of express­
ing their preferences -  and the more preference information is required, the longer 
it will take to express it. Another, more esoteric, issue that is sometimes encoun­
tered is that in certain contexts (such as expressing information and preferences 
on dating websites) people have the tendency to lie (or at least exaggerate) [84]. 
So, depending on what use is going to be made of these preferences, the degree of 
“trust” that can be placed upon this information may vary considerably.
Another, less direct, approach to explicitly gathering preferences is for a ven­
dor to ask a consumer to rate each item they purchase. Given enough ratings, 
a prediction of that consumer’s preferences can be made by examining common 
properties of different items with similar ratings. The more ratings that are made, 
the more accurate the prediction may be. This is a form of what is known as 
“relevance feedback” [146]. It could be argued that this is in fact a form of im­
plicit collection of preferences, since the consumer is not directly expressing their 
preferences, it is included here as an explicit collection method since the consumer 
is explicitly driving the preference gathering mechanism and will be aware of the 
consequences of their actions. While this does not require the upfront investment 
in time that the more direct approach requires, it does require a continuing dia­
logue between consumer and vendor -  and due to this slow process of elucidating 
their preferences, the consumer may not see the results of their effort for some 
time.
In general, explicit expression of preferences is a simple but effective approach 
to collecting a users preferences in a manner that enables the consumer to be 
aware of the collection -  and therefore make an informed choice to provide the 
information in exchange for an enhanced e-commerce experience. However, if a 
large amount of accurate preference information is required, the consumer needs 
to invest substantial time and effort in order to provide this information -  and this 
requirement may require more time and effort than many consumers are prepared 
to give.
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3.2.1.2 Implicit Collection
An indirect way for a vendor to obtain a consumer’s preferences is to implicitly 
infer a particular consumer’s preferences given their previous recorded behaviour. 
This will include things such as past purchase history, past search history, etc. This 
style of preference collection is a form of data mining called usage mining. Some 
good overviews of the whole area of data mining most relevant to e-commerce were 
presented by Madria et al, and by Van Wei and Royakkers [116, 177].
A typical example of the kind of information that can be made of through usage 
mining would be the vast data warehouses of purchase history operated by super­
markets for those customers with loyalty cards. Whenever such a customer buys 
a set of items and has their loyalty card scanned, the supermarket can associate 
those purchases with all past purchases of that person. To give an idea of the 
potential scale of this information, a report in 2006 indicated that the data ware­
house for the Sainsbury’s supermarket chain in the UK, holding the previous two 
year’s sales information, included 15 billion individual item sales across 1 billion 
transactions from 22 million customers15. This represents a staggering amount of 
information about the preferences of many millions of UK consumers.
A more complex implicit method of gathering preferences was introduced in 
the area of “collaborative filtering” , whose basic idea is that consumers who have 
expressed similar preferences in the past are potentially likely to have similar 
preferences in the future. Thus, a vendor can predict a consumer’s preferences 
based both on that person’s own explicitly expressed preferences and that of other 
consumers with similar preferences. How collaborative filtering derives preferences 
is discussed further in Section 3.2.2.2.
In general, implicit collection of preferences is an effective way of inferring a 
consumer’s preferences without requiring that the consumer make any extra ef­
fort. There are two main downsides of this approach, however. Firstly, accurately 
inferring a consumer’s preferences can be a very complex task requiring substan­
tial effort on behalf of the vendor. Secondly comes a major ethical issue -  since 
a consumer is not directly involved in the process they may not be aware that 
such information is being collected, or of how it could be potentially used. Thus, 
they may have no opportunity to either consent to, or withhold consent from, the 
process.
15http://www.retailtech.nl/rubrieken/?id==274&page=detail
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3 .2 .2  C o m p u t in g  w it h  P r e f e r e n c e s
Once a consumer’s preferences have been obtained by a vendor, the next step is for 
that vendor to make use of this information for various computational purposes 
that attempt to enhance the e-commerce experience of the consumer. Again, this 
can be split into two main categories: explicit and implicit use of preferences. 
Each of these are explored in more detail next; however, irrespective of which 
method is used, the usage of consumer preference information potentially leads 
to issues centred around the exploitation of such information -  and possibly in a 
manner deemed unacceptable by the average consumer. This kind of exploitation 
can include that discussed in this thesis.
3.2.2.1 Explicit Usage
The first main way for a vendor to use a consumer’s preferences, however gathered, 
is to explicitly use the preference information to help enhance specific consumer- 
initiated operations -  the main such operation being a search operation. Work in 
this area has largely centred around defining frameworks for embedding preferences 
directly into query languages to enable efficient preference based search. The work 
can be split into the two main approaches - quantitative and qualitative based 
areas.
The quantitative approach specifies preferences between tuples of a database 
in an instance of a relation using scoring functions, whereby a numeric score is 
associated with each tuple of a query result set. Examples of this approach in­
clude Agrawal and Wimmers’ work [8], Chomicki’s work [36], and Hristidis et al’s 
work [88]. The scoring function is defined according to the user’s stated prefer­
ences. If the score of a tuple ti is greater than the score of a tuple t2, then t\ is the 
preferred tuple. If two tuples had the same score then no preference between the 
two would be defined. This approach lays the necessary groundwork for allowing a 
preferred ordering of tuples within a database to be understood; it does not how­
ever provide a mechanism of associating a consumer’s preferences with the tuples 
such that a preferred ordering can be achieved.
The qualitative approach fills the gap left by the quantitative approach. Here, 
preferences between tuples are specified more indirectly, usually using binary pref­
erence relations which act upon attributes of tuples, where the preferences used 
are those gathered by the vendor. Chomicki discussed how preference relations 
can be defined in one of two main methods: using logical formulas, or using spe­
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cial preference constructors [38]. Examples of the former include Chomicki’s own 
work [36, 37]; examples of the latter include that of Kiefiling [102].
Whichever method is used for defining the preference relation itself, the mech­
anism by which a preference relation is embedded into a relational query language 
(such as SQL) is through the use of relational operators which extend the base 
language specification. The preference relation is expressed in these relational op­
erators, which are used by the DBMS to select the most preferred tuples from its 
dataset. Several different implementations of this approach have been proposed, 
such as Chomicki’s winnow operator [36, 37], Kiefiling’s BMO (Best Match Only) 
operator [102, 104], Torlone Ciaccia’s Best operator [161], and Borzsonyi et al’s 
skyline operator [20].
Since preference relations are incorporated into a relational query language 
through the use of new operators, optimisation and evaluation of queries can oc­
cur both by usual such methods and by new additional techniques that specifically 
target this new type of information. Examples of such new techniques include 
algorithms for evaluating general preference queries [37, 72] and algorithms for 
optimising preference queries [15, 20, 35, 38, 39, 72, 107, 133, 184]. Rizzi recently 
outlined the main research issues faced by the community in handling user prefer­
ences on OLAP cubes [145].
The usage of preferences for operations specifically requested by the consumer, 
such as performing a preference-enhanced search of the vendor’s catalogue, rep­
resents a usage of preferences tha t is easy for the consumer to understand the 
implications of, and exactly how their preferences are being used. The majority of 
relevant work in this area has concentrated on the direct embedding of preference 
information into relational query languages. While this means that preference- 
enhanced search can now be done in a relatively efficient and effective manner, 
to enable this the consumer must give all of their preference information to the 
vendor.
3.2.2.2 Implicit Usage
A less direct way that a consumer’s preferences can be used by a vendor can be 
viewed as an implicit use of preferences, meaning that the preferences are used for 
vendor-initated e-commerce operations (rather than consumer-initiated), i.e. any 
kind of personalisation that the vendor performs without an explicit request from 
the consumer.
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A typical example of such an implicit use of preferences is a “recommender 
system”. The idea behind these types of systems is to use information, including 
preference information of a particular person, to help recommend any items that 
a person may be interested in from a group of items so large that a person is 
unlikely to be able to manually find the items themselves. Examples of this include 
messages of interest in Usenet newsgroups, web sites on the internet and objects for 
sale on an e-commerce site. In the latter example the vendor may -  unprompted by 
the consumer -  display items that they think the consumer may have an interest 
in. Recommender systems are a technology widely adopted in e-commerce, the 
most famous of which is probably that used by Amazon; indeed, Jeff Bezos, CEO 
of Amazon.com, is widely quoted as saying “If I have 3 million customers on the 
Web, I should have 3 million stores on the Web” -  meaning that every single 
web page displayed to the consumer should be generated via input from their 
recommender system.
The first collaborative recommender system, called Tapestry, was created by 
Goldberg et al [73], who coined the term “collaborative filtering” (collaborative 
meaning that the information used to identify items that may be of interest comes 
from a group of people, rather than just the person involved). Tapestry was de­
signed to enable a person to find documents in a large document store; previous 
comments by other people were used as the source of information. While a success­
ful demonstrator, it had a few major issues: it only worked with small groups of 
people, and to use it people had to enter very specific queries -  somewhat defeating 
the purpose of collaborative filtering. Many systems based upon the idea of col­
laborative filtering followed; notable initial examples include GroupLens [106] and 
PHOAKS [159], both recommender systems designed to help users navigate Usenet 
newsgroup postings. Looking more specifically from the e-commerce perspective, 
Schafer, Konstan, and Riedl present a good review of the various commerical rec­
ommender systems [148] that were available at the height of the dot com era, while 
more recently Lin discussed recommender systems as one of several primary tech­
nologies important to e-commerce [95], concluding that “although recommender 
systems are clearly useful to buyers, they are especially valuable to sellers” .
The implicit usage of preferences represents a manner of usage that could change 
the way e-commerce vendors interact with consumers and in fact -  given examples 
such as Amazon.com -  it could be easily argued that this has already happened. 
Its main use, however, seems to be in helping vendors sell items to consumers that 
the consumer was not particularly looking for when they started their interaction
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with the vendor; rather than helping the consumer when they are looking for a 
specific type of item.
3.2.3  S u m m a r y  o f  E n h a n c e d  S e a r c h  T e c h n i q u e s
There are many approaches to both collecting, and subsequently using, a con­
sumer’s preferences. However, the collection of preferences always potentially leads 
to privacy issues centred around the fact that the vendor has possession of such 
personal information; while the usage of preferences always potentially leads to 
exploitation issues centred around the fact that the vendor can make use of this 
preference information to the point that the consumer may consider it an abuse 
of their trust -  if they ever found out. The first of these problems can be alle­
viated by making sure that consumers know that their preference information is 
being gathered and for what purpose it is to be used. The second of the problems 
can be managed either by the vendor stating upfront to what purposes the con­
sumer’s preferences will be used, and sticking to their promise, in some verifiable 
manner (e.g. taking part in a certification process like TRUSTe, as described in 
Section 3.1.2.1), or by using technology that aims to limit the amount of preference 
information sent to the vendor, thus minimising the amount of privacy loss and 
exploitation that could take place.
3 .3  S u m m a r y
This chapter has examined two main areas of work related to this thesis: existing 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs), and existing ways and means of obtaining 
a consumer’s preferences and using them to enhance the e-commerce experience.
The main method used by PETs in their aim to achieve protection of a con­
sumer’s privacy is to enable a consumer to conduct anonymous or pseudonymous 
transactions with a vendor; thus, it does not m atter what preference informa­
tion is released since the vendor cannot link this information back to a specific 
consumer. However, it was shown that this basic idea does not work in certain 
circumstances, such as when a consumer is interacting with a vendor and needs a 
physical item to be delivered to a real address that is linkable back to the consumer. 
In those cases, a different type of PET is needed: a non-anonymous (“onymous”) 
technology. These are designed to enhance a consumer’s privacy not by remaining 
anonymous but by minimising the amount of information that is given to a vendor.
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Obtaining and using a consumer’s preference can happen in a variety of ways. 
No matter which method is used, however, the collection of a consumer’s prefer­
ences assuredly leads to questions around privacy, since the vendor has knowledge 
of a key part of an individual’s psyche which many individuals wish to protect, 
while the actual usage of a consumer’s preferences to help with computational 
problems such as search potentially leads to questions around the possibility for 
exploitation -  whether this information is being used above and beyond what the 
consumer would deem reasonable. Thus there is an obvious link between a con­
sumer’s preferences and privacy: since a consumer’s preferences are a conceptual 
representation of a key part of their psyche, they represent information that the 
consumer may or may not wish to keep private.
Drawing these two conclusions and the conclusions of the previous chapter to­
gether, it can be seen there is at present a gap in knowledge -  the lack of a 
technology that is designed to control the release of a consumer’s preferences to 
allow preference-enhanced search in e-commerce in a privacy aware manner. The 
next chapter takes this conclusions and examines the area of preference-enhanced 
searching in detail, outlining what characteristics this onymous PET should have.
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This chapter examines issues concerning the use of using a consumer’s prefer­
ences to enhance the search process in e-commerce in detail. A model underpinning 
current e-commerce search is first discussed; this is then used to provide a precise 
description of the process of preference searching. Given this detail, the prob­
lems inherent in the design of current implementations of preference searching and 
the consequent implications for consumer privacy and the possibility for exploita­
tion are analysed. Finally, a new model tha t aims to help mitigate against these 
problems is introduced.
4 .1  E-COMMERCE
Pick up any newspaper, trade magazine, or academic journal, and chances are that 
some of the content focuses on e-Business or e-Commerce. But what exactly are 
e-Business and e-Commerce? While the classic terms “business” and “commerce” 
can usually be used interchangeably, their modern derivations “e-Business” and 
“e-Commerce” cannot. One of the most cited definitions of e-Business is that of 
IBM, one of the key players in the evolution of e-Business, who described it in 
1997 as “the transformation of key business processes through the use of Internet 
technologies” [29]. e-Commerce is commonly defined as a subset of e-Business -  
the part dealing with the buying and selling of products and services by businesses 
and consumers over the Internet.
e-Commerce plays an important part in a modern economy. Looking at the 
latest figures available at the time of writing, those of the year 2007, e-Commerce
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sales specifically were estimated to be worth UK£163 billion to the U.K. economy 
and US$124 billion to the U.S. economy (note that these figures cannot be directly 
compared due to different statistical analysis methodologies), growing at a rate of 
30% in the U.K. and 20% in the U.S., as compared to the previous year [129, 
130, 131, 167, 168]. While e-Commerce retail only represented a fraction of total 
retail sales (7.7% in the U.K. and 3.2% in the U.S.), the fact that e-Commerce 
growth rates have been outpacing total retail growth rates, coupled with the fact 
that 15% of UK businesses had sold goods online in 2006 -  which was over double 
that of the 6.9% figure seen just 4 years previously in 2002 [129] -  leads to the 
conclusion that e-Commerce is already fairly important to businesses worldwide. 
Furthermore, if the growth rates seen thus far continue along the same trends, 
then this importance is only going to increase in magnitude.
However, privacy concerns from the public have hampered the growth of e- 
commerce to a notable degree; one report by Forrester Research estimated that in 
2001 US$15 billion of sales were lost due to privacy concerns of consumers [66], 
while a report by Jupiter Research estimates that online retail sales would have 
been approximately 24% higher in 2002 if such privacy concerns had been dealt 
with effectively [97]. In 1999, Forrester Research predicted US$184 billion of US 
online retail sales in 2004 [65]; the actual figures seen were approximately US$71 
billion [166]. Many other reports with a similar theme have been published over 
the years (e.g. [48, 85, 92, 136, 180, 181], and while different reports focus on 
different aspects of the problem, all agree that there is a deficit between potential 
e-Commerce levels and those actually seen, owing to privacy concerns of the public. 
One study expounding this conclusion was G artner’s survey in June 2005 which 
showed that the problem has not abated over time, and predicted that these privacy 
concerns will only continue to further inhibit e-Commerce growth rates in the 
coming years [70].
The background to the reports of privacy concerns is that of a world where 
consumers only directly give a small amount of private information to e-Commerce 
vendors, such as name and address; the rest of the private information has to be 
gleaned by the vendor from purchasing habits of its consumers and other such 
statistical information. However, the world is changing: new technologies are 
being developed in which the consumer is required (at least, if they wish to use such 
technologies) to directly give the e-Commerce vendor larger amounts of personal 
information. One such emerging technology is addressed in this thesis, which is an 
area of active research, is in enhancing the e-commerce experience through making
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use of a consumer’s personal preferences.
4 .2  E-COMMERCE SEARCH
If e-Commerce is the process of buying and selling products and services over the 
internet, then a commonly seen part of this process is one whereby a consumer 
visits the website of a vendor and spends some time browsing or searching the 
vendor’s catalogue of available items until they find an item they wish to purchase; 
they then inform the vendor that they wish to purchase this item and send payment 
and delivery information to the vendor. Looking specifically at the case where the 
consumer is searching for an item, and not just browsing, this is described in more 
detail in Figure 4.1.
Consumer VendorClient/Agent
InternetCreate
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Send
Query
has
Evaluate
Query
has
r Poor—1
Send
Results
Receive
Results
Good
Purchase
Figure 4T: Current e-Commerce Search Scenario
The two main players involved in the process of searching are the consumer 
and the vendor. The consumer is a person who wishes to buy an item while the 
vendor is a real world business with an electronic presence on the internet and 
items to sell. Sitting between the consumer and the vendor is an agent usually 
a web browser residing on the consumer’s computer. The consumer has a set 
of preference criteria over the type of item that they wish to buy; this criteria 
exists only informally within their mind. Their main aim is to find an item that 
fits their preference criteria. The vendor has a set of stock available for sale 
and represented in a datastore. W ithout loss of generality, we assume that stock
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data is stored in a single relation S( Ai, A2, . . . ,  A k), where each A* is an attribute 
having an associated domain, Di 1 < i < k. Thus, a set of of available items are 
represented as a collection of tuples forming an instance of S  where each tuple 
t € D\ x D2 x . . .  x Dk.
E x a m p l e  1
Assume that we have a consumer who is wishing to purchase a used car. They have 
a set of preferences which states that the car is to be either a Mercedes or BM W  
(Mercedes is preferred), in Silver or Black (Silver is preferred); the make is more 
important to them than the colour; and they are willing to pay up to £35,000.
Also, assume that we have a vendor with a small collection of used cars for 
sale, and a website with a search interface. Car stocks are stored in a Cars(Make, 
Model, Colour, Engine Size, Electric Windows, Price) table, as shown below:
id Make Model Colour Engine Size Electric Windows Price
1 B M W 325i Black 5000 no £ 3 0 ,0 0 0
2 B M W M5 Silver 4500 yes £ 5 0 ,0 0 0
3 Ford Focus Red 1300 no £ 4 ,0 0 0
4 Mercedes SLK300 Silver 3500 yes £2 8 ,5 0 0
5 Mercedes SL315 Blue 3200 no £1 5 ,0 0 0
6 Mercedes SL615 Yellow 3000 yes £ 1 2 ,0 0 0
7 Toyota MR2 Sonic Shadow 1998 yes £ 6 ,0 0 0
8 Toyota Prius Black 1200 yes £ 8 ,0 0 0
The process of searching in e-commerce consists of the following steps:
(1) Create Search:
The consumer, using their internally held preferences, interacts with the 
vendor’s search function on a web page. They create an initial search query, 
Q i, which will contain a single search term for one or more of the attributes 
in the Cars table. Thus Q i represents a manually constructed subset of the 
consumer’s complete preferences. The initial search will likely be looking for 
the consumer’s “perfect” item. Using the example above, Q i will equate to 
a search for a Silver Mercedes costing less than £35,000.
(2) Send Query:
Q i is submitted to the vendor over the internet (either in a plaintext or 
encrypted format).
(3) Receive Query:
The vendor receives Q i.
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(4) Evaluate Query:
The vendor will take the Q\ and evaluate it with respect to the Cars table, 
returning a set of results, R\  tha t satisfy the search criteria of Qi. R\ will 
obviously be a subset of Cars (R\ c Cars). Using the example above, R\ 
would contain a single item -  item 4 (Silver Mercedes costing £28,500) since 
this falls within the scope of the query.
(5) Send Results:
The vendor will send R\ to the consumer, again over the internet.
(6) Receive Results:
The consumer receives R\ in the form of a human readable HTML page 
which displays each item in R\.
(7) Evaluate Results:
The consumer, using their internally held preferences, evaluates the results 
that were returned. If they decide that the results are not acceptable (for 
example, the result set is empty or too large, or they do not desire the items 
presented), then they may return to step (1) and formulate a new search 
query (Q2) by changing the search terms. This process may repeat one 
or more times, until acceptable results are returned or the consumer ends 
the process. When, however, the results returned were acceptable to the 
consumer, they may decide to purchase an items in the results. Using the 
example above, the consumer may decide to purchase the item presented to 
them.
(8) Payment:
If the consumer has decided to purchase an item, they would then go through 
a process of sending payment, and if necessary, delivery details to the vendor.
4.2.1 L i m i t a t i o n s  a n d  I s s u e s
While this basic e-commerce search methodology is currently widely used and 
relatively easy to implement it suffers from a number of limitations, most notably 
Information overload and empty result sets.
Information overload is the problem of large amounts of results being returned 
due to too broad a search being submitted (many of which are likely to be sub­
standard with respect to the user’s preferences); while empty result sets are the 
opposite problem of no results being returned due to too specific a search being
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submitted. Both are equally undesirable as they waste the time of the consumer, 
they waste the bandwidth of both consumer and vendor, and they are likely to 
frustrate consumers which may lead them to stop searching and even try a com­
petitor’s business after a few failed attempts.
The root cause of both information overload and empty result sets is the fact 
that the standard form e-commerce search takes is closely linked to the technology 
used to perform the search -  database queries in the form of hard constraints -  
meaning that searching works in an exact-match manner using specific keywords 
as specified by the consumer. This is in sharp contrast to the real world, where 
the consumer’s preferences are likely to be much more complex than what can be 
specified in this simple form, and where the consumer may often be prepared to 
compromise on less ideal results if they were all that were available.
Other limitations exist that are mostly focused around security, for example, the 
possibility that privacy can be lost to third parties intercepting communications, 
however, these are not dealt with in this thesis.
4 .3  E n h a n c e d  S e a r c h in g  u s i n g  P r e f e r e n c e s
New search techniques have been developed aimed at overcoming the related prob­
lems of information overload and empty result sets. These new techniques make 
use of a consumer’s personal preferences for searching, as shown in Figure 4.2.
VendorConsumer
Express
Prefs
Send
Prefs
has
Evaluate
Prefs
has
Evaluate
Results
Good
Purchase
Figure 4.2: Current e-Commerce Preference Search Scenario
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The two main players involved in the process of searching are the same as those 
seen in standard e-commerce search, but there is a difference in how the search is 
performed.
We illustrate the differences by running through the same example as before.
(1) Express Preferences:
The consumer, using their internally held preferences, interacts with the ven­
dor’s new preference search function on a web page. They express all of their 
preferences that they consider relevant for this search. Using the example 
above, this will equate to a search for a Mercedes or BMW (Mercedes is 
preferred), in Silver or Black (Silver is preferred), the make is more impor­
tant to them than the colour, and they are willing to pay up to £35,000. In 
addition, the consumer also indicates that they would like to see the top two 
items.
(2) Send Preferences:
All of the preferences are submitted to the vendor over the internet (either 
in a plaintext or encrypted format).
(3) Receive Preferences:
The vendor receives the preferences.
(4) Evaluate Preferences:
The vendor will evaluate the preferences with respect to the Cars table, 
returning a set of results, R  tha t satisfy the preferences. R  will obviously 
be a subset of Cars (R  c Cars). R  would contain the two items from Cars 
that most closely match the preferences -  item 4 (Silver Mercedes costing 
£28,500) and item 1 (Black BMW costing £30,000) -  since these fall within 
the scope of the preference query.
(5) Send Results:
The vendor will send R  to the consumer, again over the internet.
(6) Receive Results:
The consumer receives R  in the form of a human readable HTML page which 
displays each item in R.
(7) Evaluate Results:
The consumer, using their internally held preferences, evaluates the results 
that were returned. If they decide that the results are not acceptable (i.e.
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if the results shown were too far down their preference ordering), they may 
abandon the process. If, however, any of the results returned were acceptable 
to the consumer, they may decide to purchase one of them. Using the ex­
ample above, the consumer may decide to purchase the first item presented 
to them.
(8) Payment:
If the consumer has decided to purchase an item, they would then go through 
a process of sending payment, and if necessary, delivery details to the vendor.
Highlighting the differences between the models of preferences search and stan­
dard search, it can be seen:
o The consumer, instead of manually mentally constructing a single search 
from their preferences, now detail the whole of their preferences. Given 
that these preferences have now left a conceptual representation within the 
consumer’s mind, there now needs to exist a formal method of representing 
such preferences and a method in which the consumer can express them to 
the vendor. The consumer also expresses the amount of results that they 
wish returned.
o The vendor, instead of accepting a simple binary keyword search terms, now 
accepts a preference query, PQ. Conceptually, PQ  is used by the vendor 
to create a function, <5(PQ,Sj), which computes a preference score for each 
of the items in their table, where a higher value of 8 indicates an item that 
more closely matches PQ. Those items with the highest 8 values are the top 
most preferred items, and a set of these, containing the amount of items the 
consumer requested, are returned to the consumer as a result set R.
Thus, given this formulation of this new model of preference search, the work 
that has been accomplished thus far concentrates on the mechanics of how the 
vendor can take a set of preferences and efficiently evaluate it with respect to 
stock database.
4.3.1 L i m i t a t i o n s  a n d  I s s u e s
While this new model clearly addresses the issues it set out to solve -  namely, 
those of information overload and empty result sets -  an assumption implicit to 
the model, and therefore to all of the technologies so far created, is that the vendor
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is entirely trustworthy. This assumption means that all existing implementations 
thus far have unwittingly adopted an approach that we have deemed the “complete 
release” paradigm.
The essence of “complete release” is that since the vendor is assumed to be 
entirely trustworthy, the consumer happily gives the entirety of their preference 
information to them. In practice, however, the main goal of most vendors is to 
turn as large a profit as possible for its shareholders: if an opportunity to increase 
profit presents itself, then the assumption that the vendor is entirely trustworthy 
is one that cannot realistically hold to be true in all cases. Even if we assume that 
the majority of vendors were to be trustworthy, the fact that some may not be -  
and that the consumer has no way of identifying which are and which are not -  
means that the consumer has to either accept the risk or assume that none are 
trustworthy.
Thus, the model of preference searching as currently used presents two main 
problems.
4.3.1.1 Privacy
The relationship between privacy and a consumer’s preferences is fairly simple in 
premise -  preferences over different items, and the relative preferences between 
the items, represent a key part of the psyche of a consumer, thus representing a 
significant and valuable set of private information. Given the conclusions drawn 
in Chapter 2 that information in the age in which we live is greased (once released, 
a consumer has lost control of it), one way to attem pt to minimise this loss of 
control is to attem pt to minimise the release of the information in the first place. 
Thus, consumers who wish to retain as much privacy as possible need to release 
as little preference information as possible.
If a consumer wishes to make use of preference search techniques, they must 
release some amount of preference information. While they may only release it in 
small amounts about specific categories of items to an individual vendor (i.e. either 
intentionally or unintentionally minimising preference release) thus mitigating the 
issue somewhat, the minimisation of even this small amount of privacy loss is 
still vitally important because vendors can potentially collude, linking together 
small amounts of information they each glean about a consumer, building up an 
almost complete picture of a consumer’s preferences. This, coupled with personally 
identifiable information (PII) about the consumer, such as name and address, could
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in the extreme case result in an almost total and comprehensive loss of privacy.
Even without the use of preference search techniques, if a consumer is to buy 
an item from a vendor, then a small amount of preference information generally 
has to be given away -  the item will have characteristics that are obviously liked 
by the consumer -  notwithstanding some of the techniques in Chapter 3, which 
were evaluated as not being generally applicable to e-Commerce. So, if a consumer 
wishes to take part in e-Commerce then they cannot eradicate all preference in­
formation from being released to a vendor; however, a target that is possible, and 
should be aimed for, is to minimise the needless release of preferences wherever 
possible. This should make the possibility of vendors piecing together information 
about a person’s preferences harder to do with less accurate results.
The current model of preference searching is based upon the idea that the en­
tirety of a consumer’s stated preferences are communicated to the vendor. All cur­
rent preference searching implementations are centred around this model. While 
this does mean that they are all relatively efficient since various search optimisation 
techniques can be used, they each fail on this privacy issue. Preference searching 
technologies that are little more careful about what preference information they 
release to the vendor are needed.
4.3.1.2 Exploitation
The Oxford English Dictionary16 defines exploitation as “The action of turning to 
account for selfish purposes, using for one’s own profit” . Given the specific scenario 
of exploitation in e-Commerce discussed in this thesis, we notionally extend and 
focus this definition of exploitation to introduce the idea of “preference exploita­
tion” , giving it a meaning of “a vendor making use of the information contained 
within a consumer’s preferences to their advantage, and potentially the consumer’s 
disadvantage” .
The information contained within a consumer’s preferences are potentially sub­
ject to many different types of preference exploitation, all of which share a common 
theme: the vendor, given a preference query, would return a set of results that is 
collectively not the most preferred set of results that could be returned, because 
the vendor would rather sell the items in the set they return. Using the 6 function 
defined earlier this equates to the vendor returning an “exploited” result set, i?e, 
rather than the “unexploited” result set, R u, even though 8(P,Re) < S(P,RU).
16http://dictionary.oed.com/
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The simplest way to demonstrate this idea is through the use of a few examples. 
Looking from the point of view of individual items (with no loss in generalisation 
for sets of items), for example, a vendor could attem pt to:
o Maximise Profit: the vendor could artificially inflate the preferred ranking of 
less preferred items whose price is greater, i.e. i f  3sy,sx € S s.t. (5(P,sy) -  
6(P,sx) < e) AND (Price(sy) > Price(sx)) (where S  is the stock data and e 
is a value tuned by the vendor that indicates how closely preferred sy must 
be to sx such that it is still likely the consumer will want to buy sy) then 
the vendor returns sy instead of sx.
o Maximise the range of stock available: the vendor could artificially inflate 
the preferred ranking of items with large quantity levels in an attempt to 
only sell items with low quantity levels to consumers who are looking for 
that specific item. i.e. i f  3sy,s x e S  s.t. (6(P ,sy) - S ( P , s x) < e) AND 
(Quantity(sy) > a)  AND (Q uantity(sx) < (5) (where S  and e are as defined 
previously, and a  and /? are values set by the vendor indicating their desired 
overstocking level of sy and minimum stock level of sx respectively), then 
the vendor returns sy instead of sx.
o Artificially promote specific items: a supplier of a particular item could 
provide inducements to a vendor to artificially inflate the preferred ranking 
of their particular product, i.e. i f  3syisx e S  s.t. (5(P,sy) - S ( P ,s x) < e) 
AND (sy e T), (where S  and e are as defined previously, and T  is the set of 
items the vendor wishes to inflate the rankings of.
Thus, given adequate preference information from a consumer, a vendor is able 
to exploit the information contained within to their own advantage, and the con­
sumer’s disadvantage; thus preference exploitation is a real potential problem in 
the world of preference searching.
Looking closer at the notion of preference exploitation, it can be seen that 
exploitation of this form can be thought of as being akin to price discrimination. 
Price discrimination is commonly defined as being the sale of identical goods or 
services from the same provider at different prices to different customers, depending 
on their willingness to pay. In general, economists are proponents of this economic 
practise since definite economic advantages have been demonstrated, while the 
general public are usually opponents; vociferously disproving of it as they perceive 
it as being unfair to them and downright exploitative [128]. Exploitation of a
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consumer’s preferences, however, goes one step further than price discrimination: 
it allows the sale of different, less preferred, goods or services from the same vendor 
for an unchanged or increased price. In the worst case, a consumer could end up 
paying more for an item they desire less.
From a vendor’s point of view, preference exploitation is eminently sensible: 
they may argue that all they are enabling is a simple process such as maximisa­
tion of profit; a core goal any competent business strives for. From a consumer’s 
point of view, however, making use of enhanced search techniques which were sup­
posed to make their e-commerce interactions easier and better, but which instead 
leads to their exploitation, is obviously not desirable. Given the public dislike 
of price discrimination, this comparable but demonstrably more unfair and ex­
ploitative process could potentially seriously harm the public view of e-commerce, 
and therefore there is a real need to create technologies that mitigate against the 
possibility.
4 .4  A  N e w  M o d e l
To address the issues regarding privacy and exploitation inherent in the current 
model of the problem represented by existing implementations of preference search­
ing, an adapted model is necessary. Such a model would have the following con­
straints and characteristics:
o A Vendor, V , has a dataset of available stock items S.
o A Consumer, C , acting through an agent, A , has a set of preferences P.
o S(P, Si) is a function which computes a preference score for an item s* € S  -  
where a higher 6 indicates Si more closely matches P  and a lower S indicates 
Si less closely matches P.
o The vendor cannot be assumed to be “honest” , i.e. V  is not just interested 
in returning C  an item from S , Sx, s.t. sx most closely matches P  (such that 
a sale is likely) but also both in gathering as much preference information 
about C  as possible, and in potentially exploiting the information contained 
within P  to instead return an item sy e S s.t 8(P, sy) < S(P , sx) but V  wants 
to sell more rather than sx for some reason.
o The consumer is no longer just interested in finding the item sx inS  that most 
closely matches their preference information in P  -  i.e. the item in S  with
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the largest 8. This time, they are also requiring that the size of P  handed to 
the vendor is minimised, as are the chances that the vendor can exploit the 
information in P  to return sy instead of sx, where 8(P,sy) < 8(P,sx) but the 
vendor would rather sell Sy.
o To achieve the goal of minimising the size of the released preferences, instead 
of the consumer simply giving P  to the vendor, they instead should give P S  
(where P S  <= P). The vendor will then evaluate it against S  and against 
their own requirements, returning sz.
o Note that now sx is the item in S  which most closely matches P, sy would 
be the item that V  would return to C  given P , and sz is the item that V  
returns to C given PS.  Thus, C  is attem pting to find the sz with the lowest 
8(P S,sx) - 8 ( P S , s z).
Thus, given this new formulation of the problem, the work that needs to be 
accomplished centres on how the consumer can find the correct P S  from P  such 
that the vendor returns an item sz e S  with a minimal 5(PS, sx) -  8(PS, sz) while 
not giving away too many of their preferences (P S  is a minimal subset of P), 
i.e. the consumer receives the benefits of using their preferences to search without 
losing too much preference information.
4.4.1 G r a d u a l  P a r t i a l  R e l e a s e
An alternative approach to preference searching has been created based on the 
new model -  “Gradual Partial Release” (GPR) -  based upon the idea of sending 
a single subset of the consumer’s full set of preferences (partial release), and of 
repeating this process with different subsets of the full set of preferences until 
satisfactory results are returned (gradual partial release). The core idea of this 
approach is conceptually fairly simple and is described in Figure 4.3.
Again, we illustrate the differences between the new and the previously de­
scribed approaches through the same example as before.
(1) Express Preferences:
The consumer, using their internally held preferences, interacts with an 
agent, expressing their preferences relevant to the preference search they 
wish to perform, i.e. P  is given to A. They also express a number, n, which 
represents the number of results they wish to retrieve. Using Example 1,
59
4.4 A  N e w  M o d e l
Consumer
Send
Query
A
has *
has
Express
Prefs Create
Query
Calculate
Subset Send
Results
More needed
(10)
iood-
Good
Receive
Results
Purchase
Figure 4.3: Proposed e-Commerce Preference Search Scenario
P  will equate to a search for a Mercedes or BMW (Mercedes is preferred), 
in Silver or Black (Silver is preferred), the make is more important to them 
than the colour, and they are willing to pay up to £35,000. Assume that the 
consumer also indicated tha t they would like to see the top two items.
(2) Calculate Subset:
Using a preference subset creation algorithm, (to be discussed in Chapter 5 
the agent creates a subset of P , PSi.  This subset can contain preference 
information for one or more of the attributes in the Cars table. If the pref­
erence subset creation algorithm aimed to first create a subset representing 
the consumer’s “ideal” item, the preference subset would equate to a query 
for a Silver Mercedes, costing up to £35,000.
(3) Create Query:
The agent takes the preference subset, PS\  and converts it into a query, Q i. 
This could either be a simple binary keyword search query, or the existing 
work on preference searching could be utilised and a preference query created.
(4) Send Query:
Q i is submitted to the vendor over the internet.
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(5) Receive Query:
The vendor receives Q i.
(6) Evaluate Query:
The vendor will take Qi and evaluate it with respect to the Cars table, 
returning a set of results Ri  (where Ri  c Cars) that satisfy the search criteria 
in Qi. Using Example 1, Ri  would contain a single item -  item 4 (Silver 
Mercedes costing £28,500) since this falls within the scope of the query.
(7) Send Results:
The vendor will send R\ to the consumer, again over the internet.
(8) Receive Results:
The agent receives R\.
(9) Evaluate Results (by Agent):
The agent takes Ri and evaluates its contents, using criteria such as n results 
being required (but possibly other criteria as well). If more results are re­
quired, the agent may formulate a new search query by going back to step 2 
and calculating a different subset of P  to release and the process will repeat. 
The items in each successive Rm received will be combined into one overall 
result set, R. When its evaluation criteria are fulfilled, the agent will then 
present R  to the consumer it is acting for. If R  becomes larger than n, the 
agent will evaluate the results and presents the n items within R  that best 
match P.
(10) Evaluate Results (by Consumer):
The consumer using their internally held preferences, P , evaluates the re­
sults that were returned. If the results were acceptable, they may decide to 
purchase one of the items in the results.
(11) Payment:
If the consumer has decided to purchase an item, they would then go through 
a process of sending payment, and if necessary, delivery details to the vendor.
Highlighting the differences between the models of the new approach to prefer­
ence search and the existing approach to preference search, as previously described, 
it can be seen that:
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o The consumer, instead of expressing the whole of their preferences, P , di­
rectly to a vendor, now expresses it more locally to an agent acting on their 
behalf.
o The agent takes these preferences and splits them up into a series of subsets 
of the whole preferences, in order that these can be released gradually to the 
vendor.
Thus, an implementation that enables this approach needs the following:
(a) A way of allowing a consumer to express preferences to an agent;
(b) A method of storing these preferences within an agent in a form that allows 
operations necessary to partition preferences;
(c) A preference subset creation algorithm to take a complete set of preferences 
and split it up into one or more preference subsets;
(d) A way of sending these preference subsets to a vendor and returning retrieved 
results.
This approach of splitting up a consumer’s preference into subsets and grad­
ually releasing them could be both a technology that directly meets the aims of 
minimising privacy loss and exploitation, and an enabler of further methods of 
fulfilling these aims in a more effective manner. Directly, this approach will allow 
the possibility that only a certain amount of the full set of preference information 
of the consumer will have to be released, meaning they do not lose control of this 
information, and also meaning there is less information available to the vendor to 
practise exploitation. As an enabling technology, this approach allows for methods 
such as sending preference queries with some “fake” preference information as a 
constituent part in order to further enhance the privacy of the preference infor­
mation that is given out (in a process similar to [154]); however, this idea is not 
discussed further in this thesis.
4 .5  S u m m a r y
This chapter has analysed the issues around search in e-Commerce. The model of 
standard e-commerce search was examined and some of its issues were discussed -  
notably information overload or empty result sets. A model of using a consumer’s
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preferences to help combat these problems has been introduced by the community; 
this was in turn examined and issues inherent to this model were highlighted: issues 
around the related areas of privacy and exploitation, caused by the fact that the 
model is based upon giving all of a consumer’s preference information to a vendor 
and trusting them with this personal information. The conclusion was drawn that 
to combat these problems an alternative model of enable preference searching was 
needed; such an alternative model was then proposed, based on the idea of an agent 
acting on behalf of the consumer gradually releasing only parts of the consumer’s 
preferences to a vendor. The next chapter will consider the new model in detail.
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G r a d u a l  P a r t ia l  R e l e a s e  o f
P r e f e r e n c e s
Privacy loss and the potential for exploitation are potential problems when 
using a consumer’s preferences to assist with searching in e-commerce. The previ­
ous chapter proposed an alternative approach to the idea of preference searching 
that mitigates against these problems. This chapter details an implementation of 
this approach. It first introduces definitions and detail necessary to describe the 
implementation, followed by details of the implementation itself.
5 .1  P r e f e r e n c e s
To allow preference searching in e-commerce using the proposed approach, the 
consumer must express their preference information to their agent, and the agent 
needs to store the information in a form that it is able to work with and per­
form computation upon. Various frameworks and preference languages have been 
explored by the community over the years that would enable this.
Lacroix and Lavency presented one of the first complex studies of preference 
queries [109], proposing an extension to domain relation calculus whereby prefer­
ences can be expressed in the form of logical conditions. However, their work did 
not contain any formal language for expressing this logic, and was only able to 
capture fairly simple preferences [37].
The first work that addressed the expression of preferences in any detail was 
accomplished by both by Kiefiling and Giintzer [103], and Kostler et al [108], and 
by Govindarajan et al [78, 79]; these two independent sets of work centred on 
the specific area of deductive databases and proposed extensions to Datalog to
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accomplish their goals. While both sets of work were comprehensive, they both 
require a specialised query evaluation engine to work.
Following this, three groups of researchers all presented separate (but mostly 
similar) frameworks for formulating preferences. Agrawal and Wimmers first in­
troduced a framework for expressing and combining preferences [8] that works by 
specifying preferences between tuples of a relation using scoring functions, whereby 
a numeric score is associated with each tuple of a query result set. However, it 
does not provide a mechanism of associating a consumer’s preferences with the 
tuples such that a preferred ordering can be achieved. The other two pieces of 
work, however, do. These were Kiefiling and Kostler’s Best Match Only (BMO) 
query model [102, 104], and Chomicki’s Winnow operator [37]. Both were similar 
in scope, but Chomicki’s work defined preferences in the form of logical formu­
las, while Kiefiling and Kostler’s work defined preferences using special preference 
constructors.
Alongside these general frameworks for formulating preferences, more specific 
implementations were introduced. An example of this is the skyline operator, in­
troduced in 2001 by Borzsonyi et al [20], which when given a set of preferences 
over numeric attributes will search for a set of “interesting” tuples, where inter­
esting means that it is not dominated by any other tuple. For example, hotel hi 
dominates hotel h2 if hi is cheaper than h2 but both have the same rating. The 
problem being solved by the skyline operator is also known as the maximal vector 
problem. This has been implemented by extending the SQL syntax to allow a 
“SKYLINE OF ...” clause to be added to a standard SELECT statement. While 
a very powerful idea, it is limited to working with numeric attributes only, and 
thus is not flexible enough for our purposes.
The work presented in this thesis is an enhancement to the general concept of 
preference searching, and not to any specific existing preference searching tech­
nology. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, the requirements of a preference 
framework are simply to allow preferences to be expressed and evaluated in a 
technology-independent manner. This should mean that the results will be rele­
vant to any preference framework. However, rather than starting completely from 
scratch, the work of Kiefiing (i.e. the work presented in [102]) will be used as a 
base -  since it gives a set of base preference constructors that allow fairly complex 
preferences to be expressed in a manner that has a sound logical underpinning, 
while remaining simple to use, without loss of generality.
A consumer’s preferences over a specific category of items will naturally exist
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in the form of preferred values across a range of attributes used to describe items 
within that category. For example, when thinking about a car they wish to buy, 
a consumer might have preferences about the make, engine size, and price: they 
may prefer the make to be “BMW”, followed by “Mercedes” or “Ford” ; and the 
engine size to be between 1500cc and 2000cc. These may be considered as “value 
preferences” , i.e. preferences expressed over values of a specific attribute of an item. 
The first is an example of a “discrete value preference” (preferences expressed over 
specific values); the second an example of a “range value preference” (preferences 
expressed over a range of values). The consumer might also have a preference about 
which of these attributes are more preferred: they may consider their preferences 
over make to be more more important than those over engine size. This may be 
considered an “attribute preference” , i.e. a preference expressed over a set of value 
preferences.
Within both such preferences a preferred ordering is specified, or can be in­
ductively assembled, allowing a consumer to specify a preference ordering (or lack 
thereof) between two discrete values within a value preference, between sets of 
continuous values within a range preference, or between value preferences within 
an attribute preference. The preference operators that enable this, along with a 
more in-depth discussion of each of the types of preferences, are now detailed.
5.1.1 R e l a t i v e  P r e f e r e n c e  O p e r a t o r s
To allow complex preference relations to be directly expressed, or inductively built, 
two preference operators are required. These are the Pareto and Prioritised accu­
mulation operators [102].
D e f i n i t i o n  1 - P a r e to  A c c u m u la tio n  O p era to r
The pareto accumulation operator (®) defines a relation between two values (v\ and 
v2), where v\ ® v2 indicates that v\ is considered equally as preferred as v2.
D e f i n i t i o n  2 - P r io r it ise d  A c c u m u la tio n  O p era to r
The prioritised accumulation operator (h )  defines a relation between two values (v\
and v2), where v\ & v2 indicates that v\ is more preferred than v2.
Based on these two operators, we introduce two types of value preference and 
an attribute preference in the following sections.
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5.1.2 D i s c r e t e  V a l u e  P r e f e r e n c e s
A Discrete Value Preference (DVP) is a Value Preference defined on a single at­
tribute. Let vi, U2 , . . . ,  Vk be a set of values of a discrete attribute A. A  DVP on A  
is expressed in the form of A = exp , where exp involves Ui, • • • , vk and the two 
preference operators, and is formed according to the following grammar:
<dvp> ::= <equal-values>
I <equal-values> <prioritised-op> <equal-values> 
<equal-values> ::= <value>
I <equal-values> <pareto-op> <value>
<pareto-op> ::= ®
<prioritised-op> ::= &
<value> ::= <character> I <value> <character>
<character> : : = A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N  
| 0 | P | Q | R | S | T | U  I V  | W | X | Y | Z | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |  
5 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I 0
For example, Colour = Silver <8> Black Red <8> Green <8> W hite  is a DVP, and it 
expresses that Silver or Black are equally preferred, followed by the less preferred 
set of values of Red, Green or White (equally preferred). Note that when oper­
ators appear in a single DVP the Pareto operator (<8>) takes precedence over the 
Prioritised operator (&) in computation. That is, Colour = Silver <B> Black & Red® 
Green®White is equivalent to Colour = (Silver <8> Black) &L(Red<8>Green®W hite) . 
Also note that all values expressed in this form are required to be distinct, hence 
cyclic preference relations (e.g. V\ Sz V2 & th) are not valid17.
A DVP may be represented as a partially directed graph: each vertex represents 
a value in the expression; vertices connected by a directed edge represent a Pri­
oritised relationship (&); and vertices connected by an undirected edge represent 
a Pareto relationship (<8>) preference relationship. For simplicity of presentation, a 
set of vertices connected by undirected edges can also be condensed as a supernode. 
Figure 5.1 gives an example of a DVP.
It is easy to see from the properties of a DVP that there should be no isolated 
vertices in a graph representing a DVP as this graph is acyclic.
17More expressive preference frameworks exist, and the reader is referred to [38, 102] for further 
details. For the purposes of this thesis, we only consider a simple preference framework.
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Red
Silver
Green
Black
White
Figure 5.1: Example of a DVP represented as a graph
5.1.3 R a n g e  V a l u e  P r e f e r e n c e s
A Range Value Preference (RVP) is similarly defined to that of a DVP, except 
that it is specified over a range, rather than a set of discrete values. To express 
an RVP, a standard set of Range Preference Operators, as used by Kiefiling’s et 
al. [102, 104], may be used. These are “GREATER THAN (X )” (a preference for 
values greater than X ), “LESS THAN (X )” (a preference for values less than V), 
“BETWEEN (V ,y )” (a preference for values between X  and V), “HIGHER” (a 
preference for higher values), and “LOWER” (a preference for lower values).
An RVP on an attribute A  is expressed in the form of A  = exp, where exp is 
constructed according to the following grammar:
<rvp> ::= <rvp-gt> I <rvp-lt> I <rvp-bet> I <rvp-higher> I <rvp-lower> 
<rvp-gt> ::= "GREATER THAN" <value>
<rvp-lt> ::= "LESS THAN" <value>
<rvp-bet> ::= "BETWEEN" <value> <value>
<rvp-higher> ::= "HIGHER"
<rvp-lower> ::= "LOWER"
<value> :: = <numbers> I <numbers> <decimal-point> <numbers>
<decimal-point> :: = "."
<numbers> : = <number> I <number><numbers>
<number> :: = 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 0
For example, a consumer may wish to define a preference over an attribute of 
Engine Size for those items with values less than 3000. This would be expressed 
as EngineSize = L E S S  T H A N  3000.
Range Value Preferences do not explicitly contain the Prioritised and Pareto 
preference accumulation operators, however, they can be implicitly inferred. The
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Greater T han , Less T h a n , and Between  operators will split a range of values 
up into two groups of equally preferred values, with a prioritised relation between 
them. For example, Greater Than x  splits a range up into a group of values 
greater than the value x, all equally preferred, which are preferred to the group of 
values less than the value x, all equally preferred.
Note that if further preferences over a range are desired, then a DVP may be 
used: for example, suppose a consumer wished to express a preference of Engine 
Size less than 5 litres, but prefers 2 or 3 litres to 4 litres, they could express a DVP 
of EngineSize  = 2L <8> 3L & 4L.
5.1.4 A t t r i b u t e  P r e f e r e n c e s
Discrete and Range Value Preferences, as described above, allow preferences to 
be stated over values of a single attribute. To allow preferences to be defined 
across the multiple attributes that usually describe available items the notion of 
an “Attribute Preference” is now introduced.
An Attribute Preference, A P , is a set of Value Preferences, VP\, VP 2 , . . .  ,V P n, 
with a preference accumulation operator defined sequentially between them. The 
grammar for constructing an AP is the same as that for a DVP, except that 
attributes are substituted for values. For example, supposing Colour and Make 
were equally preferred, with Gears less preferred: this would be expressed as A P  = 
M ake <8> Colour k  Gears, or as a graph shown in Figure 5.2.
Colour
Make
Figure 5.2: Example of an A ttribute Preference represented as a graph
The interpretation of one attribute being preferred to another in an A P  is 
essentially “importance” -  in the sense of which attribute should assume prece­
dence when being evaluated. For example, suppose we have two DVPs, M ake = 
M erced eskB M W  and Colour = Silver kB la c k , along with an AP, A P  = M a k ek  
Colour (Figure 5.3 shows this preference information represented graphically). 
This indicates that the Make attribute is more preferred than the Colour attribute.
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Thus, if given two items, a Black Mercedes and a Silver BMW, the Make attribute 
takes precedence, meaning that the preferred item would be that containing the 
more preferred value of the Make attribute: the Black Mercedes, since Mercedes 
is more preferred than BMW. If however, the A P  had been A P  = M ake <8> Colour 
(i.e. Make and Colour are equally preferred), then no precedence between the 
two attributes would be indicated and both items would be considered equally 
preferred.
Make
Colour
►( BMW
Silver \ Black j
Figure 5.3: Attribute Preference with Values
It should be noted, however, that while an AP defines computational precedence 
between attributes thus allowing values from different attributes to be assessed as 
more or less “important” , as in the previous example, this does not mean that 
a preference relationship between values from different attributes can be directly 
established. In other words, using the previous example, it could not be said that 
M ake = Mercedes is more preferred than Colour = S ilver , since attem pting to 
assess the relative preference between values of different attributes makes no sense 
in the given preference framework.
5 .2  P r e f e r e n c e  S e t
When a consumer has specified a set of Value Preferences (over values in a single 
attribute), and a set of Attribute Preferences (over attributes of a table), we have 
a Preference Set V. In this section we observe the properties associated with, and 
establish some measures for, P , before considering how V  may be split up and 
sent to the vendor to allow preference search while minimising privacy loss and 
the potential for exploitation in the next section.
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5.2.1 F u l l y  D e f i n e d  a n d  C o m p l e t e l y  O r d e r e d
Two properties that V  may have are Fully Defined and Completely Ordered; these 
properties are introduced as they are useful during the process of splitting V  up 
into subsets, as discussed in Section 5.4
If V  meets the following criteria then it is known as “Fully Defined” : all at­
tributes referred to within V  are connected, i.e. there are no pairs of attributes 
without a defined preference relation (either explicitly stated or that can be de­
duced); and for each DVP within P , all values within it are connected, i.e. there 
are no pairs of values without a defined preference relation (either explicitly stated 
or that can be deduced). Fully Defined Preference Sets have the following prop­
erty: given any two attributes, or two values within any one of its attributes, a 
defined preference relation can be shown. Hence, there can be no ambiguity when 
assessing the relative preference of one value to another within a DVP, or the 
relative preference of one attribute to another within an AP.
If P  meets the following criteria then it is known as “Completely Ordered” : all 
Attribute Preferences within V  have a specified prioritised ordering (i.e. there are 
no pairs of attributes defined as equally preferred within the A ttribute Preference); 
and all DVPs have a specified prioritised ordering (i.e. there are no pairs of values 
defined as equally preferred within the DVP). Completely Ordered Preference Sets 
have the following property: given any two attributes, or two values within any 
one of its DVPs, a definite preferred ordering can be directly established.
These properties of V  are important to the approach to preference searching 
outlined in this thesis. If parts of P  are to be released in a gradual process 
according to some algorithm, that algorithm will need to be able to calculate 
the more preferred value of a set of values in a Value Preference, and the more 
preferred attribute in an Attribute Preference, in order to decide which to release. 
A completely ordered V  can clearly help with that task.
Given that the grammar of expressing a single DVP requires all values within 
the DVP to be connected, and the grammar of expressing a single AP requires all 
values within the AP to be connected, it is easy to see tha t V  is guaranteed to 
be fully defined. To obtain a completely ordered P , we may impose some default 
assumptions on a fully defined V. We will describe this process in Section 5.4.1.3.
We assume that V  contains a single AP. This is a reasonable assumption because 
it is relatively straightforward to combine multiple APs into a single AP, based on 
the grammatical rules defined for an AP given in the previous section, and using
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a process similar to that employed to obtain a completely ordered V  as described 
in Section 5.4.1.3. Thus, for the remainder of this thesis, we will consider that V  
contains a single AP only.
5 .2 .2  S ize  o f  In f o r m a t i o n  in  P r e f e r e n c e s
Attempting to assess a quantitative “amount” of preference information within a 
set of preferences stated by a consumer is an area that previous work in the area of 
expressing and defining preferences has not needed to explore; this is because such 
work has typically concentrated on the expressing of preferences and the mechanics 
of the evaluation of this information over a set of items. However, if a technology 
is to take these preferences, split them into subsets, and evaluate which subsets it 
should send (and in which order) then this area of work becomes necessary as it 
will inform this evaluation process.
When considering a DVP, an obvious and relatively meaningful way to measure 
the amount of preference information within it is to simply examine how many 
values have been specified by the consumer. Thus a DVP with four values specified 
contains twice as much preference information as a DVP with only two values 
specified. Thus, we define the preference information contained within a DVP, 
denoted by ||DVP||, as the number of values present in the DVP.
Measuring the amount of preference information contained with a RVP, how­
ever, is distinctly less obvious. For example, a RVP that indicates a consumer 
wishes the image quality of a digital camera to be between 4 and 8 megapixels 
could suggest a single value (4-8 megapixels), 5 values (4,5,6,7, and 8 megapixels), 
or 50 values (4.0, 4.1, 4.2, ... ,7.8, 7.9, and 8.0 megapixels). If the first -  speci­
fying a single value -  then there is a question of how specifying between 4 and 8 
megapixels compares to that between 6 and 8 megapixels. If the second or th ird  -  
turning the preference into a series of discrete values and counting -  then how does 
one specify which is the correct interval? This problem is very similar in nature 
to that seen in the worlds of machine learning and data mining, where much work 
has been done on “discretising” (or “quantising”) continuous data into discrete 
intervals. These methods are developed primarily to help reduce time complexity 
when dealing with datasets with continuous data and to derive useful information 
from the data. Catlett presented a seminal overview of work in this area almost 20 
years ago [27], mainly focused on the machine learning area, while more recently 
several texts on data mining include sections on discretising data, e.g. [67, 83, 183].
72
5.2 P r e f e r e n c e  S e t
A simplistic approach -  and one adopted for the proof of concept implemen­
tation of GPR in this thesis -  is tha t a single RVP represents a single piece of 
preference information. The reasoning behind this is twofold. Firstly, it could 
be argued that an individual piece of preference information is one that focuses 
a search query in a single way. A RVP will either focus the query in one way 
in exactly the same way as a single value in a DVP, i.e. splitting a set of items 
into two -  those items that match this preference and those that do not -  or by 
instructing the query to order the items in a certain manner (i.e. the H IG H E R  
or L O W E R  RVPs). Secondly, and more pragmatically, this will allow the basic 
idea of gradual release of subsets of a consumer’s preference information to be 
investigated without engaging in a large amount of work of discovering the best 
method of discretising preference information in these circumstances. Using a less 
simple approach, for example “discretising” the data and measuring the amount 
of items in the resulting set, could potentially become a very complex problem 
given that a different approach to discretising may be needed for different domains 
that preferences were expressed over. This is left for future work. Thus, we define
i i w p i i  = i.
Given a way of measuring preference information contained within both types 
of Value Preferences, measuring the preference information with a Preference Set 
V  as a whole, denoted ||P||, is a matter of calculating the sum of the size of its 
constituent Value Preferences. That is, let V  be a Preference Set containing a 
single AP over VPUVP2, . . . ,  VPn. Then, \\P\\ = £ \\VPi\l
i =1
5 .2 .3  P r e f e r e n c e  S u b s e t s
To enable the idea of partial release of a consumer’s preferences, the concept of 
a subset of a consumer’s preference is necessary. A Preference Subset (PS)  is 
essentially the Preference Set V  with zero or more preference values removed. An 
example of this is shown in Figure 5.4, where each value that will be kept is shaded 
and each value that will be removed is not.
A V S  with zero values removed is, of course, equal to V,  and equates to the 
existing approach to preference search -  that of releasing all of the consumer’s 
preferences in one go. A V S  with all values removed would represent a search with 
no preference information and would thus equate to a non preference-enhanced 
search. So, for the purpose of this thesis, we will consider those V S  where 0 < 
\\VS\\ < \\V\\ only.
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Preference Set
VPi - Vti Vl2 Vl3
VP2 — V21 V22 Vsa
VP3 — V31 V33
Preference Subset after Removal
VPi
VPz V23
VP3
Figure 5.4: Preference Subset with values removed
When a value within a DVP is removed from P , ordering will need to be main­
tained within the DVP. If the value were a maximal (minimal) value, then no 
work is to be done as the value is simply removed from the DVP, along with the 
preference operator following (preceding) it. If the value were to lie between the 
maximal or minimal values, however, then ordering is maintained by inferring the 
preference relation between its neighbours. In graph terms, if the value was part 
of a supernode of equally preferred values, that supernode’s preference relations 
remain unaltered. If the value was a single value with a prioritised ordering on 
either side of it, then the prioritised ordering would be inherited. For example, 
suppose we have DVP\ -  V\ k, v2  & V3  and v2  were to be removed, then the subset 
would be DVP\ = V1 &CV3 . Figure 5.5 shows each combination of preference relation 
around a value, and how the ordering is inherited in each case.
If all values within a single DVP were to be removed, then that attribute itself 
will be removed from the AP too. Ordering between Value Preferences will be 
maintained in the same way as for values within a DVP. An example of this is
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Preference Set
VPi Vn V12 vts
VP2 V22 V29
VP3 V3i V32 VM
Preference Subset after Removal
Figure 5.6: Preference Subset with attributes removed
5 . 2.4 M e a s u r i n g  P r e f e r e n c e  L o s s
Given the definitions of Preference Sets and Preference Subsets, and a set of meth­
ods that measure the preference information contained within each, then a way of 
measuring preference loss has been enabled -  comparing the preference information 
that is contained within V  to that released in the form of subsets.
If only one such subset were to be released to a vendor, the calculation of the 
amount of preference information released would be a simple matter of comparing 
the size of preference information in the Preference Subset released to that in the 
full Preference Set. That is,
|PS|
E  \\v p}\\
Preference L oss(P ,P5) =   (5.1)
E liv a ii
i=l
where [P\ and \PS\ are the numbers of Value Preferences in V  and V S  respectively, 
VP'- is a V P  6 V  with zero or more values removed, and || . || is a function as defined 
in Section 5.2.2.
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So, the privacy loss measure will be a numerical value between 0 and 1, where:
o 1 would indicate complete preference loss -  i.e. all preference information in 
V  was contained in VS.,
o 0 would indicate complete preference retention -  i.e. VS  was empty;
o values in between 1 and 0 would indicate that some amount of preference loss 
has occurred; the closer the value to zero, the less the amount of preference
In situations where multiple subsets are released, however, then measuring the 
preference information lost is a little more complicated, and can be split into two 
scenarios -  that in which the Vendor is unable to link together separate queries as 
having originated from the same source, and that where the vendor is able to do 
this. We term this linkability.
In the first of these scenarios, where the vendor is unable to fink together mul­
tiple queries as being from the same source (for example, if a technology such as 
Crowds was used, as discussed in Section 3.1.1.1), then each subset released would 
have its own separate measurement of preference loss as described above, while 
the preference loss as a whole could be effectively measured as being that of the 
largest measure of preference loss seen, usng the measure defined above. That is:
This is because the preference loss would not be cumulative, i.e. a vendor would 
only “know” the preference information given to it as being from that consumer on 
a per query basis. Not being able to link together multiple such sets of information 
renders them useful only separately.
In the second of these scenarios, where the vendor is able to link together queries 
as coming from the same source, preference loss as a whole could be effectively 
measured as that of the union of all subsets released. This is because the vendor 
could theoretically take each of the subsets released to it, connect them together, 
and form an overall picture of the preferences given all preference information 
included in each subset. Thus:
loss.
Preference Loss(V,VSi, ... ,VSk) = Max IK ^ill \\(vsk\\\\n... m
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Preference Loss(P, V S i , . . . ,  VSk) = ||(7’S 1u...u7\S*)ll
IMI
|(P5,u...uP5t)l
£  I l l ' l l
i* i__________
\v\
SllVPill
i=l
(5.3)
Note that techniques such as constructing “fake” queries to send to the vendor 
could be used in order to confuse the overall picture of the preferences that could 
be formed, however, tha t idea is not dealt with in this work.
5.2.5 P r e f e r e n c e  L o s s  a n d  P r iv a c y  L o s s
We have argued and identified in previous chapters that a technology designed to 
control the release of a consumer’s preferences to allow preference-enhanced search 
in e-commerce in a privacy aware manner is needed; since to protect privacy we 
need to protect (or control) the release of personal information. Information about 
one’s preferences -  i.e. one’s likes and dislikes -  are intuitively and obviously 
personal private information, and therefore equating preference loss to privacy 
loss is one seemingly meaningful approach of measuring privacy loss in the specific 
circumstances of preference searching.
As measures have been created tha t attem pt to measure such preference loss 
-  by assessing the amount of preference information within a Preference Set, and 
within a collection of Preference Subsets derived from this Preference Set and 
subsequently released to a Vendor -  then these measures can be used as a way of 
measuring privacy loss. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis:
Privacy Loss('P) = Preference Loss(P) (5.4)
Given the difficulties of coming to an agreement on what “privacy” means (as 
discussed in Chapter 2), the formulation of a general measure of privacy loss would 
be an incredibly complicated -  if not impossible -  task, and any solutions proposed 
would undoubtedly cause numerous disagreements amongst the community and 
would thus be less than useful. Thus we make no claims that the measure of
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privacy loss employed here is more generally useful -  or even particularly correct 
-  in these circumstances. However, it does seem a reasonable way to measure an 
aspect of privacy loss and therefore serves a useful purpose for our work.
5 .3  E x p l o it a t io n
The theoretical idea of preference exploitation of a consumer’s preferences was 
introduced in Chapter 4; there it was described as “a vendor making use of the 
information contained within a consumer’s preferences to their advantage, and 
potentially the consumer’s disadvantage” . In practice, this vendor would achieve 
this by first evaluating the consumer’s preference query against their set of stock 
creating a set of unexploited results, RSU. A process of exploitation would then 
occur, where RSU will be distorted (e.g. by the vendor removing items from it), 
before returning a set of exploited results, RSe, to the consumer.
5.3.1 M e a s u r in g  E x p l o i t a t i o n
In order to accurately measure the “amount” of exploitation that has taken place, 
access to both the unexploited and exploited result sets is necessary, so that a 
comparison can be drawn. Such a measure is necessary for the purposes of this 
thesis if it is to demonstrate th a t the G PR approach can help minimise preference 
exploitation. In the experiments we will assume tha t both axe available.
Access to both RSU and RSe gives the necessary input for measuring the dif­
ference between the two. Many possible metrics for the difference could be con­
structed. However, given tha t RSU and RSe can be viewed as simple mathematical 
sets, the notion of “relative complement” (or “set theoretic difference”) from math­
ematical set theory will be used.
The relative complement of RSe in RSU, or RSU \  RSe, is the set of items that 
exist in RSU but not RSe, i.e. RSU \  RSe = {x : x e RSU and x i RSe}. Clearly 
RSU \  RSe shows the set of items tha t have been removed from RSU due to the 
process of vendor exploitation. Examining the cardinality of that set, i.e. \RSU \  
RSe |, will give a simple measure of the amount exploitation that has occurred.
E x p lo ita t io n ^ ^ , RSe) = |RSU \  i?5e| (5.5)
For example, assume RSU = {1,2,3,4,5}, and the vendor removes items 1 and
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3, adding 6 and 7, to  create R S e = {2,4,5,6,7}. In this case, R SU \  R Se = {1,3}. 
and |R SU \  R S e\ = 2
This measure will thus return a positive integer value, k , where
o k = 0 indicates tha t there are no items in the unexploited result set that are 
absent from the exploited result set, and therefore the exploitation process 
did not remove anything;
o k > 0 indicates tha t k items are in the unexploited result set that are ab­
sent from the exploited result set, and therefore have been removed by the 
exploitation process. The higher the value of k , the more items have been 
removed, and the more exploitation has occurred.
The measure given above gives only a basic indication of the amount of ex­
ploitation tha t has occurred, as it does not, for example, give any indication as to 
the relative “quality” of items removed (e.g. taking into account whether it was 
the top most preferred item th a t was removed, or the least preferred item in the 
set). But this measure suffices for the purpose of testing our hypothesis in this 
thesis.
5 .4  G r a d u a l  P a r t i a l  R e le a s e
Now we introduce the Gradual Partial Release (GPR) method. The basic idea of 
GPR is tha t a consumer’s preferences are to be split into subsets and gradually 
released to a vendor. This process will involve four main areas:
o Preparing for GPR;
o Creation of a collection of Preference Subsets; 
o Gradual release of this collection (including stopping criteria); and 
o Post-processing of the results.
Each of these areas are discussed in turn  in the following.
5.4.1 P r e p a r i n g  f o r  G r a d u a l  P a r t ia l  R e l e a s e
Before the GPR process can be occur, the consumer’s preferences need eliciting, 
representing internally, and possibly modifying to ensure that GPR works correctly.
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5.4.1.1 Eliciting Preferences
In the proof of concept implementation, preferences will be stated directly within 
the system without a user interface. Preference Sets are built by expressing pre­
ferred values of attributes, stating the preference relationship between values, and 
finally stating the preference relation between the attributes themselves. This al­
lows complex preferences to be built up in an easy to use manner. This could 
potentially be extended into a visual metaphor able to be used by real world con­
sumers, given the development of a good UI.
5.4.1.2 Representing Preferences
Preferences are represented internally in the form of a graph, as previously dis­
cussed. This allows for easy traversal of a consumer’s preferences using well estab­
lish graph traversal techniques.
5.4.1.3 Establishing Completely Ordered Preferences
Given an arbitrary Preference Set, it can be seen that if constructed using the 
preference grammar previously introduced, P  must necessarily be fully defined. 
However, given a fully defined P, it can be seen that while it is possible for it to 
initially be completely ordered -  if the consumer used the prioritised accumulation 
operator (&) between every value specified in each DVP and between every at­
tribute pair -  it does not necessarily contain such an ordering. This lack of assured 
ordering may cause problems for GPR algorithms that require a definite preference 
ordering between any pair of values. To avoid encountering these ambiguities, P  
will be made completely ordered.
To completely order P, essentially, the partially directed graph of P  needs to 
be made directed -  i.e. all undirected edges within P, and its subgraphs, need to 
be made directed edges. A decision is needed on which direction an undirected 
edge should take. There are different ways this could be achieved; for example:
o A simple random process (the rationale being that if the consumer expressed 
no preference between a pair of values then it does not really matter how the 
order is imposed);
o A process whereby the value stated first by the consumer becomes the pre­
ferred value (the rationale being that since this value was stated by the con­
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sumer first, it is possible that it is slightly more preferred than the second. 
If not, then it does not really matter anyhow);
o A manual process of asking the consumer to impose an order; or
o If the agent is to attempt to build up an estimation of the vendor’s catalogue 
for the purpose of assessing exploitability, then using statistics from the 
estimated catalogue to decide which of the values is more likely to retrieve 
results. For example, if the amount of stock matching a preferred value of an 
attribute of “Make” matched five items while the amount of stock matching a 
preferred value of an attribute of “Memory” contained ten items, the optimal 
attribute to select as “most important” would be “Memory”, as releasing the 
values in this attribute is more likely to return more results.
The proof of concept implementation uses the second of these possibilities -  that 
of introducing a directed edge in the direction that the values were stated. Thus 
the first value will have an induced preference over the second. The algorithm used 
to do this is shown in Algorithm 5.1. Lines 2 to 10 induce an ordering in each DVP, 
first iterating through every DVP (line 2), then each value in each of these (line 
3); for every vertex (value) its edges are checked for directionality (line 5). If they 
are undirected, then that edge is converted into a directed edge, with the start 
vertex set as the current vertex and the end vertex the vertex at the other end of 
the edge (line 6). Lines 12 to 17 induce an ordering between all attributes that 
preferences were expressed over, and it works in a similar way, checking the edges 
between each Value Preference vertex, setting undirected edges to be directed.
5 .4 .2  Su b s e t  C r e a t io n
A Preference Subset, VS, of a consumer’s full Preference Set, V, represents a por­
tion of a consumer’s preferences. Which “parts” of V get placed into a particular V 
is the responsibility of what we have termed the Subset Creation Algorithm (SCA).
The SCA is required to create one or more preference subsets. This will enable 
single Preference Subsets to be released in turn by the agent until a sufficient 
amount of results have been received (as specified by the consumer) or until the 
collection of preference subsets is exhausted.
The creation and population of a Preference Subset is a non-trivial task. Firstly, 
it has the potential of making subsets of a wide variety of sizes, ranging from a 
single item from V  through to the whole of V. The size of the subset is influenced
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A lgorithm  5.1 Completely Ordering a Preference Set
Require: The consumer has expressed their preferences in the form of V
1 / /  First, induce order in each Discrete Value Preference’s subgraph
2 for all DVP  € V  do
3 for all value € D VP  do
4 for all edge connected to value do
5 if edge is undirected th en
6 Set edge is Directed
7 end if
8 end for
9 end for
10 end for
11 / /  Next, induce order between each Attribute
12 for all VP  e V  do
13 for all edge connected to V ?  do
14 if edge is undirected th en
15 Set edge is Directed
16 end if
17 end for
18 end for
by two separate things: how many VPs are included in the subset, and how many 
values per DVP are included in the subset.
Firstly, the fewer attributes that preferences are expressed over in the preference 
subset, the less preference information being released; thus it will minimise the 
privacy loss and chances of exploitation. However, it is relatively more likely to 
retrieve results from a search as its focus is lost (i.e. more items will potentially 
match the query), thus a collection of subsets with fewer attributes will likely 
require fewer subsets to be released. However, if the amount of results retrieved 
is greater than the amount requested by the consumer the agent will have to 
evaluate those results returned to calculate which of those n it should present to 
the consumer in order to avoid the problem of information overload that preference 
searching is meant to solve. Conversely, the more attributes that preferences are 
expressed over in the preference subset the more focused the query will become 
mitigating this issue -  but to the detriment of privacy loss and the chances for 
exploitation.
Secondly, the fewer items per DVP in the Preference Subset, the less preference 
information is being released. Thus, it will minimise the privacy loss and chances 
of exploitation. However, it is relatively less likely to retrieve results from a search 
as its range is very narrow; thus a collection of small subsets will likely require 
the release of many of them. This will increase the time taken for the process
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to occur. Conversely, a “larger” Preference Subset (i.e. containing many of the 
items from P), the greater the amount of preference information is being released 
-  thus probably needlessly compromising the privacy of the consumer whilst also 
increasing the chances of exploitation. On the other hand, it is relatively more 
likely to retrieve results for a search; thus a collection of large subsets will likely 
require the release of only a small amount of them. However, if amount of results 
retrieved is greater than the amount requested by the consumer the agent will have 
to evaluate those results returned to calculate which of those n it should present to 
the consumer in order to avoid the problem of information overload that preference 
searching is meant to solve.
Thus, the goal of a “good” SCA is to balance these issues and create a collection 
of Preference Subsets that will, when gradually released, try to achieve a balance 
between retrieving a set of results close to the optimal results (i.e. those that 
would be returned by an honest Vendor) and releasing the bare minimum amount 
of preference information necessary to achieve this.
Note that given the assumption stated in Section 5.2.2 that RVPs are considered 
to contain only a single piece of preference information, then they should be treated 
by an SCA in the same way that a DVP with only a single value stated would be. 
Thus a preference subset can either contain the RVP or not.
There are many possible approaches a SCA could take to create a collection 
of Preference Subsets. Three such approaches have been created for the purposes 
of this thesis that concretely illustrate some of the possibilities that a SCA can 
take and that demonstrate the basic GPR idea. The first approach (deemed the 
Highly Focused Subsets SCA) represents the “smallest” end of the preference subset 
scale: an SCA that creates many preference subsets of minimum size. The second 
approach (deemed the Single Query SCA) represents the “largest” end of the 
preference subset scale: an SCA that creates a single preference subset containing 
all of the consumer’s preferences. Finally, the third approach (deemed the Relax 
Down SCA) represents an example of an SCA that sits somewhere in the middle 
of the scale. Each of these are examined in detail next.
Note that no claims are made that any of these SC As are particularly efficient 
or particularly elegant; they simply demonstrate the range of possibilities that an 
SCA could take. More complex and clever SCAs can be imagined. For example, 
an SCA that could firstly estimate statistical properties about the stock database 
of the vendor (similar to methods employed to categorise the content of “hidden 
web” databases [94]) and then use this estimation to inform the way it creates
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subsets can be easily imagined -  although not easily implemented. Such work can 
clearly improve the model proposed in this thesis, and we suggest that these more 
advanced forms of subset creation and release should be explored in the future.
5.4.2.1 SCA - Highly Focused Subsets
The Highly Focused Subsets SCA is based on the idea that each subset should be as 
tightly focused as possible. Thus, for each individual preference subset sent to the 
vendor, both privacy loss and the chances of exploitation are minimised. However, 
it is likely that many subsets will have to be released to a vendor in order to retrieve 
enough results, since each search query will be relatively unlikely to return results. 
If the vendor is able to link together queries then this means this SCA is unlikely 
to reduce overall privacy loss by a great deal, but exploitation should be minimised 
if each separate query was evaluated separately, since minimising the amount of 
preference information released per subset reduces the potential for exploitation of 
that information. When the assumption is made that vendors cannot link together 
queries, both privacy loss and exploitation are minimised.
The approach taken by this SCA is that the Preference Subset Collection cre­
ated should contain Preference Subsets that sequentially attempt to find items 
with a gradually decreasing preference match; i.e. the first Preference Subset 
should search for an item that is the consumer’s “perfect” potential item (i.e. the 
item with characteristics that match the combination of the most preferred value 
of each attributes as specified by the consumer); the second Preference Subset 
should search for the second most preferred potential item (i.e. an item with the 
combination of the most preferred value for each attribute apart from the least im­
portant -  which should now have the second most preferred value), etc. When the 
least preferred value of that attribute is reached, the next least preferred attribute 
is iterated through in the same way, and the process starts again. This pattern 
will carry on until a Preference Subset is created containing the combination of the 
least preferred value from each attribute; this means that all possible combinations 
have been exhausted.
An algorithm to achieve this is presented as Algorithm 5.2. Lines 2 and 3 set 
up two arrays: currentPosition and maxPosition. The first of these represents 
a pointer to the position of the value of each attribute that should be released, 
the second represents how many values there are in each attribute. Lines 6 to 9 
then populate these arrays: the currentPosition array is populated entirely with
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the value “1” -  representing the most preferred value of each attribute -  while 
the maxPosition array is populated with the number of values present in each 
attribute of V. Next, lines 12 to 28 create all of the preference subsets, until the 
last possible combination of values is reached -  the least preferred value of each 
attribute. In this loop, line 13 creates a new V S , and lines 16 to 18 take the value 
at the current position pointer for each attribute and inserts them into the VS. 
The remainder of the work to be done is in setting up the position pointers ready 
for the next time around the loop. Lines 22 to 27 then iterate over each of the 
attributes, checking to see whether the position pointer has overflowed past the 
last value. If it has, lines 23 to 26 set the position pointer for that attribute back 
to “1” -  the most preferred value -  and shifts the position pointer to the next 
attribute. Finally, lines 31 to 35 insert the least preferred values of each attribute 
to create the final preference subset.
\p\
Generally, this SCA can create a collection up to ]""[ ||V\Pi|| Preference Subsets
i=1
-  potentially a very large amount for any non-trivially sized V. Each Preference 
Subset created will contain \V\ items of preference information. For example, sup­
pose a consumer expresses the following preferences: Make = Toyota k  Ford; 
Colour = Silver k  Black k  Red; Gears = Manual k  Automatic; and AP  = M akek  
Colour k  Gears. The Highly Focused Subsets SCA iterates through the Prefer­
ence Set as shown in Figure 5.7, and creates the corresponding queries shown in 
Figure 5.8.
5.4.2.2 SCA - Single Query
The Single Query SCA is based on the extreme possibility of minimising the 
amount of Preference Subsets created and sent -  to only send one containing 
essentially the consumer’s full preference set, V, but with all preference ordering 
information converted to a Pareto preference, so that when this is sent to the ven­
dor, the chances for exploitability are lessened as the vendor lacks vital preference 
information -  it will know which preferred values the consumer has specified, but 
not know which of these values are more preferred. However, the amount of pre­
ferred values released to the vendor is maximal in this approach. Thus, this SCA 
is more effective in combating exploitation than privacy loss.
The approach taken by this SCA is that the Preference Subset Colletion will 
only create one Preference Subset which will contain all values held in V, but with 
all values holding an equally preferred status. An algorithm that will create the
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A lgorithm  5.2 GPR SCA - Highly Focused Subsets 
1: / /  Create Arrays
2: Create array currentPosition[] with size \V\
3: Create array maxPosition[] with size \P\
4: .
5: / /  Populate Arrays with pointers to most preferred values 
6: for i = 1 to i = \P\ do {For each attribute in V}
7: currentPosition[i] <= 1 {Most preferred value of this attribute}
8: maxPosition[i] <= ||V\Pi|| {Amount of values in this attribute}
9: end for 
10: .
11: / /  Create Preference Subsets
12: w hile (currentPosition * maxPosition) do {While not at the least preferred 
element of each attribute}
13: Create new empty VS
14:
15: / /  Insert the values at current pointer positions into VS
16: for (i = 1 to i = \V\) do {For each attribute in P}
17: VPI, <= ^  * } ( current P osition  }
18: end for
19:
20: / /  Set current position pointer to next least preferred configuration, ready
for next VS
21: currentPosition[[P\\ + + {Increment current pointer of least important at­
tribute}
22: for i = \V\ to i = 1 do {For each attribute in V}
23: if currentPosition[i] > maxPosition[i] then  {If pointer for this attribute
has overflowed past least preferred value}
24: currentPosition[i] <= 1 {Go back to the start for this attribute}
25: currentPosition[i -  1] + + {Go to next value in the next attribute}
26: end if
27: end for
28: end w hile  
29: .
30: / /  Insert the values at final pointer positions into the final VS  
31: Create new empty V S  
32: .
33: for (i = 1 to i = \P\) do {For each attribute in V}
34: V P ' ,  <= V P { i }  {currentPosition}
35: end for ____________________
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Figure 5.7: HFS SCA - Iterative Process
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PS1: M ake -  Toyota, Colour = S ilver, Gears = Manual
PS2: M ake = Toyota , Colour = S ilver, Gears = Automatic
PS3: M ake  = Toyota, Colour = Black, Gears = Manual
PS4: M ake = Toyota, Colour = B lack, Gears = Automatic
PS5: M ake = Toyota, Colour = Red, Gears = Manual
PS6: Make = Toyota, Colour = Red, Gears = Automatic
PS7: M ake = Ford, Colour = S ilver, Gears = Manual
PS8: M ake = Ford , Colour = S ilver , Gears = Automatic
PS9: M ake = Ford , Colour = B lack , Gears = Manual
PS10.Make = Ford, Colour = Black, Gears = Automatic
PS11: M ake = Ford, Colour = Red, Gears = Manual
PS12: M ake = Ford, Colour = Red, Gears = Automatic
Note: For all of the Preference Subsets, A P = M ake & Colour & Gears
Figure 5.8: HFS SCA - Preference Subsets Created
PS1
j ^ ^ e j  ^ Toyota^}
Silver
Gears
Figure 5.9: SQ SCA - Iterative Process 
subset collection using this approach is shown in Algorithm 5.3.
A lgorithm  5.3 GPR SCA - Single Query 
1: Create new empty P«S 
2: .
3: / /  Insert all values of all attributes into P S  
4: for i = 1 to z = |P| do {For each attribute in P} 
5: for jf = 1 to j  = ||V\Pj|| do {For each value}
6; VP'j <= VPij {Add value to V P J
7: end for
8 : end for
This SCA will create a single Preference Subset. This Preference Subset will
|p|
contain ]r||DV\Pj|| items of preference information. For example, suppose a con-
i =1
sumer expresses a preference set as in the previous example. The Single Query 
SCA iterates through P  as shown in Figure 5.9, and creates the corresponding 
queries shown in Figure 5.10.
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PS1: Make = Toyota 0  Ford, Colour = Silver 0  Black 0 Red, Gears = Manual 0 
Automatic
Note: AP  = Make & Colour Sz Gears
Figure 5.10: SQ SCA - Preference Subsets Created
5.4.2.3 SCA - Relax Down
The Relax Down SCA sits somewhere in between the two extremes of the previous 
two SCAs. This starts with the absolute minimum amount of preference infor­
mation in a single Preference Subset (as per the first VS  created by the Highly 
Focused Subsets SCA), but then gradually relaxes the search criteria by adding a 
value at a time into the Preference Subset - i.e. it adds more and more preference 
information, in the order of less important preference values to most important 
preference values, into the subsequent subsets.
Since this approach is interested in finding the most preferred results for the 
consumer, then the first subset should aim to find an item that is the consumers 
ideal item, i.e. the most preferred value of each attribute. The second subset 
should aim to find the results of the first query, plus the next most desirable 
possibility for the consumer, i.e. the most preferred value from each attribute 
apart from the least preferred attribute, which should contain the first and second 
most preferred values. This will continue, until all values of the least preferred 
attribute are added, at which point the next least preferred attribute is relaxed by 
choosing its next value, and the process starts again. This pattern will carry on 
until a subset is created containing the all preferred values from all attributes.
An algorithm that will create subsets using this approach is presented as Al­
gorithm 5.4. Lines 2 and 3 create two pointers, currentAttr and currentValue, 
which combine to point to the location in V  that the algorithm has currently re­
laxed to. Since the algorithm starts out fully unrelaxed, at the consumer’s ideal 
item, then the initial values populated point to the first value of the last attribute. 
Next, a while loop between lines 6 and 39 creates the Preference Subsets, one at 
a time, until there are no more values to relax in V. In this loop, lines 10 to 30 
iterate through each attribute and inserts the correct values for that attribute into 
VS  -  only the first value if the attribute has yet to be relaxed (lines 13 to 15), the 
values up until the currentV alue pointer if the attribute is in the process of being 
relaxed (lines 18 to 22), and all values in the attribute if that attribute has already 
been fully relaxed (lines 25 to 29). Finally, lines 35 to 38 check to see whether the 
pointer is now pointing past the last value, and if it is it moves the pointer to the
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first value of the next attribute to relax.
A lgorithm  5.4 GPR SC A - Relax Down 
1: / /  Create pointers and populate inital values 
2: currentAttr <= \V\ {Start at the last Attribute}
3: currentValue <= 1 {Start at its first value}
4: .
5: / /  Create Preference Subsets
6: w hile currentAttr ± 0 do {While there are still attributes and values to relax} 
7: Create new empty VS
8 :
9: / /  Iterate through each attribute
10: for i = 1 to i = \P\ do {For each Attribute in V}
11:
12: / / I f  the attribute hasn’t yet been relaxed, only insert the first value
13: if currentAttr < i th en
14: VP', <= VP*
15: end if
16:
17: / / I f  the attribute is the one currently being relaxed, insert its values up
until the current position pointer 
18: if currentAttr = i th en
19: for j  = 1 to j  = currentValue do {For each relaxed value in VPi}
20: VPr <= VPij
21: end for
22: end if
23:
24: / / I f  the attribute has already been relaxed, insert all of its values
25: if currentAttr > i th en
26: for j  = 1 to j  = ||VPi|| do {For each value in VPi}
27: VPr <= VP^
28: end for
29: end if
30: end for
31:
32: / /  Relax the pointer ready by moving the pointer to the next value
33: currentV alue + +
34: / / I f  the pointer overflowed (is pointing past the last value) then move the
pointer to the first item of the next attribute 
35: if  currentValue > ||V^Pi|| then
36: currentValue <= 1
37: currentAttr —
38: end if
39: end w hile
\v\
This SCA will create up to ^ ||I^Pi|| Preference Subsets, and the size of the
i =1
Preference Subsets created will range from \P\ items of preference information in
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\ v \
the first subset, up to ^ ||V 'P i || items of preference information. For example,
i=l
suppose a consumer expresses a preference set as in the previous example. The 
Relax Down SC A iterates through V  as shown in Figure 5.11, and creates the 
corresponding queries shown in Figure 5.12.
PS1 PS2
(^Toyota^) j j w a t e j - - -  -Q o y o tt^ )----- » ^ F o n T ^
{^S itvaf^)-  a^ RatT^ ( ^ t v e r ^ ) -----^^Blacir^ -----
J jS e a n ^ J -- - - | J 3 e a r e j -  - ^ ManuaCh
PS3   PS4
|jA«aJ-- ^ Toyou^  .^ T )  -  -  -  ^ T oyo ta^  — »^ F o f d ^
Figure 5.11: RD SC A - Iterative Process
PS1: Make = Toyota, Colour = S ilver , Gears = Manual
PS2: Make = Toyota, Colour = S ilver, Gears = Manual k  Automatic
PS3: M ake = Toyota, Colour = Silver k  B lack, Gears = Manual k  Automatic
PS4: M ake = Toyota, Colour = Silver k  Black k  Red, Gears = Manual k
Automatic
PS5: M ake = Toyota k  Ford, Colour = Silver k  Black k  Red, Gears = Manual k  
Automatic
Note: A P  = M ake k  Colour k  Gears
Figure 5.12: RD SCA - Preference Subsets Created
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5.4.3 G r a d u a l  R e l e a s e  o f  S u b s e t s
Given that the agent has created a collection of Preference Subsets using a partic­
ular SCA, the next step is for these Preference Subsets to be gradually released to 
the vendor. The agent will do this, working its way from the first VS  to the last, 
stopping either when enough results are returned (as specified by the consumer) 
or when the last V S  has been released. An algorithm to achieve this is presented 
as Algorithm 5.5.
Algorithm  5.5 Gradually Releasing Preference Subsets 
Require: One or more PS  
Require: maxResults specified by Consumer 
1: / /  Initialise variable to keep track of amount of results fetched 
2: numResults <= 0 
3: .
4: while More PS  Available AND numResults < maxResults do {Still subsets 
and not enough results}
5: Release next PS  to vendor, get RS  back
6: numResults <= numResults + \RS\
7: end while
5.4.4 POST-PROCESSING OF RESULTS RECEIVED
At this point in the GPR process, the agent has now created a collection of Prefer­
ence Subsets to release, has released them, and has gathered the returned Result 
Set. The SCA will have attempted to ensure that the amount of results in that 
result set is equal to the number of results requested by the consumer, however, if 
the last query sent retrieved multiple items then it is possible that it could contain 
more. In this case, the agent will need to assess the Result Set w.r.t V, so that 
it can show the consumer only the amount of items they requested (so as to stop 
information overload).
Given that the Highly Focused Subsets SCA is essentially a brute-force method 
of calculating a preferred ordering of items, the agent can use the same algorithm 
to calculate the most preferred n items out of the p items in the Result Set. The 
use of this method does not represent a particularly efficient way of performing the 
necessary calculations, given the relative inefficiency of the HFS SCA; it should, 
however, produce the required results for the proof of concept implementation.
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5.5 Sum m ary
The idea of Gradual Partial Release of a consumer’s preferences to a vendor has 
been developed and detailed, and the specific aspects of how to achieve this idea 
have been discussed. In order to be able to describe the approach in full, a series 
of definitions necessary for describing various aspects of consumer, vendor, and 
preference searching was detailed. A series of measures was discussed that will 
enable the evaluation of the effectiveness of different GPR algorithms. Finally, 
three examples of GPR algorithms were detailed, including one which will emulate 
the results (but not the process) of the current paradigm of preference searching, in 
order to evaluate the relative effectiveness of the approach. These GPR algorithms 
are significant as they are the mechanism by which the release of a consumer’s 
preferences to enhance search can be controlled in a privacy aware manner.
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R e s u l t s  a n d  E v a l u a t io n
The Gradual Partial Release (GPR) approach to preference searching was de­
tailed in Chapter 5. This approach was implemented in the form of a proof of 
concept system; this was then used as the basis for a process of evaluation. This 
chapter presents the details of this evaluation firstly of the GPR approach as a 
whole, and secondly of the specific GPR algorithms in particular.
The evaluation process was split into two main areas. The first area looked at 
the overall effectiveness of the proposed GPR approach for preference searching 
(using all three GPR algorithms), examining how well it worked with respect to 
the main desired outcomes of reducing privacy loss and exploitation; including 
how this was affected by varying input. The second area looked at its efficiency, 
examining how the GPR approach (using all three GPR algorithms) worked in 
terms of speed, network traffic, and other quantitative measures.
This chapter first discusses the environment in which the experiments were 
performed, including how problem instances and test data were generated; this is 
followed by the results of the evaluation itself and conclusions consequently drawn.
6 .1  E x p e r im e n ta l  S e t u p
This section describes the various components of the setup used to perform exper­
iments aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of the GPR approach. This includes 
what is actually going to be tested, the data that is going to be used within the 
experiments, and the environment in which the experiments were performed.
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6 .1 .1  Overview  o f  E x p e r im e n t s
Analysis of the GPR approach was split into two main phases of experiments: 
firstly analysing the overall effectiveness of the GPR approach with regards to 
the main aims of the GPR approach (minimising privacy loss and exploitation); 
and secondly analysing how different types of input (i.e. differently sized and 
configured vendor catalogues and consumer preference sets) affect the effectiveness 
and efficiency of each of the GPR algorithms.
6 .1 .2  G eneration  of P r oblem  In sta n c es
When considering experiments designed to evaluate the GPR approach, there are 
two sets of data that must first be present: the consumer’s preferences, and the 
vendor’s catalogue. In all experiments both sets of data will be generated in order 
to exert complete control over statistical aspects of the data sets used and thus 
allow more meaningful evaluation to take place. Some discussion of how this data 
was generated is necessary before results are discussed, in order that the context 
of the results can be fully understood.
6.1.2.1 Generating the Vendor’s Catalogue
The first set of data necessary for each experiment is the vendor’s catalogue. Dur­
ing experiments, the structure of the vendor’s catalogue is as follows:
o An integer “ID” field. This will hold a unique identifier for each item in the 
catalogue, and will be the primary key of the table;
o A series of n integer fields, labelled “Attr_n”, where n is the number of 
attributes specified in each experiment; these fields will hold the values of 
each attribute describing each item in the catalogue; and
o A decimal “price” field. This will hold the price of each item in the catalogue.
The catalogue was configured in this way so as to be a representation of a com­
pletely generic vendor’s catalogue, with no bias from any specific type of attribute. 
A price field is included separately as an item’s price is represented in a decimal 
format in order to more closely match the real world.
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E xample  2
An example of what the structure of a vendor’s catalogue with 4 attribute fields 
specified is shown in the following table:
id AttrA Attr.2 A ttrS Attr-4 Price
When populating the table for each experiment, the following rules are used to 
create the values:
o For each of the main attribute fields, an integer value will be randomly cre­
ated between 1 and k , where k is the number of values per attribute as 
specified for each experiment. The method used to create this random value 
uses a uniform distribution or a normal distribution as required by the exper­
iment. The reason for using a uniform distribution is to create items in the 
catalogue representing a wide range of unbiased attribute information, while 
a normal distribution is used to evaluate whether the change in distribution 
changes the outcome of the experiment. If a normal distribution is used, the 
mean value is taken as k /2, with the standard deviation as k/6, ensuring a 
good spread of data between 1 and k.
o A decimal value will be randomly created for the price field between j  and 
k , where j  and k are the minimum and maximum price as specified for each 
experiment. The method used to create this random value uses either a uni­
form distribution or a normal distribution, as specified for each experiment. 
If a normal distribution is used, a mean value and standard deviation is also 
required as an input to the data generation method. The reason for using a 
uniform distribution is, as with the main attribute fields, to create items in 
the catalogue with a wide range of unbiased pricing information. Separately, 
using a normal distribution in a separate set of experiments will allow the 
evaluation to see if having items clustered around certain prices makes a 
difference in the effectiveness or efficiency of the GPR approach.
This generated data attempts to represent a highly generic catalogue of available 
items with no particular bias as to type of attribute that could possibly describe 
such items.
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E xample 3
An example of what an excerpt of a vendor’s catalogue with 4 attribute fields and 
3 values per attribute might look like is shown in the following table:
id Attr.l Attr.2 Attr.3 Attr-4 Price
35 1 2 1 3 £9,458
36 3 3 2 1 £7,209
37 3 2 3 3 £2,374
38 2 1 2 2 £8,093
6.1.2.2 Generating the Consumer’s Preferences
The second set of data necessary for each experiment is the consumer preference 
set that would be used to search the vendor’s catalogue. Preferences are spec­
ified over m  of the n attributes in the vendor’s catalogue, where m  is specified 
in each experiment. The values in each attribute chosen will be integers from 1 
to k, where k is the number of values per attribute specified in each experiment. 
Relative preferences between the items can all be expressed as prioritised relations 
(&). The values simply represent a subset of the values available in the vendor’s 
catalogue, and do not need a more complex generation method since the values 
these would correlate with in the vendor’s catalogue are already randomly gener­
ated; thus this will be sufficient for testing the effectiveness of the GPR approach. 
As for the preferred ordering within the preferences, recall that prior to any GPR 
process the consumer’s preferences will go through a process of having a complete 
order imposed upon them, as described in Section 5.4.1.3; thus whatever relative 
preferences are specified the preference set will end up being completely ordered 
anyway.
An example of what a preference set with 3 attribute fields and 4 values per 
attribute might look like is shown in Figure 6.1.
6.1.3 V e n d o r  E x p lo i t a t io n
In order to assess whether the GPR approach has minimised the amount of ex­
ploitation that could potentially occur, then the vendor in our experiments will 
need to attempt such exploitation where possible. A simple exploitation model 
has been used in all experiments -  the vendor is attempting to maximise profit by
98
6.2 E f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  G PR  A p p r o a c h
Figure 6.1: Example of Generated Preference Set
taking the original, unexploited result set, RSU that it calculates, and dropping 
20% of the items within that have the lowest prices.
6.1.4 E n v ir o n m e n t
The proof of concept software implementation was christened “PEEPS” -  Privacy 
Enabled Enhanced Preference Searching -  and was implemented in the Java pro­
gramming language. All java code implemented was written using Sun’s JRE 6.0 
specification.
All experiments with the software took place on the 64 bit Sun 1.6.0 (r4) JVM 
for Linux; this JVM in turn ran on a 64 bit RHEL 5.2 OS. The database that the 
Vendor Agent connected to to store its catalogue was MySQL v5.0.45, connecting 
to Java using the MySQL Connector/j 3.1, distributed by MySQL AB. The MySQL 
instance ran on the same machine as the JVM in order to lessen the effects of 
network latency when evaluating the software performance.
The hardware used to run these experiments on was one quad-core Intel Core2 
Extreme QX6700 (4x 2.66GHz cores with 8MB L2 cache), 4GB 800MHz DDR2 
memory, and a pair of 500GB E-SATA300 hard disks formatted with the XFS file 
system.
6.2 E f fe c t iv e n e ss  of  G P R  A pproach
The first phase of analysis aimed to understanding how well the GPR approach 
worked in general -  and the three GPR algorithms presented in Section 5.4.2 in
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particular -  perform with respect to the two main aims of minimising consumer 
privacy loss and exploitation. Comparisons were drawn between the GPR approach 
and the existing approach to preference searching as one of the GPR algorithms 
(the Single Query algorithm) was designed to mimic the outcomes of the existing 
approach.
6 .2 .1  O v e r v ie w  o f  E x p e r im e n t
A series of individual experiments were set up and performed, where for each 
experiment all variables (vendor catalogue size, number of attributes, etc) were 
created afresh using a randomising function, and a new set of test data (i.e. a 
vendor catalogue and a corresponding consumer preference set) was generated. 
These experiments were performed in two groups -  firstly with the random data 
generation method used to create the stock catalogue using a uniform distribution, 
and secondly using a normal distribution.
A benchmarking process was first run upon this set of test data which calculated 
the actual top 10 preferred results in the vendor’s catalogue w.r.t. the consumer’s 
preferences. Next, each GPR algorithm was then run which attempted to obtain 
the top 10 preferred results, where the vendor was using the simple exploitation 
algorithm previously discussed. For each algorithm the privacy loss and exploita­
tion that occurred was measured and recorded, along with the time taken and 
the amount of network traffic produced. 3000 of these separate experiments were 
performed for each of the two groups of experiments.
The reasoning behind this experimental design was to produce a set of results 
that could quantifiably demonstrate whether the GPR approach in general, and 
each GPR algorithm in particular, was able to reduce the levels of privacy loss 
and exploitation that would be seen if they were used as compared to the existing 
approach. The series of random scenarios created aimed to lessen any bias that 
may occur if the values of the variables were accidentally chosen such that they 
described a scenario particularly well suited for a particular algorithm. Using 
both a uniform then a normal distribution allows for evaluation as to whether the 
properties of the vendor’s catalogue change the effectivess of the GPR approach.
100
6.2 E f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  G PR  A p p r o a c h
6 .2 .2  E x pe r im e n t  D eta ils
In this first set of experiments, the random function used (the Apache Commons18 
RandomData19 java classes) used a uniform or a normal distribution to create the 
values that constrained the variables describing the experiment. The limits im­
posed upon each of the variables were chosen manually simply to enact restrictions 
around the process and were designed to enable a very wide range of possibilities. 
The limits were as follows:
o Vendor Catalogue parameters:
-  Database size: Random, between 1 and 250,000
-  Number of Attributes, n: Random, between 5 and 30
-  Number of Values per Attribute, k : Random, between 5 and 30
-  Price: Random, between £999.99 and £49,999.99
o Consumer Preference parameters:
-  Number of Attributes: Random, between 1 and n
-  Number of Values per Attributes: Random, between 1 and k
-  Number of items to fetch: 10
The test data generated to populate the vendor’s catalogue and consumer’s 
preferences to fit each experiment was created as discussed in Section 6T.2.
6.2.3 R e s u lts
Discussion of the results gathered when using a uniform distribution to generate 
the vendor’s catalogue while performing the series of experiments is split into the 
two main evaluative areas -  privacy loss and exploitation.
6.2.3.1 Privacy Loss
Table 6.1 shows the basic overall statistics of the privacy loss during the experi­
ments, Figure 6.2 graphs the mean privacy loss, and Figure 6.3 graphs the distri­
bution of privacy loss.
Note that Privacy Loss is measured as defined in Equation 5.2 in Section 5.2.4.
18http://commons.apache.org/
19 Package org. apache. commons. mat h. r andom
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Mean (Standard
Deviation)
Min Max Total Privacy 
Loss seen
GPR Approach 
(Highly Focused Subsets)
0.16 0.04 0.13 1 0.1% 
of experiments
GPR Approach 
(Relax Down)
0.26 0.16 0.13 1 0.2% 
of experiments
Existing Approach 
(Single Query)
1 0 1 1 100% 
of experiments
Table 6.1: Privacy Loss, uniformly distributed stock
Some degree of privacy loss occurred in 100% of experiments for all GPR algo­
rithms. This was as expected, since in order to perform any search enhanced with 
preferences, some degree of preference information has to be released.
Privacy L oss (Average) 
vs GPR algorithm
■  Highly Focused 
□  Relax Dawn
■  Single Query (Exist­
ing Approach)
Figure 6.2: Average Privacy Loss, uniformly distributed stock
The GPR algorithm that imitates the existing approach (the Single Query al­
gorithm) shows a consistent level of privacy loss of 1.0 in all experiments -  i.e. 
total privacy loss at all times. This was as expected, as this algorithm releases all 
preference information in the first (and only) query it sends.
The Highly Focused Subsets and Relax Down GPR algorithms, however, show 
a reduction in the level of privacy loss in almost all cases: the Highly Focused 
Subsets algorithm in around 99.9% of cases and the Relax Down algorithm showing 
a reduction in over 99.8% of cases. The Highly Focused Subsets algorithm was seen 
to generally reduce the amount of privacy loss to about one fifth of that of the 
existing approach; the Relax Down algorithm to between one quarter of that of 
the existing approach. This represents a significant reduction in privacy loss of the 
consumer’s preferences.
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The distribution seen for the Highly Focused Subsets algorithm is a result of the 
fact that it releases a preference subset containing an amount of preference infor­
mation that is equal to the amount of attributes that preferences were expressed 
over (it releases a single value per attribute). Thus the privacy loss seen is a direct 
proportion of this amount of information and the amount of values expressed in 
total in V.  Given the bounds established in these experiments for the random 
creation of a consumer’s preference set, this averages out to the figures shown in 
the graph of distribution. The distribution seen for the Relax Down algorithm is 
also affected similarly due to the way it creates the preference subsets.
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Privacy Loss
Figure 6.3: Distribution of Privacy Loss, uniformly distributed stock
Note that for normally distributed catalogue data similar patterns in the values 
and distribution of privacy loss were observed during experimentation, and are 
thus not detailed further here.
When compared with the existing approach, the two GPR algorithms that im­
plement the idea of the G PR approach demonstrably reduced the loss of preference 
information, and therefore privacy loss, of a consumer’s preferences as compared 
to the existing approach in the vast majority of experiments. The Highly Focused 
Subsets algorithm performed better by reducing the amount of privacy loss to 
a greater extent, managing to give away less than a quarter of the consumer s 
preferences at any one time; the Relax Down algorithm fared less well but still 
managed a reduction of privacy loss by generally giving away less than a half of 
the consumer’s preferences. This is as expected due to the manner in which the 
two algorithms work: the former sending very highly focused subsets all contain-
Distribution of Privacy Loss 
vs GPR algorithm
•  Highly Focused 
O Relax Down
Single Query (Existing
Approach)
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ing a minimum of preference information, while the latter gradually increases the 
amount of preference information released as it iterates through subsets. Thus, it 
has been demonstrated that the GPR approach has the potential to significantly 
reduce privacy loss as compared to the current approach, and that if a consumer 
wishes to maximise privacy loss the Highly Focused algorithm is the most effective.
6.2.3.2 Exploitation
Table 6.2 shows the basic overall statistics of exploitation during the experiments, 
Figure 6.4 graphs the mean exploitation, while Figure 6.5 graphs the distribution 
of exploitation.
Note that exploitation occurs as described in Section 6.1.3 and is measured 
according to Equation 5.5 in Section 5.3.1.
Mean (Standard
Deviation)
Min Max Exploitation
seen
GPR Approach 
(Highly Focused Subsets)
0.26 1.39 0 10 8.7% 
of experiments
GPR Approach 
(Relax Down)
0.92 2.54 0 10 26.9% 
of experiments
Existing Approach 
(Single Query)
1.38 2.88 0 10 33.3% 
of experiments
Table 6.2: Exploitation, uniformly distributed stock
Exploitation was seen in roughly one third of experiments where the stock 
catalogue data was uniformly distributed, and roughly two thirds where normally 
distributed. This difference will be due to the fact that a stock catalogue with 
normally distributed data will have groups of items with similar attribute values, 
thus for queries which find those groups of items exploitation will be easier to 
perform since the vendor has a wider choice of items it can remove from the result 
set.
The GPR algorithm that imitates the existing approach (the Single Query al­
gorithm) shows exploitation in all experiments where exploitation was seen by any 
algorithm. The average exploitation was measured at 1.38 (standard deviation of 
2.88) for uniformly distributed stock catalogue data, and 2.41 (standard deviation 
of 3.43) for normally distributed.
The algorithms that implement the new GPR approach, however, reduce ex­
ploitation in roughly 90% of experiments where the Highly Focused Subsets algo­
rithm is used, and roughly 30% of experiments where the Relax Down algorithm
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■  Highly Focused 
□  Re-lax Down
■  Single Query (Exist­
ing Approach)
Figure 6.4: Average Exploitation, uniformly distributed stock
is used against uniformly distributed stock data and 50% against normally dis­
tributed stock data. In fact, the Highly Focused Subsets algorithm completely 
eradicates exploitation in more than two thirds of experiments where it occurred 
with the existing approach; the Relax Down algorithm completely eradicated it 
in around 20%. In those cases where exploitation was not eradicated completely, 
it was reduced -  the Highly Focused Subsets algorithm significantly reducing the 
amount seen; and the Relax Down algorithm reducing it to a lesser, but demon­
strable, amount.
Distribution of Exploitation 
vs GPR algorithm
100%
H* Highly Focused 
O Relax Down 
Single Query (Existing 
Approach)
70% :
60%
&
10%
108 g6 750 2 3 41
Exploitation
Figure 6.5: Distribution of Exploitation, uniformly distributed stock 
When compared with the existing approach, the two GPR algorithms that im-
Exploitation (Average) 
vs GPR algorithm
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plement the idea of the GPR approach demonstrably reduce this type of exploita­
tion. As expected, the Highly Focused Subsets algorithm is shown to be more 
effective at this task than the Relax Down algorithm. Thus, it has been demon­
strated that the GPR approach has the potential to materially reduce this type of 
exploitation as compared to the current approach. Additionally, it appears that 
the Highly Focused Subsets algorithm was more effective at this task, due to the 
fact that highly focused preference subsets will, when released to the vendor, rep­
resent a highly focused search query that is likely to produce a minimum of results; 
and the less preference information given and therefore the less results that are 
returned, the less exploitation can occur.
6 .2 .4  Summary
The results presented in this section have shown that while it is by no means 
guaranteed that the GPR approach to preference searching will always reduce 
privacy loss and exploitation as compared to the current approach to preference 
searching, it has been demonstrated that it is likely to do so in the majority of 
cases -  and the amount of reduction seen can be significant.
Of the algorithms that implement the GPR approach, the Highly Focused Sub­
sets algorithm was shown to be most effective at reducing both privacy loss and 
exploitation, due to the method that algorithm employs in releasing preference in­
formation: sending highly focused subsets of preference information that minimise 
preference release and the chances for exploitation.
6.3 F urther  A nalysis of G P R  A pproach
After the first phase of analysis demonstrated that the GPR approach to pref­
erence searching has the potential to significantly reduce both privacy loss and 
exploitation of a consumer’s preferences in the series of random scenarios created, 
the second phase of analysis aimed to understand how varying the main available 
parameters of such scenarios affected both the effectiveness (i.e. how much re­
duction in privacy and exploitation occurred) and efficiency (i.e. the time taken 
and communications incurred) of each of the GPR algorithms. When looking at 
the effectiveness of the GPR approach, comparisons were drawn between the GPR 
approach and the existing approach to preference searching as one of the GPR 
algorithms (the Single Query algorithm) was designed to mimic the output of
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the existing approach. Such comparisons cannot, however, be drawn with regards 
efficiency since this algorithm does not mimic the actual computational implemen­
tation of the existing approach -  and is undoubtedly far less efficient than these 
relatively mature implementations. Given that this work is a proof of concept and 
makes no claims as the relative efficiency of the approach, however, this is not seen 
as an issue.
6.3.1 O v e r v ie w  o f  E x p e r i m e n t
A series of individual experiments were set up and performed. Fixed values for 
each of the five parameters (vendor catalogue size, number of attributes, etc) were 
chosen initially. Then, for each of these five parameters, the fixed values chosen for 
the other four parameters were used while the remaining one was varied from a low 
to a high number over a series of intervals. For each of the chosen intervals 1000 
experiments were performed, where for each a new set of test data (i.e. a vendor 
catalogue and a corresponding consumer preference set) was generated given the 
same values for the five parameters.
For each of these experiments, a benchmarking process was first run upon the set 
of test data which calculated the top 10 preferred results in the vendor’s catalogue 
w.r.t. the consumer’s preferences. Next, each GPR algorithm was then run which 
attempted to obtain the top 10 preferred results, where the vendor was using the 
simple exploitation algorithm previously discussed. For each algorithm the privacy 
loss and exploitation that occurred were measured and recorded, along with the 
time taken and the amount of network traffic produced.
The reasoning behind these experiments was to produce a set of results that 
quantifiably demonstrate how the effectiveness and efficiency of each of the GPR 
algorithms is effected given varying input. Varying a single variable at a time, 
while the others remained fixed makes the results seen to show this information, 
while running many experiments for each of the varied values chosen and taking 
average results across each series enables the results to be as unbiased as possible 
by any particular random sets of test data generated.
6.3.2 E x p e r im e n t  D e t a i l s
The fixed values chosen for the experiment parameters were as follows: a vendor 
catalogue size of 30,000, with a number of attributes of 15 and number of values 
per attribute of 15; a consumer preference set with a number of attributes of 5
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and a number of values per attribute of 5. These particular numbers were chosen 
as representing a scenario that is not too simple, somewhat realistic, and that the 
benchmarking process and all GPR algorithms can work through relatively quickly. 
The focus of this set of experiments is to understand trends that may emerge as 
parameter values vary, rather than looking at the actual numbers reported during 
the experiments. This means that any bias that may be present in the scenario 
that these parameter values describe should not be an issue.
The random function used a uniform distribution to create the values that con­
strained the values of the parameters describing the experiment. The variance of 
the parameters (minimum, maximum, and interval) were chosen manually to allow 
a range of values to be seen but that enable efficient evaluation. The parameter 
variance chosen were as follows:
o Vendor Catalogue parameters:
-  Database size: 10,000 to 100,000; intervals of 10,000
-  Number of Attributes, n: 5 to 24; intervals of 1
-  Number of Values per Attribute, k: 7 to 16, intervals of 1
o Consumer Preference parameters:
-  Number of Attributes: 1 to 10, increments of 1
-  Number of Values per Attributes: 5 to 14; increments of 1
For each of the parameter values, 1000 experiments were performed, where each 
experiment used a newly created set of test data using the same parameter values. 
Thus, 10,000 experiments were performed when varying the vendor’s catalogue 
size; 20,000 experiments when varying the number of attributes in the vendor’s 
catalogue; 10,000 experiments when varying the number of values per attribute in 
the vendor’s catalogue; 10,000 experiments when varying the number of attributes 
in the consumer’s preferences; and 10,000 experiments when varying the number 
of values per attribute in the consumer’s preferences.
The test data generated to populate the vendor’s catalogue and consumer s 
preferences to fit each experiment was created as previously discussed, using the 
uniform method when generating the vendor’s calogue. Note that only a single 
stock catalogue distribution was considered in order to keep the series of experi­
ments unbiased.
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6 .3 .3  R esu l t s
The results of this set of experiments are split into discussing the results of each 
of the parameters varied.
6.3.3.1 Varying Size of Vendor’s Catalogue
The first of the areas examined look at how the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
GPR algorithms is affected by the size of the vendor’s catalogue. Figures 6.6 - 6.7 
show how privacy loss and exploitation were affected as the size of the vendor’s 
catalogue changes, while Figures 6.8 - 6.10 show how runtime, number of queries 
generated, and communications traffic generated were consequently affected.
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Figure 6.6: Privacy Loss vs Size of Vendor’s Catalogue
With regards the privacy loss seen, the size of the vendor’s catalogue has no 
effect on the Highly Focused Subsets or Single Query GPR algorithms. This is as 
expected, since the former algorithm always creates queries of a fixed size relative 
only to the amount of attributes in the consumer’s preferences, while the latter 
algorithm always releases all preferences.
However, the privacy loss when using the Relax Down algorithm decreases as 
the size of the catalogue increases, since as the catalogue size increases the query 
selectivity increases, meaning the Relax Down algorithm will need to send less 
queries to retrieve the same amount of results: given that the algorithm works by 
making each subsequent query “bigger” , less queries means the last query will be 
smaller. When the vendor’s catalogue is sufficiently small the privacy loss should 
become total, like that of the Single Query algorithm (and therefore the existing
V  * Highly Focused 
V Relax Down 
♦  Single Query (Existing 
Approach)
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approach), since it will ultimately need to create a query containing all preferences; 
whereas when the vendor’s catalogue is sufficiently large the privacy loss should 
become minimal, like that of the Highly Focused Subsets algorithm, since the first 
query containing just a single value per attribute within the consumer’s preferences 
should retrieve the desired amount of results. The implication of this is that the 
larger the amount of items a particular vendor has available, the smaller the privacy 
loss that should occur when using this algorithm.
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Figure 6.7: Exploitation vs Size of Vendor’s Catalogue
With regards exploitation, the size of the vendor’s catalogue has little effect. 
This is as expected since exploitations act purely upon the consumer’s preferences: 
the information within the vendor’s catalogue has no bearing on this.
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Figure 6.8: Runtime vs Size of Vendor’s Catalogue
Looking at the efficiency measures, the results show that varying the amount of 
items in the vendor’s catalogue only appreciably affects the runtime of the Highly
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Figure 6.9: Queries vs Size of Vendor’s Catalogue
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Figure 6.10: Network Traffic vs Size of Vendor’s Catalogue
Focused Subsets algorithm, which shows a gradual decrease with an exponential 
trend. This is due to the fact tha t the number of queries sent by the Highly 
Focused Subsets G PR algorithm is seen to increase exponentially as the number of 
items (and therefore query selectivity) decreases, since the likelihood that a single 
very focused query will find matching items in the vendor’s catalogue decreases 
as the amount of items decreases. The network traffic for this algorithm follows 
this trend, as each query and response generates network traffic. The implications 
here are that when the query selectivity is low, the Highly Focused Subsets GPR 
algorithm may generate an undesirably large amount of queries. The other GPR 
algorithms show no such issues.
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6.3.3.2 Varying Num ber of A ttributes in Vendor’s Catalogue
The second of the areas examined looks at how the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the GPR algorithms is affected by the number of attributes describing items in 
the vendor’s catalogue. Figures 6.11 - 6.12 show how privacy loss and exploita­
tion were affected as the number of attributes in the vendor’s catalogue changes, 
while Figures 6.13 - 6.15 show how runtime, number of queries generated, and 
communications traffic generated were consequently affected.
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Figure 6.11: Privacy Loss vs Attributes in Vendor’s Catalogue
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Figure 6.12: Exploitation vs Attributes in Vendor’s Catalogue
Neither privacy loss nor exploitation are affected by the size of the vendor’s 
catalogue; all values seen remain fairly constant with no trend emerging. This is
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as expected as only the attributes relevant to the consumer’s preferences should 
have any effect on any part of the preference searching process, so adding more 
attributes while keeping the consumer preferences static will not have any effect 
on the GPR process, whichever algorithm is used.
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Figure 6.13: Runtime vs Attributes in Vendor’s Catalogue
Number of Queries
200 
180 I 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
80 
40 
20
» » »
*  Highly Focused 
V Relax Down 
Single Query
v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Attributes
Figure 6.14: Queries vs Attributes in Vendor’s Catalogue
Looking at the efficiency measures, the results show that varying the number 
of attributes in the vendor’s catalogue does not appreciably affect the runtime, 
network traffic, or number of queries generated by any of the GPR algorithms. The 
slight gradual increase seen in network traffic of the Single Query GPR algorithm 
is simply due to the fact tha t the size of the results returned will increase as there 
is more information to return to the consumer.
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Figure 6.15: Network Traffic vs Attributes in Vendor’s Catalogue
6.3.3.3 Varying Num ber of Values per A ttribute in Vendor’s Cata­
logue
The third of the areas examined looks at how the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
GPR algorithms is affected by the number of values in each attribute describing 
items in the vendor’s catalogue. Figures 6.16 - 6.17 show how privacy loss and 
exploitation were affected as the number of values per attribute in the vendor’s 
catalogue changes, while Figures 6.18 - 6.20 show how runtime, number of queries 
generated, and communications traffic generated were consequently affected.
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Figure 6.16: Privacy Loss vs Values per Attribute in Vendor’s Catalogue 
W ith regards the privacy loss seen, the number of values per attribute in the
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vendor’s catalogue has no affect for the Highly Focused Subsets or Single Query 
GPR algorithms. This is as expected, since the former algorithm always creates 
queries of a fixed size relative to the amount of attributes in the consumer’s pref­
erences, while the latter algorithm always releases all preferences.
However, the privacy loss when using the Relax Down algorithm increases as 
the number of values per attribute increases, since as this parameter increases the 
chances that any query finds results decreases, meaning the Relax Down algorithm 
will need to send more queries: given that the algorithm works by making each 
subsequent query “bigger” , more queries means the last query sent will be relatively 
larger. When the vendor’s catalogue has a sufficiently large number of values 
per attribute the privacy loss should become total, like that of the Single Query 
algorithm (and therefore the existing approach), since it will need to create a query 
containing all preferences; whereas when the vendor’s catalogue has a sufficiently 
small number of values per attribute the privacy loss should become minimal, like 
that of the Highly Focused Subsets algorithm, since the first query containing just 
a single value per attribute within the consumer’s preferences should retrieve the 
desired amount of results. The implication of this is that if using the Relax Down 
algorithm, the wider the range of items available from the vendor, the more the 
privacy loss seen is likely to be.
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Figure 6.17: Exploitation vs Values per Attribute in Vendor’s Catalogue
With regards exploitation, the number of values per attribute in the vendor’s 
catalogue has no effect. This is as expected as only the attributes relevant to 
the consumer’s preferences should have any effect on any part of the preference 
searching process, so adding more values per attributes while keeping the consumer
115
6.3 F u r t h e r  A n a l y s is  o f  G P R  A p p r o a c h
preferences static will not have any effect on the GPR process, whichever algorithm 
is used.
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Figure 6.18: Runtime vs Values per Attribute in Vendor’s Catalogue
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Figure 6.19: Queries vs Values per Attribute in Vendor’s Catalogue
Looking at the efficiency measures, the results show a number of interesting 
things. The time taken for the Single Query algorithm becomes very large as it 
approaches the number of values per attribute in the consumer’s preferences; this 
is because the single query sent will match more and more items in the vendor’s 
catalogue, and therefore the time taken for the query evaluation in the database 
and the amount of post-processing of the results by the agent to select the most 
preferred n items increases. This is shown in the amount of network traffic seen 
for this algorithm - the larger the result set returned, the more traffic is seen. The
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Figure 6.20: Network Traffic vs Values per Attribute in Vendor’s Catalogue
time taken for the Relax Down algorithm is fairly static, on the other hand, whilst 
the time taken for the Highly Focused Subsets algorithm increases gradually as this 
particular parameter increases; this is due to the fact that each of its queries will 
become less likely to find matching items, and therefore more queries will be sent 
-  a process that will take increasing amounts of time (and also network traffic).
6.3.3.4 Varying Num ber of A ttribu tes in Consumer’s Preferences
The fourth of the areas examined looks at how the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the GPR algorithms is affected by the number of attributes in the consumer’s pref­
erences. Figures 6.21 - 6.22 show how privacy loss and exploitation were affected 
as the number of attributes in the consumer’s preferences changes, while Figures 
6.23 - 6.25 show how runtime, number of queries generated, and communications 
traffic generated were consequently affected.
With regards the privacy loss seen, the number of attributes in the consumer’s 
preference has no affect for the Highly Focused Subsets or Single Query GPR algo­
rithms. This is as expected, since the former algorithm will always send preference 
subsets of a fixed size relative to the number of values per attribute -  not the 
number of attributes -  while the latter algorithm always releases all preferences. 
Thus, the number of attributes in the consumer’s preferences has no bearing on 
this.
However, the privacy loss when using the Relax Down algorithm increases as 
the number of attributes increases, since as this increases the chances that any
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Figure 6.21: Privacy Loss vs Attributes in Consumer’s Preferences
query finds results decreases, meaning the Relax Down algorithm will need to send 
more queries: given that the algorithm works by making each subsequent query 
“bigger” (adding more and more of the preferred values), more queries means the 
last query will be relatively larger. When the vendor’s catalogue has a sufficiently 
large number of values per attribute the privacy loss should become total, like 
that of the Single Query algorithm (and therefore the existing approach), since it 
will need to create a query containing all preferences; whereas when the vendor’s 
catalogue has a sufficiently small number of values per attribute the privacy loss 
should become minimal, like that of the Highly Focused Subsets algorithm, since 
the first query containing just a single value per attribute within the consumer s 
preferences should retrieve the desired amount of results. The implication of this 
is that if the consumer is using the Relax Down algorithm, the more attributes 
they express preferences over, the more potential for privacy loss there will be.
With regards exploitation, the amount seen for the Single Query and Relax 
Down algorithms increases as the amount of attributes in the consumer s prefer­
ences increases; due to the fact that there is more information for the vendor to 
exploit. The trend seen for the Highly Focused Subsets algorithm is very interest­
ing. There is no exploitation seen for small amounts of attributes, since there is 
very little preference information sent and therefore very little information to ex­
ploit; conversely, there is no exploitation seen for large amounts of attributes, since 
the queries created are so targeted that they are also hard to exploit. However, in 
between these values lies a very specific area where exploitation is possible and is 
seen; this level is just where the first query sent becomes sufficiently targeted that
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Figure 6.22: Exploitation vs Attributes in Consumer’s Preferences
it stops retrieving more than the n results requested and multiple queries have to 
be sent.
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Figure 6.23: Runtime vs Attributes in Consumer’s Preferences
Looking at the efficiency measures, it can be seen that the Single Query algo­
rithm takes a large time to run when a consumer expresses preferences over only a 
small amount of attributes; this is because the single query sent will match many 
items in the vendor’s catalogue, and therefore the time taken for the query eval­
uation in the database and the amount of post-processing of the results by the 
agent to select the most preferred n items increases. This is shown in the amount 
of network traffic seen for this algorithm - the larger the result set returned, the 
more traffic is seen. The time taken for the Relax Down algorithm is fairly static,
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Figure 6.24: Queries vs Attributes in Consumer’s Preferences
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Figure 6.25: Network Traffic vs Attributes in Consumer’s Preferences
on the other hand, whilst the time taken for the Highly Focused Subsets algorithm 
increases gradually as this particular parameter increases; this is due to the fact 
that each of its queries will become less likely to find matching items, and therefore 
more queries will be sent -  a process that will take increasing amounts of time (and 
also network traffic).
6.3.3.5 Varying Num ber of Values per A ttribute in Consum er’s Pref­
erences
The fifth and final of the areas examined looks at how the effectiveness and effi­
ciency of the GPR algorithms is affected by the number of values in each attribute
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of the consumer’s preferences. Figures 6.26 - 6.27 show how privacy loss and ex­
ploitation were affected as the number of values per attribute in the consumer’s 
preferences changes, while Figures 6.28 - 6.30 show how runtime, number of queries 
generated, and communications traffic generated were consequently affected.
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Figure 6.26: Privacy Loss vs Values per A ttribute in Consumer’s Preferences
With regards the privacy loss seen, the number of values per attribute in the 
consumer’s preferences has no affect for the Single Query GPR algorithm. This is 
as expected, since it always releases all preferences. Thus, the number of values 
per attribute in the consumer’s preferences has no bearing on this.
However, the privacy loss seen when using the Highly Focused Subsets or Relax 
Down GPR algorithms decreases as the number of values per attribute in the 
consumer’s preferences increases, since for both algorithms a larger amount of these 
values means tha t a query containing a certain amount of preferences represents 
a smaller proportion of the overall amount of preferences. The implication of this 
is that if the consumer expresses preferences over larger amounts of values for a 
given number of preferences, the relative privacy loss seen is likely to be less. This 
does not mean tha t less preference information will be released -  just tha t the 
amount of preference information released as compared to the amount specified 
will decrease.
With regards exploitation, the number of values per attribute in the consumer’s 
preferences has no real effect. This, for the Highly Focused Subsets and Relax 
Down algorithms, is as expected -  since these algorithms split up a consumer’s 
preferences and release the values gradually, minimising the chances of exploita­
tion. For the Single Query algorithm, however, this result is counter intuitive -  it
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Figure 6.27: Exploitation vs Values per Attribute in Consumer’s Preferences
would seem tha t the more information there was to exploit, the more exploitation 
would occur. Looking in more detail at the results, however, it is clear that this 
trend is seen because the single query released finds a minimum of many hun­
dreds of results, and given the type of exploitation configured at the vendor, this 
exploitation is unlikely to  remove items tha t happen to be in the list of top 10 
most preferred. Given a set of preferences and a vendor’s catalogue where the 
single query released find a number of results close to the amount requested by 
the consumer, however, a trend of exploitation increasing in line with increasing 
values per attribute would be expected.
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Figure 6.28: Runtime vs Values per A ttribute in Consumer’s Preferences 
Looking at the efficiency measures, the results show that as the amount of values
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Figure 6.30: Network Traffic vs Values per A ttribute in Consumer’s Preferences
per attribute in the consumer’s preferences increases, the run time of each of the 
algorithms increases. For the Single Query algorithm; this is because the single 
query sent will match many items in the vendor’s catalogue, and therefore the time 
taken for the query evaluation in the database and the amount of post-processing 
of the results by the agent to select the most preferred n items increases. This is 
shown in the amount of network traffic seen for this algorithm - the larger the result 
set returned, the more traffic is seen. The time taken for the Relax Down algorithm 
is fairly static, on the other hand, whilst the time taken for the Highly Focused 
Subsets algorithm increases gradually as this particular parameter increases; this 
is due to the fact th a t the implementation of GPR pre-creates all subsets before 
it starts to gradually release them — and the more values per attribute in the
123
6.4 S um m ary
consumer’s preferences, the more subsets will be created by the Highly Focused 
Subsets algorithm.
6 .4  S u m m a r y
This chapter has detailed the evaluation process that was undertaken; this was de­
signed to allow an evaluation of whether the techniques and technology developed 
in this work (the GPR process) achieved the goal it set out to achieve -  to allow 
preference-enhanced search in a privacy aware manner.
In the first set of experiments, the overall effectiveness of the GPR approach 
was examined; the experiments showed that, as compared to the existing approach, 
the GPR approach reduced privacy loss in almost all cases (99.9% for the Highly 
Focused Subsets GPR algorithm and 99.8% for the Relax Down GPR algorithm) 
and by a significant degree (by roughly four fifths and three quarters). It also 
demonstrably reduced exploitation (in 90% and 30% of cases where exploitation 
was seen in the existing approach), and to a significant degree (by 80% and 33%). 
In the second set of experiments, the performance of each GPR algorithm was 
examined in more detail by varying different properties of the consumer’s prefer­
ences and vendor’s catalogue and analysing how both effectiveness and efficiency 
were affected. Of the three algorithms, the Relax Down GPR algorithm is the 
most preferred method to use, since it best balanced the competing requirements 
of both reducing privacy loss and exploitation and being relatively efficient. The 
Highly Focussed Subsets GPR algorithm is best in terms of reducing privacy loss 
and exploitation where efficiency is not a factor.
Thus, the evaluation demonstrated that the GPR approach to preference search­
ing can reduce both privacy loss and exploitation with no penalty in terms of 
achieving the goal of retrieving the most preferred results with respect to the 
consumer’s preferences, and has thus demonstrated that the proposed alternative 
approach to preference searching in e-commerce has merit.
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C h a p t e r  7
C o nclusions
In this final chapter, we summarise the research carried out in this thesis, high­
lighting the major contributions from this work and areas where further work is 
deemed necessary.
7 .1  P r iv a c y  in  t h e  In f o r m a t io n  A g e
Privacy is a concept which has intrigued society and inspired heated debate through­
out the whole course of civilisation. Methods used for the protection of privacy 
have changed through the ages as new thinking and new technologies have altered 
the perception of privacy and the ways in which it can be lost. The age in which 
we currently find ourselves is often called the “information age”, and this is an 
age characterised by extreme amounts of information being available about people 
-  much of it likely to be considered as “private” by the individuals concerned -  
at the click of a mouse button. Information itself has become valuable, and in­
formation about people even more so. Unfortunately, the information age is an 
age where an individual can unwittingly lose control of this valuable information 
about themselves, and the legal methods typically employed to protect privacy 
in recent decades axe struggling to keep up. Given the “greased” nature of such 
information, once control of it has been lost by the individual it is pretty much 
impossible to get back. Thus, technologies that strive to place the control of the 
release of this information in the hands of the consumer, including those for sup­
porting e-commerce applications and activities, are needed to protect privacy in 
the information age.
125
7.2 P r e f e r e n c e  S ea r c h in g
7.2 P r e f e r e n c e  S e a r c h i n g
The concept of using a consumer’s preferences to help enhance their e-commerce 
experience through personalisation is one that has attracted increasing attention 
from the research community in recent years. One specific area of work has been 
in the use of a consumer’s preferences to help enhance search techniques.
“Standard” search techniques simply allow a consumer to express keywords that 
they wish to search for; this often results in either empty result sets (if the key­
words expressed defined too narrow a query for the stock catalogue being searched 
resulting in no items being found) or information overload (if the keywords ex­
pressed defined too wide a query resulting in an unwieldily large amount of items 
being found). Preference Searching has been proposed as a way of solving this 
problem. The basic idea is that instead of issuing queries containing hard con­
straints, a query is constructed to contain soft preferences. The model used in 
all current implementations of this idea is for a consumer to release all of their 
preference information to the vendor to enable this.
However, the release of this preference information to a vendor means a loss of 
privacy and the potential for exploitation. A loss of privacy is obvious in this case 
and is caused by the fact that the consumer is required to release private personal 
information to a vendor. The release of this information also presents chances for 
exploitation -  the possibility that the vendor can take this preference information 
and inject their own preferences, distorting the result set to their advantage -  
and the consumer’s disadvantage -  in a manner transparent to the consumer. All 
current approaches to preference searching are based on this model, so all suffer 
this issue.
This research proposed an alternative, consumer-centric, approach to the prob­
lem of preference searching. It shifts the computation involved in using preferences 
to enhance search from the vendor side to the consumer side. The consumer has an 
agent working on their behalf that enables preference searching through the release 
of portions of the consumer’s preferences in a carefully controlled manner that aims 
to retrieve preferred results. This approach allows a set of most preferred items 
to be calculated whilst also minimising firstly privacy loss by only releasing those 
parts of the consumer’s preferences necessary to find their most preferred items; 
and secondly the chances of exploitation by minimising the amount of preference 
information available for the vendor to exploit.
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To support the proposed alternative approach to preference searching, measures 
are required that allow the quantification of private information contained within 
preferences and to assess the loss of it during the release process. To the best of 
our knowledge, no such measures currently exist, specifically quantifying preference 
privacy. In this work we attempted to take a step forward in this area by proposing 
two measures.
One method of viewing privacy loss of a consumer’s preferences is to think of it 
as a function of how much preference information is released to the vendor relative 
to how much exists. Our measure of privacy loss is based on this observation, 
and produces a numerical indication of how much privacy has been lost that takes 
into account how much preference information has been released to a vendor. The 
proposed measure is relatively simple, but is adequate for the purposes of proving 
our concept. Constructing more generally applicable measures of privacy loss in 
this context can be an interesting area of future work.
Exploitation, on the other hand, is a conceptually simpler problem. The amount 
of exploitation of a set of results is essentially a function of how much that set of 
results has been distorted by the vendor for their own purposes. Thus, constructing 
a measure of exploitation is a matter of measuring the difference between the result 
set that should have been sent to the consumer, and the result set that was sent 
to the consumer. We propose a measure of exploitation that produces a numerical 
indication of how much exploitation has occurred that is based on to the cardinality 
of the difference between the two sets. Again, this is a relatively simple way of 
measuring exploitation, but sufficient for the purposes of verifying the hypothesis of 
t his work. Measures considering more complex exploitation models (e.g. relaxing 
the unlinkability assumption, or assuming that the vendor is able to use data 
m ining to establish consumer preferences) are worth investigating in the future.
7 .4  G r a d u a l  P a r t ia l  R e l e a s e
A major contribution of this work is a proof of concept implementation of the 
proposed consumer-centric model, called Gradual Partial Release. This imple­
mentation aimed to achieve the goals of the new model by taking a consumer’s 
preferences, splitting this up into subsets of these preferences, and releasing the 
subsets until the amount of results specified by the consumer are returned.
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Implementing GPR involved several major areas of work. Firstly, a basic pref­
erence framework was required, in order that preferences could be expressed into 
the system. A preference framework, built on some existing work, was introduced. 
This allowed preferred values, or a range of values, to be expressed across multiple 
attributes. This framework has a limited expressive power in terms of the variety 
of preferences that it can represent, but it allowed us to verify our hypothesis. 
Integrating the GPR approach with a more complex and expressive preference 
framework is viewed as the next stage of work for this approach.
Once preferences have been expressed, they need splitting into subsets of prefer­
ences. This thesis presented three such algorithms. One essentially duplicated the 
manner in which the existing approach works by releasing a single subset contain­
ing all preferences; this was to allow comparison between the existing approach 
and the new approach. A second algorithm aimed to retrieve preferred results in a 
privacy-preserving and exploitation-reducing manner by sending subsets that were 
as highly focussed as possible. However, while each subset released contains only 
a small amount of information, many subsets may need to be released in a highly 
inefficient manner. A third algorithm took this idea and attempted to make it 
more efficient by starting out with a subset that was as highly focused as possible; 
preferences were then added one at a time to subsequent subsets in order to balance 
privacy loss and exploitation while finding preferred results in an efficient manner. 
More advanced algorithms are possible further work, and could include ideas such 
as first using query probing techniques to estimate a vendor’s catalogue in order 
to target subsets such that they are more likely to retrieve preferred results.
7 .5  C o n c lu d in g  R em a rk s
Privacy is an important human value that should be protected wherever possible. 
An area of active research where this is not currently being achieved is that of using 
a consumer’s private preference information to enhance the search process in e- 
commerce. In this work we have we proposed an alternate approach to preference 
searching, called Gradual Partial Release, along with methods that implement this 
approach. Our experiments confirmed that the approach is effective — in terms of 
finding a set of preferred results while reducing privacy loss and exploitation. We 
therefore believe that GPR represents a promising way forward in reducing privacy 
loss and exploitation while achieving the goal of preference-enhanced searching in 
e-commerce.
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